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THE PUBLIC, THE PRIVATE AND THE
CORPORATION
PAUL N. Cox*
PREFACE
It has been argued that there is in the 1990's a crisis in corporate
law.' The alleged crisis arises from competing claims about normative
foundations.2 The antagonists in this competition are said to be
contractarians, represented by legal economists of a broadly neoclassical
variety, and communitarians.3
There may be a crisis, or at least, a substantial debate, in corporate
law theory.4 It is questionable that there is a crisis in corporate law, in
* Professor of Law, and Paul Beam Fellow (1996), Indiana University School of Law,
Indianapolis. Professor Cox received his B.S. in 1971 from Utah State University, his J.D. in
1974 from the University of Utah, and his L.L.M. in 1980, from the University of Virginia.
This article represents an effort to work out, at least to this writer's temporary satisfaction,
a contradiction, consisting for him of the simultaneous attractions of contractarian and anti-
contractarian thought in approaching the corporation. Some readers will be disappointed to
find that the resolution favors a contractarian pole. Nevertheless, I wish to thank William
Bratton and Lyman Johnson, whose writing and correspondence forced me into this effort.
My disagreement with them does not diminish my admiration for their work.
1. David Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373 (1993) [hereinafter Millon, Crisis]. The contractarian/-
communitarian dichotomy is also suggested by Ronald Daniel, Stakeholders and Takeovers:
Can Contractarianism Be Compassionate?, 43 U. TORONTO L. J. 315 (1993) and by Michael
DeBow & Dwight Lee, Shareholders, Non-shareholders and Corporate Law: Communitar-
ianism and Resource Allocation, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 393 (1993).
2. Millon, Crisis, supra note 1, at 1373.
3. Id. at 1377-83.
4. The contractarian position, said by communitarians to constitute the dominant
paradigm, is most prominently articulated in FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991). It is defended, for example, in DeBow
& Lee, supra note 1; Stephen Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization
Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423 (1993); Henry N. Butler
& Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians,
65 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990); Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11
GEO. MASON L. REV., Summer 1989, at 99 [hereinafter Butler, The Contractual Theory of the
Corporation]. The communitarian position is most prominently and consistently articulated
by Professor David Millon and Professor Lyman Johnson. See, e.g., Lyman Johnson, The
Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Law, 68 TEX. L. REV. 865 (1990)
[hereinafter Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Law]; Lyman
Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty in the Corporate Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
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part because it is doubtful that academic debates about the nature of the
corporation directly determine concrete questions of corporate law.5
Still, the current debate reflects and seeks to systematize underlying
tensions in both doctrine and practice and is therefore perhaps useful as
a means of identifying the implications of these tensions. It is not to be
expected, and, perhaps, not to be hoped that the debate will resolve
these tensions, particularly if resolution requires a doctrinal victory for
one or the other side in the debate. It is not to be expected because the
current debate is merely another chapter in a long history of the tension
2215 (1992) [hereinafter Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty]; David Millon,
Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L. J. 201; David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law,
24 IND. L. REV. 223 (1991) [hereinafter Millon, Redefining Corporate Law]; Lyman Johnson
& David Millon, The Case Beyond Time, 45 Bus. LAW 2105 (1990). Professor Lawrence
Mitchell's work also prominently reflects communitarian themes. E.g., PROGRESSIVE
CORPORATE LAW, NEW PERSPECTIVES ON LAW, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY (Lawrence E.
Mitchell ed., 1995); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Cult of Efficiency, 71 TEx. L. REV. 217 (1992)
[hereinafter Mitchell, Cult of Efficiency]; Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Critical Look at Corporate
Governance, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1263 (1992).
David Millon has published a useful bibliography of "Communitarian Corporate Law
Scholarship." Millon, Crisis, supra note 1, at 1391-93. However, one difficulty in identifying
communitarians is that there is no clear definition of the communitarian position, largely
because different communitarians make quite distinct claims. Thus, although William Bratton
must be considered the most effective critic of neoclassical economic analysis of corporate law,
it is not clear, at least to me, that the same communitarian label is appropriate for him as for
some others, because he tends to concede a large, albeit incomplete role for "contract" and
"efficiency." William W. Bratton, Jr., Public Values and Corporate Fiduciary Law, 44
RUTGERS L. REV. 675 (1992) [hereinafter Bratton, Public Values]; William W. Bratton, Jr.,
Confronting the Ethical Case Against the Ethical Case for Constituency Rights, 50 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1449 (1993) [hereinafter Bratton, Confronting the Ethical Case]; William Bratton,
The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives From History, 41 STAN. L. REV.
1471 (1989) [hereinafter Bratton, Perspective From History]; William W. Bratton, Jr., The
Nexus of Contracts Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407 (1989)
[hereinafter Bratton, Critical Appraisal]. Moreover, although there are strong communitarian
themes in the work of some other critics of the contractarian position, these critics often
employ contractarian and efficiency arguments for their positions. See, e.g., Marleen
O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-
Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899 (1993) (discussing efficiency arguments);
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under State Nonshareholder
Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REV. 45 (1991) (discussing implicit contract theory)
[hereinafter Stone, Employees as Stakeholders]. Indeed, such arguments have raised
"communitarian" ire. See, e.g., Hugh Collins, Organizational Regulation and the Limits of
Contract, in CORPORATE CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY: CHANGING STRUCTURES AND
THE DYNAMICS OF REGULATION 91 (Joseph McCahery et. al. eds., 1993) (criticizing Stone's
implicit contract theory as insufficiently organizational).
5. For similar skepticism, see Bratton, Perspectives from History, supra note 4, at 1516-17;
William H. Simon, What Difference Does it Make Whether Corporate Managers Have Public
Responsibilities?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1697 (1993) [hereinafter Simon, What Differ-
ence].
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between the public and private character of the corporation.6 Corporate
law doctrine fudges the tension by incorporating both the private claim
and the public claim, steadfastly refusing to consistently choose between
them.7 There is no apparent reason to expect that the current chapter
in law review writing will do more than prior chapters in changing this
state of affairs. It is perhaps not to be hoped that the current chapter
will generate a final victory, because such a victory would threaten a
fragile peace. American law practice in late Twentieth Century is largely
a process of compromise and mediation between competing and highly
antagonist political moralities; not a process of exposition from the
premises of an agreed upon morality.8 An authoritative choice between
competing political moralities would, indeed, generate a crisis.
Consequently, a general theme of this article is that the contractarian-
6. See, e.g., Bratton, Perspectives from History, supra note 4, at 1474-1501 (recounting
history of conceptions of corporation); Bratton, Critical Appraisal, supra note 4, at 432-43
(recounting history of public and private conception of corporation); Paul Cox, The Indiana
Experiment in Corporate Law: A Critique, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 185, 193-214 (1990) (recounting
history of public and private conceptions of corporation) [hereinafter Cox, Indiana
Experiment].
7. See William Bratton, Self-Regulation, Normative Choice, and the Structure of Corporate
Fiduciary Law, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1084 (1993) (viewing American Law Institute's
Principles of Corporate Governance as avoiding choice between competing theories and as
"flexible" and "mediative"); Bratton, Critical Appraisal, supra note 4, at 443 (noting that
corporate law accommodates competing conceptions).
8. Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 128-53 (1990)
(recounting decline in legal consensus and current political heterogeneity) [hereinafter
POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE]. Cf id. at 153-57 (stating law is not all politics).
Judge Posner resolves the tension between his claims through a version of pragmatism. The
view expressed in the text is stronger than Posner's decline of consensus claim in that it
postulates profound and incommensurable conflict and is skeptical of the possibility of
resolution of this conflict, even through mechanisms of dialogue. Cf id. at 148-53 (visions are
changed through conversion). Plausible depictions of the conflict include THOMAS SOWELL,
A CONFLICT OF VISIONS: IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF POLITICAL STRUGGLES (1987) and the
"cultural theory" of certain of the followers of anthropologist Mary Douglas. MICHAEL
THOMPSON ET. AL., CULTURAL THEORY (1990); RICHARD J. ELLIS, AMERICAN POLITICAL
CULTURES (1993). Parenthetically, "cultural theory" is itself highly critical of the "atomism"
of rational choice and, therefore, of neoclassical economics analysis. See, e.g., Aaron Wild-
avsky, Can Norms Rescue Self-Interest or Macro Explanation Be Joined to Micro Explanation?,
5 CRITICAL REV. 301 (1991) (criticizing Jon Elster). For a discussion of whether or not it
plausibly postulates conflicting cultures, compare Jeffrey Friedman, Accounting for Political
Preferences: Cultural Theory v. Cultural History, 5 CRITICAL REV. 325, 334-37 (1991) (cultural
theory fails to link postulated biases to ways of life) [hereinafter Friedman, Accounting for
Political Preferenced], with Richard J. Ellis, The Case for Cultural Theory: Reply to Friedman,
7 CRITICAL REV. 81, 87-94 (1993) (postulating linkages), it provides a plausible conception of
contemporary competing political commitments. See also Friedman, supra note 8, at 345
(stating cultures postulated by cultural theory are close matches to current political
conceptions).
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/communitarian debate in corporate theory is simply a reflection of
clashing political moralities observed elsewhere in law, and observable,
with introspection, within many if not most of those who have, in the
spirit of at least some effort at detachment, thought about the questions
raised by the debate.9 This theme is unremarkable."l However, the
more specific claim made here is that these clashing political moralities
are imperfectly modeled as a confrontation between "communitarianism"
and the neoclassical economic analysis of the firm.
There are three reasons for this claim. First, the communitarian
notions that persons are not autonomous choosers of their preferences,
purposes, projects or ends and are highly dependent upon historically
contingent social forms are shared by positions within conservative and
even classically liberal traditions. Corporate communitarian proposals
reflect the concerns of an egalitarian, progressive or socialist tradition."
9. My writing reflects the tension. Compare Cox, Indiana Experiment, supra note 6
(criticizing corporate constituency statute), with Paul N. Cox, Reflections on Ex Ante
Compensation and Diversification of Risk as Fairness Justifications for Limiting Fiduciary
Duties of Corporate Officers, Directors and Controlling Shareholders, 60 TEMPLE U. L. Q. 47
(1987) (criticizing neoclassical economic theory) [hereinafter Cox, Reflections]; Dierdre A.
Burgman & Paul N. Cox, Corporate Directors, Corporate Realities and Deliberations Process:
An Analysis of the Trans-Union Case, 11 J. CORP. L. 311, 359-65 (1986) (postulating social
norms as basis of judicial decision).
10. See, e.g., Millon, Crisis, supra note 1, at 1381-83 (arguing that corporate debate
reflects rival ideologies); Bratton, Critical Appraisal, supra note 4, at 442-46 (noting rival
corporate law theories as political theories); Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law
Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923 (1984) (stating that reform debate reflects scholars distinct
normative commitments).
11. By "egalitarian socialist tradition" is meant that tradition within which the means of
production are subject to social control and to employment in the social interest where control
is understood in democratic egalitarian terms and interest is understood in terms of a vision
of human flourishing that entails notions of solidarity, participation, joint self realization, etc.
The term "socialist" as used in the text does not necessarily imply central economic planning.
For accounts suggesting this broader understanding, see N. SCOTT ARNOLD, THE PHILOSOPHY
AND ECONOMICS OF MARKET SOCIALISM, A CRITICAL STUDY 3-11, 34-64 (1994) [hereinafter
ARNOLD, PHILOSOPHY AND ECONOMICS OF MARKET SOCIALISM]; Jon Elster, Self-realization
in Work and Politics: The Marxist Conception of the Good Life, in ALTERNATIVES TO
CAPITALISM 128-58 (Jon Elster & Karl Ove Moene eds., (1989)) [hereinafter Elster, Self-
Realization in Work and Politics]; John E. Roemer, Can There Be Market Socialism After
Communism, in MARKET SOCIALISM, THE CURRENT DEBATE 89-107 (Pranab K. Bardhan &
John E. Roemer eds., 1993) [hereinafter MARKET SOCIALISM, THE CURRENT DEBATE].
It is of course the case that some communitarians may and some may not be plausibly
labeled "socialist," depending upon one's definition of socialism. The notion of "egalitarian
socialist tradition" is intended to be broad enough to encompass elements of egalitarian
liberalism, suggested, for example, by Charles Taylor's communitarianism and more clearly
socialist and neo-Marxist positions, suggested, for example, by the work of Ronald Beiner and
Michael Walzer. CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS 181-203 (1995) [hereinafter
TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS]; RONALD BEINER, WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH
1997] THE PUBLIC, THE PRIVATE AND THE CORPORATION 397
It is therefore doubtful that these notions uniquely justify a communit-
arian substantive agenda. In short, opposition to the normative
proposals of corporate communitarianism can take "communitarian"
forms. Second, neoclassical economic analysis is problematically viewed
as "individualist" or contractarian in character. It is the case that
individuals and contract are methodological devices within the neoclassi-
cal apparatus. It is also the case that mainstream neoclassical views of
corporate law-those attacked by corporate communitarians-typically
generate judgments consistent with individualist political commitments.
However, the neoclassical normative commitment, in obvious keeping
with its utilitarian cousin, is collectivist, even organic. Moreover, it will
be argued here that neoclassical economic analysis and corporate
communitarianism share some features related to a legal tradition arising
from legal realism. They share a belief in the dependency of social
phenomena on law, in the sense, at least, that desired end-states may be
achieved through conscious manipulation of law."2 Third, corporate
communitarians attack neoclassical analysis on the ground that it fails to
account for the phenomenon and necessity of shared moral commitment,
but this failure is not one of contractarian theory, more generally
considered, and is not a failure that yields communitarian substantive
agendas.
These reasons suggest that some more fundamental dispute underlies
the debate and that communitarian and neoclassical arguments are
employed by the debaters merely as means of conducting the dispute.
A candidate for characterizing this underlying dispute is that it is
methodological: perhaps corporate communitarians are in some sense
"postmodernist" or "interpretivist" and perhaps neoclassical scholars are
in some sense "positivist" or "rationalist." There is something to this.
There is an element of "anti-scientism" in communitarian thought and
an element of "scientism" in neoclassical thought, if "scientism" is
understood as an aggressively assumed capacity to "objectively" predict,
LIBERALISM? 153 (1992); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF
PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 18-19 (1983).
12. This will no doubt come as something of a surprise to those communitarians who rely
upon the insights of "law and society." To the extent that these insights suggest that social
practice deviates from legal rules, a derivative conception of law may be implied (one that
would conform law to practice). The implication is inconsistent with the assertion in the text.
The assertion is nevertheless supportable if it is recognized that there is to be selectivity in
identifying the practices to be legally incorporated (a problem, also, for species of liberalism
that rely upon derivative conceptions of law). It is supported, as well, by communitarian
tendencies to moral universalism. See infra text and notes 231-422 and accompanying text.
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and, therefore, control, phenomena so as to achieve desired consequenc-
es or end states. 3 It will be argued here, however, that this method-
ological candidate is inadequate. If both sides share a belief in their
capacity to achieve desired end-states, both rest on forms of rationalism.
Moreover, both entail, albeit perhaps in different degrees, a pretense to
the objectivity of standing outside a practice in evaluating it. Moreover,
anti-scientism does not explain differences in normative commitment,
and hostility to neoclassical scientism is shared by positions hostile, as
well, to the communitarian substantive program.
The better candidate for the underlying dispute is therefore
competing individualist, substantive visions and communal, altruist, or
egalitarian substantive visions of the good society. Such visions may
compete in at least one of three ways.'n First, advocates of the visions
may disagree about goods and bads. For example, it is possible that
individualists and communitarians disagree about the goodness or
badness of egalitarianism. 5 Second, they may disagree about the
institutional causes of an agreed upon good or bad. For example, they
may disagree about whether a contractarian conception of the corpora-
tion produces alienation in and exploitation of employees and whether
communitarian conceptions of the corporation yield these (undesirable)
consequences. Third, they may disagree about the realm of the possible.
It is here that charges of utopianism and countercharges of "false
necessity" appear. 6
It is the ambition of political philosophy to resolve disagreements
about goods and bads, but heroic efforts in this regard have not yielded
13. For an attack on "scientism" from a "communitarian" perspective, see Charles
Taylor, Interpretation and the Science of Man, 25 REV. METAPHYSICS 3 (1971) [hereinafter
Taylor, Interpretation and the Science of Man]. For an apparent attack within corporate
communitarianism, see Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty, supra note 4. For an
example of an expression of "scientific" ambition, see POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRU-
DENCE, supra note 8, at 353-92.
14. Cf. ARNOLD, THE PHILOSOPHY AND ECbNOMICS OF MARKET SOCIALISM, supra
note 11, at 15 (identifying the first two of the possibilities addressed in the text).
15. Id. Further disagreements are possible. Persons may accept the general principle
of egalitarianism and nevertheless disagree about "equality of what." Amartya Sen, Equality
of What?, in LIBERTY, EQUALITY AND THE LAW 137-62 (Sterling McMurrin ed., 1987).
Persons may also disagree about matters of definition. For example, the terms "alienation"
and "exploitation" may be differently defined. See ARNOLD, PHILOSOPHY AND ECONOMICS
OF MARKET SOCIALISM, supra note 11, at 65-92 (attempting a definition of exploitation that
would be acceptable to "socialists").
16. Compare Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J. L.
& ECON. 1 (1969) (discussing the "Nirvana Fallacy"), with Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of
Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276 (1984) (discussing false necessity).
[Vol. 80:391
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resolution.17 In principle, questions of institutional cause and effect are
resolvable by empirical inquiry. 8 The difficulties are that there is not
in fact agreement about empiricist principle,19 empiricism typically turns
out to consist in fact of deduction from contestable premises 0 and
actual empiricism tends to yield messy "facts" subject to varying
interpretations.2 The realm of the possible is not verifiable except by
reference to experiment, including natural experiment, but experiments
are evaluated by reference to commitments to goods and bads and to
beliefs about causes and effects.22 This is not to say that empiricism is
impossible or useless. Nor is it to say that a consequentialist method of
moral, social, or economic inquiry is ruled out. It is to say, rather, that
empiricism does not typically end debate.
This gloomy picture suggests that resolution, at least as a matter of
intellectual exercise, is not in the offing. More particularly, it suggests
that the fundamental underlying dispute will not be obviated as we learn
more facts. 3  "Facts" merely alter the details and direction of the
debate (and perhaps, but only problematically, conceptions of the
possible within the real world). The point is illustrated by corporate
communitarianism. The proposals and ideas of corporate communit-
arians are derived from a long standing tradition, but the contemporary
interest in these proposals and ideas follows and perhaps arises from not
merely the alleged "excesses" of the 1980's in the United States,2 4 but
also the collapse of the command economies of Eastern Europe and the
17. Cf. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 56-60 (1980) (questioning moral
philosophy as basis for constitutional law on grounds of irresolvability); POSNER, PROBLEMS
OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 348-52 (making a similar argument).
18. ARNOLD, THE PHILOSOPHY AND ECONOMICS OF MARKET SOCIALISM, supra note
11, at 15-16, 24-27.
19. That is, there can be skepticism about empiricism on the ground that discovered
"facts" are structured by the categories with which we approach them.
20. Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with
Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563,
597-99 (1982) [hereinafter Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives].
21. RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE, PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF
ECONOMIC LIFE 197-98 (1992).
22. SOWELL, supra note 8, at 13-17.
23. But see POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 387 (postulating
such progress).
24. The excesses theme is suggested by ROBERT BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE
HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985). The alleged (and
apparently popularly believed) bad effects of the so-called "Reagan Revolution" are disputed
in Lowell Gallaway and Richard Vedder, The Distribution Impact of the Eighties, Myth v.
Reality, 7 CRITICAL REV. 61 (1994); RICHARD MCKENZIE, WHAT WENT RIGHT IN THE 1980s
(1993).
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Soviet Union.25 Faith in central planning has perhaps not survived that
collapse as a respectable position, but commitments underlying that faith
surely have survived. The collapse may therefore be viewed as
stimulating interest in "capitalist" reform, in particular by reducing
reformist ambition to the level of the "intermediary institution" from the
level of the nation-state 6 and in advocating some retention of markets
(as in "market socialism" proposals).27 The reported death of central
planning is an important "detail," but the underlying debate remains.
This article does not seek that which its author, therefore, thinks
implausible-a resolution. Its far less ambitious purposes are by way of
suggested clarification. Specifically, it seeks to support three of the
foregoing assertions: that the social construction of the individual
generates no particular normative implication, that neoclassical economic
analysis of the firm is both less contractarian and more collectivist than
is suggested by corporate communitarian critiques, and that substantive
communitarian proposals are not compelled by communitarian insistence
upon or accounts of morality.
The article proceeds in two parts. Part I summarizes the author's
understanding of contractarian positions. It argues that "individualist"
and "contractarian" positions arise from a variety of traditions, including
some inconsistent with neoclassical analysis and consistent with
communitarian premises. It also argues that corporate law may be
conceived within a contractual theory as reflecting a type of formalism,
one that relies upon socially generated norms while eschewing legal
enforcement of these. Part II addresses aspects of communitarian
positions. It argues that the substantive proposals of communitarians are
not compelled by communitarian premises because liberal, even
classically liberal agendas are also consistent with those premises. It also
argues that corporate communitarianism, despite its appeal to "communi-
ty," is primarily an extension of the egalitarian liberal project, retaining
the directive features of post-New Deal law, not a departure from
25. ARNOLD, THE PHILOSOPHY AND ECONOMICS OF MARKET SOCIALISM, supra note
11, at 34-36; ARNOLD, ALTERNATIVES TO CAPITALISM, supra note 11, at 1.
26. Taylor, Invoking Civil Society, in PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS, supra note 11, at
204-224. Tocqueville is typically relied upon for the intermediary institution theme. There is
an obvious "conservative" counterpart to the theme in calls for decentralized government.
ROBERT DEVIGNE, RECASTING CONSERVATISM: OAKESKOTT, STRAUSS, AND THE RESPONSE
TO POSTMODERNISM, 65-69 (1994) [hereinafter DEVIGNE, RECASTING CONSERVATISM].
27. See, e.g., Elster, ALTERNATIVES TO CAPITALISM, supra note 11, at 1-33; Pranab K.
Bardham & John E. Roemer, Introduction to MARKET SOCIALISM, THE CURRENT DEBATE,
supra note 11.
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advocacy of the "regulatory state" associated with that project.
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE CONTRACTARIAN AND COMMUNITARIAN
MODELS
The contractarian/communitarian debate is generally framed as a
contest over definition: for contractarians the corporation is merely a
nexus of contracts (a variation on an aggregate theory); for communit-
arians, it is an institution determined by and infused with socially
established norms (a variation on an entity theory)."z This framing of
the question is of course too general; it masks the fundamental character
of underlying disagreements. A difficulty, however, with any attempt to
expose these more fundamental disagreements is that it risks caricature
by failing to capture the diversity of opinion within each camp. The
latter error is perhaps inevitable in any effort at explication by means of
dichotomy 29 and should be therefore forgiven in the interest of advanc-
ing explication. Indeed, forgiveness is sought for what follows here.
What is at stake in the debate? The "nexus of contracts" view takes
a general and a specific form. The general form, in viewing the
corporation as contractual, treats it as the product of private order-
ing-as a complex of devices adopted in service of the diverse purposes,
projects, or ends of its participants." It therefore recommends a legal
treatment of the corporation that is facilitative and non-directive: as the
corporation is private, the law should merely enable and enforce
agreements. Concrete implications of this view include the claims that
corporate law rules are merely standard form agreements supplied by
law but modifiable by agreement, that these rules should not be
mandatory, that interests in the corporation should be freely alienable
and that legal scrutiny of the behavior of corporate actors should be
minimized in favor of the impersonal scrutiny of market forces.31 The
special form, neoclassical economic analysis, shares this treatment and
these recommendations, but supplies an analytical apparatus that
provides both a means of implementation and a welfarist rationale for
these features.2 (The extent to which the special form is consistent
28. Millon, Crisis, supra note 1; Millon, Theories of the Corporation, supra note 4;
Mitchell, Cult of Efficiency, supra note 4; Johnson, Delaware Judiciary, supra note 4; Bratton,
Perspectives From History, supra note 4; Cox, Indiana Experiment, supra note 6.
29. Millon, Crisis, supra note 1, at 1382 (recognizing this risk).
30. Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4.
31. Id.; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 1-39.
32. See Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of Corporate
Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1703, 1714-26 (1989) [hereinafter Clark, Contracts, Elites, and
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
with the general one is an issue to be addressed below.)33
The corporate communitarian view treats the corporation as a thing,
or as a set of relationships, having a reality and value independent of and
distinct from the individual purposes implied by the contractarian's
instrumental view. This independent and distinct reality entails a notion
of shared endeavor, of the value of participation in a common undertak-
ing, and of adherence to a non-instrumental morality.34 Communitarian
positions take two general forms. The first, often advocated within the
rubric of "relational contract," relies upon social norms or relation-
specific norms as imperatives to be legally enforced.35  The second,
which may be associated with neorepublicanism, 36 advocates substitu-
tion of participatory political mechanisms for the contractual or
hierarchical structures of the current corporation.37
At bottom, both forms reject the contractarian notion that the
corporation instrumentally serves, through mutual advantage, the
individually held ends or purposes of its participants. The norm-based
view substitutes the notion of adherence to a shared morality.38 The
Traditions] (describing contractarian views of the corporation, economic views as a subset of
these and the "disguised elitism" within the economic views); Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Nexus
of Contracts Approach to Corporations: A Comment on Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1449 (1989) (employing economic arguments to challenge adequacy of pure contract
metaphor).
33. See infra notes 73-97, 170-82 and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., Bratton, Public Values, supra note 4; Johnson, Individual and Collective
Sovereignty, supra note 4; Lawrence E. Mitchell, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Corporate
Law, 50 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1477 (1993) [hereinafter Mitchell, Groundwork].
35. See, e.g., IAN MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT, AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980) [hereinafter MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT]; Ian
MacNeil, Bureaucracy, Liberalism and Community-American Style, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 900
(1984-85) [hereinafter MacNeil, Bureaucracy]; Jay Feinman, Relational Contract and Default
Rules, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 43 (1994); Robert W. Gordon, MacCaulay, MacNeil
and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 565. For a
perceptive critique from an economics perspective, see Richard Craswell, The Relational Move:
Some Questions From Law and Economics, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 91 (1994).
36. Neorepublicanism is articulated for example in Frank Michelman, Law's Republic,
97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988) [hereinafter Michaelson, Law's Republic]; Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond
the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988) [hereinafter Sustein, Republican Revival].
For perceptive critiques, see Richard Fallon, What is Republicanism and Is It Worth Reviving?
102 HARV. L. REV. 1695 (1989); Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic
Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 801 (1993).
37. See, e.g., Marleen A. O'Connor, A Socio-Economic Approach to the Japanese
Corporate Governance Structure, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1529 (1993) [hereinafter O'Connor,
A Socio-Economic Approach]; William R. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L.
REV. 1335 (1991) [hereinafter Simon, Socio-Republican Property].
38. See, e.g., Bratton, Public Values, supra note 4; Johnson, Individual and Collective
Sovereignty, supra note 4; Mitchell, Groundwork, supra note 34.
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political view substitutes a notion of participation in a process of public
justification.39 Concrete recommendations flowing from the relational
form of communitarianism include the divorcing of the corporation from
market forces viewed as threats to corporate relationships (as in
advocacy of anti-takeover legislation)40 and the legal enforcement of
"moral" norms in regulating managerial behavior (as in proposals for a
fiduciary duty to all corporate constituencies). 41 Concrete recommenda-
tions flowing from the neo-republican form of communitarianism include
mandated worker participation programs,4' inalienable worker owner-
ship of firms,4' and employee co-determination. 44
It should be noticed that many of these proposals have been made
as well by persons who would not identify themselves, or typically be
identified by others, as communitarians. 45  Many, for example, would
seem to follow from egalitarian or progressive liberalism.46 This may
39. See, e.g., O'Connor, Socio-economic Approach, supra note 37; Simon, Social
Republican Property, supra note 37.
40. See, e.g., Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Takeovers and Corporate Law:
Who's in Control?, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1177 (1993).
41. See, e.g., Mitchell, Corporate Governance, supra note 4 (discussing Board as
Mediator); Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law
to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899 (1993) (discussing
Board as Referee) [hereinafter O'Connor, The Human Capital Era].
42. O'Connor, Socio-Economic Approach, supra note 37.
43. Simon, Social-Republican Property, supra note 37.
44. Lewis D. Soloman & Kathleen J. Collins, Humanistic Economics: A New Model for
the Corporate Social Responsibility Debate, 12 J. CORP. L. 331 (1987).
45. Many of these proposals are similar to those made within a body of literature within
business economics that advocates decentralization of decision making within firms, typically
on anti-Taylorist, pro-Japanese, and Schumpeterian premises. MICHAEL BEST, THE NEW
COMPETITION, INSTITUTIONS OF INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING 106-134,251-77 (1990); MARK
CASSON, THE ECONOMICS OF BUSINESS CULTURE, GAME THEORY, TRANSACTION COSTS,
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3-28,225-42 (1991); NEIL FLIGSTEIN, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF CORPORATE CONTROL 295-314 (1990); MICHAEL PIORE & CHARLES F. SABLE, THE
SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE (1984). This literature may support communitarian positions
and may in part be motivated by communitarian commitments. It also tends to rely, as does
much of the communitarian literature, on the notion that norms yield the "trust" necessary to
economic cooperation. Nevertheless, the literature is distinguishable from the communitarian
positions under discussion on the grounds that: (1) its organizing rationale tends to be that
the proposed reforms will enhance "efficiency," or "productivity," so the reforms are
instrumental to these ends; and (2) it tends to take the form of recommended internal changes
(perhaps in combination with "industrial policy"), rather than the form of legal mandate
regarding internal structure.
46. See ROBERTA. DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION (2d ed. 1990) (proposing corporate
democracy); JOHN GRAY, LIBERALISMS: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 161-98 (1989)
(criticizing market socialism implications of Rawls work) [hereinafter GRAY, LIBERALISMS].
Indeed, corporate communitarian proposals might be characterized as simply continuations of
the long-running corporate social responsibility debate. Cox, Indiana Experiment, supra note
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be because egalitarian liberalism's rejection of classical liberalism's
commitment to inviolable "property rights"'47 eliminates liberalism's
insistence upon neutrality and the public/private distinction in the
context of economic production, so distinctions between egalitarian
liberalism and communitarianism are problematic in this context. It may
also be because significant strains of communitarianism seek rather
expressly to support egalitarian liberal agendas from non-liberal or anti-
liberal premises.48 Nevertheless, corporate communitarians are both
accused of being communitarians49 and have identified themselves with
the label."0 What, then, is distinctively "communitarian" about corpo-
rate communitarian literature? Perhaps nothing. The communitarian
label may be attached to a variety of distinct positions, only some of
6, at 203-14.
Egalitarian liberalism means that species of liberalism associated with scholars such as
John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); RONALD
DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985), and associated as well with post-New Deal
American laws. See Jerry Mashaw, Rights in the Federal Administrative State, 92 YALE L.J.
1129 (1983) (contracting individual and statist rights and associating latter with egalitarian
distributive themes). Egalitarian liberalism is therefore to be distinguished from "classical
liberalism." The latter tends to emphasize property rights, to favor limited government and
common law systems and to favor formal, as distinguished from substantive equality. For
accounts of the distinction, see Christine M. Korsgaard, G.A. Cohen, Equality of What? On
Welfare, Goods and Capabilities; Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-Being, in THE QUALITY
OF LIFE 54-61 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993); LOREN E. LOMASKY, PERSONS,
RIGHTS AND THE MORAL COMMUNITY 84-110 (1987); Steven Shiffrin, Liberalism, Radicalism,
and Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1103, 1114-30 (1983). However, there is some
tendency in these sources, particularly Shiffrin, to dismiss classical liberalism as confined to a
Lockean natural rights theory. A point of this article is to claim that it is not so confined.
47. It is possible that "private property" is not the distinguishing feature of "market
economics" or "capitalist systems," at least where their efficiency properties are emphasized.
JOSEPH STIGLITZ, WHITHER SOCIALISM? 171-96 (1994). Much, however, would seem to de-
pend upon one's definition of property rights. Indeed Stiglitz' invocation of a residual control
conception of property suggests a conception in keeping with strains of classicly liberal
thought. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A
Theory of Vertical and Lateral Organization, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986). Thus, Stiglitz
suggests that ownership (or at least who owns) in the residual control sense matters because
it affects the credibility of commitments not to intervene, and, therefore, degrees of decentral-
ization. STIGLITZ, supra at 164-66, 176-77. Stiglitz also argues, perhaps in tension with
classical thought, that well defined property rights are not essential to efficiency. Id. at 174-76.
They may, however, be necessary to the plan, purpose or preference pursuit emphasized by
classical liberalism, for a reason Stiglitz identifies: the credibility of commitments not to
intervene in such pursuit.
48. See Jeffrey Friedman, The Politics of Communitarianism, 8 CRITICAL REV. 297,298-
309 (1994) (viewing Charles Taylor and Michael Sandel as seeking to support egalitarian
liberal program by means of communitarian argument).
49. DeBow & Lee, supra note 1.
50. Millon, Crisis, supra note 1.
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which are incompatible with liberalism, including classical varieties of
liberalism." Indeed, it will be argued below that many communitarian
arguments fail to yield corporate communitarian proposals because
contractarians can accept and even premise their positions on similar
arguments.
An explanation of this point, foreshadowing the argument to come,
is that the communitarian/liberal debate is in part a methodological one,
one between distinct and competing understandings of "theory" in
academic exercises. On this view, the "liberal" or contractarian view
seeks to understand human behavior in terms of individual choice on the
assumption that persons rationally seek to achieve their individually held
goals, purposes or ends; theory is a matter of predicting behavior. The
communitarian, or perhaps sociological view seeks to understand human
behavior instead in terms of individual adherence to cultural mores or
norms. The liberal as theorist treats rational goal pursuit as enabling
theory as prediction about behavior. The communitarian as theorist
rejects goal pursuit in favor of a complex account of motivation, an
account in which theory is not prediction, but description-the postulat-
ing of concepts and of interactions between these concepts.52  The
normative origins of these methological and theoretical positions may be
identified with the Enlightenment and utilitarianism, in the case of the
liberal theorist, and with conservative reaction to these, in the case of the
communitarian 3 The historical irony, given that the communitarians
under discussion here fall within a "progressive" camp, is that the liberal
origin is identifiable with reform and the communitarian origin with
reaction. The irony is of course also a potential explanation of the
compatibility of communitarian argument and some contractarian or
classically liberal argument, as the strand of the latter to be emphasized
here might be labeled "conservative."
There is nevertheless a distinctively communitarian position,
substantive in character, to which corporate communitarians might
adhere and by reference to which their proposals might be interpreted,
that is clearly incompatible with even a "conservative" variation on
classical liberalism. Specifically, there is a tradition that rejects the
"liberal" notions of neutrality and of the separation of the public and
private in favor of an organic conception of society in which the state is
51. Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law, Politics and the Claims of Community, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 685 (1992).
52. BRIAN M. BARRY, SOCIOLOGISTS, ECONOMISTS, AND DEMOCRACY 3-7 (1978).
53. Id. at 7-9.
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central. 4 The idea, in extreme form, is that there is a stark choice
between a state-centered society in which all persons share in a common
good, on the one-hand, and a individualistic one in which persons pursue
their egoistic desires, on the other." The first of these options is
thought to entail notions of reconciliation, belonging, and fulfillment
through participation. The second is thought to entail social atomism,
alienation and exploitation. The anti-liberal tradition obviously favors
the organic view by which the state ensures that individuals reflect and
adhere to a common good or hierarchically ordered set of goods. It
therefore rejects the notion of a private realm distinct from the sphere
of the state on the ground that such a realm will be characterized by
atomism, egoism, alienation, and exploitation.
It is possible, but not entirely clear that corporate communitarians
are advocating this stark picture of the alternatives and favoring the
organic one. Much of their rhetoric is consistent with it and their
proposals can obviously be interpreted as consistent with it. The
relational form of corporate communitarianism obviously selects those
social norms consistent with solidarity for legal enforcement and the neo-
republican form obviously contemplates corporations as participatory
democracies in which individual pursuit of self-interest is to be subordi-
nated to a process of public justification. Although corporate communit-
arians tend to emphasize decentralization, so that corporations are
viewed as intermediary institutions between the state and the individual,
and although neorepublicanism leaves the substantive common good
undefined, so that it becomes the future product of political deliberation,
the role of the state is expansive in these proposals. In both examples,
there is a state mandate precluding alternative "private" arrangements.
If communitarians contemplated no such mandate, they would be
contractarians. Nevertheless, corporate communitarians, like their neo-
republican cousins,56 also emphasize their moderation, distancing
themselves from the statist implications of the organic view and insisting
on retention of "liberal" elements in their proposals. 7
54. The tradition has roots in German Romanticism, particularly as expressed in Hegel
and roots in Rousseau. See CHARLES E. LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY 91-
130 (1987); ANDRZEJ RAPACZYNSKI, NATURE AND POLITICS, LIBERALISM IN THE PHILOSO-
PHIES OF HOBBES, LOCKE, AND ROUSSEAU 248-75 (1987).
55. LARMORE, supra note 54.
56. See Gey, supra note 36 (recounting and questioning neo-republican moderation).
57. See, e.g., Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty, supra note 4 (generally
arguing that over and under-socialized accounts should be avoided); Millon, Crisis, supra note
1 (noting that autonomy is also a value to be preserved in communitarian thinking).
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A difficulty with this moderate interpretation is that the basis upon
which the organic view and its implications are to be limited or
compromised is unclear, and the principles by which communitarians
seek to assure contractarian individualists of this moderation may,
therefore, be unconvincing.58  Perhaps, however, communitarian
moderation can be understood in terms of pragmatic, contextualized
judgment. It is plausible that in actual practice, the law engages in a
pragmatic, contextualized and somewhat ad hoc accommodation of
competing organic and individualist claims, but such a description is not
a plausible basis for assessing the debate between communitarians and
contractarians. Even pragmatists must approach context with theory
59
and it is the theory with which context should be approached that is at
issue in the debate. It may also be possible to conceive of communit-
arian moderation in terms of a "dialogue" in which particular (corporate
law) decisions are treated as tentative hypotheses," but this, too, fails
to say much about the merits of the perspectives from which hypotheses
are advanced.6 It also assumes what is an issue in the important sense
that "corporate law as dialogue" presumes a political baseline: the
58. See, e.g., Gey, supra note 36 (criticizing neorepublicanism on this basis); Will
Kymlicka, Some Questions About Justice and Community, in DANIEL BELL, COMMUN-
ITARIANISM AND ITS CRITICS 215-17 (1993) (criticizing Bell on this basis).
59. Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE LJ. 409,423-37 (1990). Cf,
Richard Warner, Why Pragmatism? The Puzzling Place of Pragmatism in Critical Theory,
1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 535 (noting that pragmatism precludes privileging any conception of
justice over another, as it entails relativism).
60. Bratton, Public Values, supra note 4, at 682-92.
61. Dialogue is a possible characterization of the process by which corporate law is
made, but it does not, as such, seem to address the merits of positions within the dialogue.
On the other hand, dialogue and the perhaps related idea of practical wisdom or practical
reasoning, see ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 53-108 (1994); Charles Taylor,
Explanation and Practical Reason, in QUALITY OF LIFE, supra note 46, at 208, may imply a
particular political commitment. As suggested in the text, invocation of dialogue presumes a
form of neorepublicanism in that it presumes a requirement of public justification. This is
particularly evident in Habermas, as his dialogic scheme rather clearly contemplates a
constructivist transcending of society. JURGEN HABERMAS, COMMUNICATION AND THE
EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 119-20 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1979). Practical reasoning, albeit
perhaps without the democratic baggage, makes a similar assumption. There is of course a
certain inevitability to the presumption generated by the legal realist tradition that builds into
modern legal thought a collective baseline (as though the claim that "private" activity has an
ultimately legal basis in an allocation of power). It may nevertheless be possible to imagine
an alternative baseline through the claim that there is no collective decision maker for a
particular decision in the absence of a collective process for that decision. ROBERT
GRAFSTEIN, INSTITUTIONAL REALISM, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ON RATIONAL
ACTORS 184-87 (1992) [hereinafter GRAFSTEIN, INSTITUTIONAL REALISM]. See infra notes
183-230 and accompanying text.
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"private" is obviated at the outset by making it a possible hypothesis
subjected to collective approval or disapproval, rather than a sphere
preserved from collective inquiry.
A third possible understanding of communitarian moderation is that
individualism and communitarianism are to be enabled through reform
of institutional structure. On this account, current structure (e.g.,
inadequately constrained markets) mandates individualism; reformed
structure would permit communitarian elements. The moderation takes
the form of a claim that particular substantive decisions or actions are
not mandated, even though the structure within which these occur is
mandated, so the role of the state is limited. Institutional reform is on
this account enabling. There is something to this claim; the extent to
which a given communitarian proposal approximates the state-centered
organic view is of course a function of the content of the proposal.62
Whether or not communitarian moderation is viable, the present
analysis assumes that some, perhaps limited commitment to an organic,
state-centered common good and to the stark choice between this
organic conception and an allegedly alienated, atomistic world is a viable
interpretation of corporate communitarianism. The typical liberal
response to the stark choice thesis is to deny it by postulating a third
alternative. Specifically, the liberal claim is that the shared goods,
sustained forms of life, feeling of belonging and commitment, etcetera,
deemed by communitarians to be the desirable products of the organic
view, can and are generated by "society" independently of the state. So
the alternative to the "state perfectionism" of the organic view is not in
fact the atomistic, alienated egoism postulated by communitarians.63
The obvious implications are that the social sphere is to be deemed
"private," preserved from state control or interference, and that a limited
state is to be "neutral" about the various conceptions of the good
generated within this sphere. Call this the separation argument: state
and society are to be separated. 6'
62. See Simon, What Difference, supra note 5 (describing proposals of Professors Johnson
and Millon as moderate); O'Connor, supra note 4 (suggesting that Professor Bratton's
proposals are moderate).
63. See, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 219-30 (1990)
Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity, supra note 54, at 91-130; LOMASKY, supra note 46,
at 205-54. Cf. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 225 (1985) (interpreting his own theory in terms of core, shared values and thereby
rendering it dependent upon culturally contingent individualism).
64. This point may require that some distinctions be made. It is clear that communit-
arians, particularly those influenced by Hegel, emphasize the notion of a "civil society."
TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS, supra note 11, at 204-224. So, too, do "conservatives"
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There are, however, many versions of the separation argument.
Progressive or egalitarian liberals may make it while simultaneously
rejecting the notion that "private" property rights, markets and the
organization of economic production are within the social sphere.65
Their position is at least difficult to distinguish from that of communit-
arians in the present context for the reasons earlier noticed: contempo-
rary communitarians tend to import egalitarian commitments into their
interpretations of organic society66 and progressive liberal or egalitarian
critiques of property and of markets eliminate rights-based and private
sphere obstacles from the application of the organic view to matters of
economic production. Classical liberals tend to make the argument and
to apply it precisely to such matters. The classical liberal position is
therefore of interest because, given progressive or egalitarian liberalism's
position on property and economic interaction, the classical position is
the remaining "liberal" one in this context. It should also be noted that
neo-conservatives, although committed to many communitarian positions,
with classically liberal inclinations. MICHAEL OAKESHOTr, ON HUMAN CONDUCT (1975).
And both Taylor and Oakeshott clearly recognize competing variants. Taylor recognizes a
Lockean variant and a Montesqueian variant; Oakeshott recognizes civil association and
enterprise association variants. It is apparent in both accounts, that civil society is distinct
from the state, but for present purposes the following distinctions may be made. First,
communitarians, while maintaining this distinction, understand it in terms of decentralized
politics, so social association or intermediate associations are largely structured and nurtured
by the state even if independent of a centralized state. The "liberal" or anti-state view
identified in the text denies that the state should have a structuring and nurturing role: society
is self-regulating, so that law, as the instrument of the state, is to be minimized. Second,
society remains "public" or "political" even though separated from the state in the
communitarian view: its character is one of "self-rule" through processes of public justification
or in terms of common norms. By contrast, the anti-state view is that society remains
"private" or anti-political in the sense that association, while not necessarily wholly
instrumental, is voluntaristic, and norms are spontaneously generated, not objects constructed
through processes of articulation.
These distinctions suggest, of course, the possibility of communitarian moderation: the
point is not an organic, state-centered conception, but avoidance of the "extremes" of such a
conception, on the one-hand, and anarchy, on the other. TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHICAL
ARGUMENTS, supra note 11, at 220. Perhaps, but then much depends on just what is meant
by the structuring and nurturing role of the state and the extent to which the public or political
is to be pervasive. Taylor's notion that society viewed as self-regulating leads to anarchy, and
that self-regulation is a threat to freedom because it fails to direct disposition of things
according to a "collective will or common decision," seems clearly consistent with the
"organic" depiction in the text. Id. at 221.
65. Compare KYMLICKA, supra note 63, at 219-230 (arguing for social sphere), with
TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENT, supra note 11, at 95-159 (attacking libertarianism).
66. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text. See also KRONMAN, supra note 61,
at 34-50 (viewing neorepublicanism as grafting a principle of Kantian equality onto a
communitarian theme).
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tend both to make the separation argument in the context of economic
production and to assert a species of the argument-in the form of
decentralized governmental authority-more generally.67
An interesting question, however, is the extent to which neoclassical
economic analysis of the firm entails a commitment to the (classically)
liberal argument. That analysis arises out of the utilitarian tradition, and
that tradition, most obviously in Mill, is generally identified with classical
liberalism. It is, however, a mistake to think classical liberalism (or, for
that matter "liberalism" generally) is monolithic, either in its recommen-
dations or in the means by which these are derived.68 It is surely the
case that mainstream economic analysis postulates a form of "private
sphere" in that it generally treats decentralized market processes as
superior to state direction of economic activity. This respect for the
"private," however, is conditional on the "private's" instrumental efficacy
in generating collective welfare.69 It is also the case that economic
analysis adopts a form of neutrality: welfare (e.g., wealth) is defined
such that diverse conceptions of the good have formally equal claims.7"
This, however, is a utilitarian version of neutrality; it maximizes a
"common denominator" (utility or wealth) so its respect for diverse
conceptions is contingent upon or instrumental to this common
denominator.7 There is a further question: as economic analysis seeks
to explain all behavior in terms of maximizing self-interest, has it not in
a sense conceded the communitarian claim that atomistic egoism is the
alternative to organic society and therefore foregone the liberal
rejoinder? Of course, economic analysis may be viewed as denying that
the organic society communitarians contemplate is possible, so perhaps
it does not need the liberal rejoinder, but the present question is whether
that rejoinder and economic analysis are compatible. It will be argued
below that the answer to this question depends upon the neoclassical
analyst's assumptions about her capacity to identify and direct efficient
allocations.7"
In sum, what is at stake in the debate is a variation on an old theme:
the proper role of government, and, therefore, of law in economic
67. See DEVIGNE, supra note 26, at 78-118 (recounting various neo-conservative
positions).
68. GRAY, LIBERALISMS, supra note 46, at 262.
69. Richard Craswell, Efficiency and Rational Bargaining in Contractual Settings, 15
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 805, 823 (1992) [hereinafter Craswell, Contractual Settings].
70. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 12-16 (4th ed. 1992).
71. See LARMORE, supra note 54, at 48-50.
72. See infra notes 93-97, 194-229 and accompanying text.
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production. It is possible to frame this old theme in terms of a technical
issue and therefore to hold out the hope of an empirical resolution to it.
This, indeed, is how economic analysis of the firm seeks to proceed: the
question is one of the efficiency of alternative arrangements. The
technical issue gambit works, however, only if there is agreement that it
is the issue. It should be apparent that this condition is not satisfied.
There is instead a deeper issue of political morality. This deeper issue
may be framed as an empirical one: what are the consequences of
alternative state-directed and socially generated economic arrangements.
The difficulty is that the relevant consequences-alienation, exploitation,
egoism, etc.-are not only poor candidates for precise calibration in
empirical investigations, but matters themselves laden with normative
commitments and, therefore, problematic candidates for an agreed upon
definition. Unfortunately, this is true as well of "efficiency," at least if
the informational difficulties in assessing the matter are recognized.
II. THE CONTRACTARIAN PERSPECTIVE
A. The Contractual Theory of the Firm
The standard "nexus of contracts" description of the corporation
postulates four basic ideas. First, the description invokes, at least
rhetorically, the entire complex of individualist political theory associated
with contract. Specifically, it invokes the following notions:73 (1) The
basic social unit for purposes of descriptive method (and on some
accounts, normative commitment) is the individual; (2) individuals have
73. There are of course many theories of contract, including communitarian theories.
The work of Ian MacNeil illustrates the possibility of a communitarian theory. See, e.g.,
MAcNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 35. Ian MacNeil, Values in Contract:
Internal and External, 78 NEW L.J. 340 (1983). By Individualist contract theory, I mean a
complex of theories associated with libertarian, classically liberal, and neoclassical economic
positions, even though these positions are often engaged in debate, for example, over the role
and meaning of consent. The six basic ideals which follow in the text are nevertheless
believed to capture a common core. The nexus of contracts theory of the firm is summarized
in Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, supra note 4. Classical liberal theory
is well captured in Randy E. Barnett, Conflicting Visions: A Critique of Ian MacNeil's
Relational Theory of Contract, 78 VA. L. REV. 1175 (1992); Randy E. Barnett, The Sounds of
Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 871 (1992) [hereinafter
Barnett, The Sounds of Silence]; Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM.
L. REV. 269 (1986). For neoclassical views, see, e.g., Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default
Rules and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489 (1991) [hereinafter Craswell,
Philosophy of Promising]; Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational
Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981). For a summary of this perspective, see JULES
COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 17-43 (1992).
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diverse preferences that are to be treated as exogenous for descriptive
(and perhaps normative) purposes; (3) given scarcity, individual behavior
consists of choice making, which choice making is undertaken purpose-
fully or rationally-persons seek to satisfy their preferences through their
choices; (4) such choice making presupposes a prior distribution of
entitlements (property) which distribution is assumed, (except to the
extent, as indicated below, that background norms must be specified to
enable maintenance of this assumption); (5) given that the presupposed
distribution is to be respected, choice entails decision to transfer or not
to transfer entitlements, so transfer requires (some form of) consent; (6)
the law's functions are to enforce presupposed distributions (as by
forbidding force and fraud) and to enable cooperation (by enforcing
consensual transfer).
Second, this invoked complex of contractual ideas is applied to
corporate relationships: these relationships are the products of contractu-
al exchange.74 However, contractual exchange within the corporation
74. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4; Butler, The Contractual Theory of the
Corporation, supra note 4. It should be recognized, however, that there are a number of
economic theories of the firm within a neoclassical (in a broad sense that incorporates
neoinstitutional elements) tradition. These originate in Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm,
4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937), in which the firm (e.g., the corporation) is distinguished from
market transactions by hierarchical direction and explained by savings in the transaction costs
of market negotiation. The hierarchical claim was challenged by Armen Alchian & Harold
Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777
(1972), who explained hierarchy in contractual terms, treating the advantage of the firm as
efficiencies generated through team production and hierarchy as contractual monitoring. See
also Steven N. S. Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1983). But
see OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, INTRODUCTION, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM, ORIGIN,
EVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT 10 (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G. Winter eds., 1991)
(noting that Alchian and Demsetz now both recognize "fiat" as "distinguishing feature of the
firm").
"Transaction cost economics," associated particularly with Oliver Williamson, views the
firm in terms of contractual solutions to opportunism problems arising from asset specific
investment. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM
(1985) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM]; Oliver Williamson,
Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations 22 J.L. & ECON. 233
(1979). Property rights theory explains fiat, or power of direction in the absence of detailed
contractual agreement, in terms of residual property rights. Stanford J. Grossman & Oliver
Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94
J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986); Oliver Hart, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, in
THE NATURE OF THE FIRM, ORIGIN, EVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra at 138; Oliver
Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and The Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119
(1990). Principal-Agent theory examines means by which management is or may be made to
maximize shareholder wealth. See Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976);
Eugene Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980). For
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is rendered complex by the necessity of projecting exchange into an
uncertain future and by the costs of so doing. The terms of exchange are
therefore incomplete. Incompleteness entails the necessity of discretion-
ary decision made unilaterally by management, but its hierarchical
authority is itself a term of the corporate contract.
Third, the discretionary authority of management is itself constrained
both by the terms of any express contract between corporate participants
and by the assumed objectives of the contractual relationship." These
assumed objectives and their implications for the proper exercise of
discretion are themselves conceptualized in contractual terms. Thus, the
presumed objective of contributors of equity capital is maximized return
(given a level of risk), and managerial discretion is to be exercised
consistently with the supposition that equity capital was contributed in
exchange for a promise to so exercise discretion.76 Similarly, the
presumed objective of contributors of labor is a fixed wage, to be used
by the worker in satisfying the worker's preferences in exchange for
adhering to the directions of management. It is important to recognize
at this point that, presumed objectives and presumed terms of exchange
are just that, presumed, in this scheme. However plausible they may be,
they are typically postulated from suppositions about the character,
desires and other attributes of quite generalized persons, not from
"findings" about the actual attributes of particular individuals or from
the often non-existent terms of express agreements. 77 The contractual
conceptualization of corporate relationships-dubbed contractual "gap
filling" by adherents of the theory-therefore relies upon two proposi-
tions derived from the individualist complex noticed above: Gaps are to
be filled or terms supplied by reference to what persons having the
supposed attributes would (hypothetically) have agreed to and such
generalized (standard) terms may be trumped by express agreement to
the contrary. It should nevertheless be apparent that this construction
of structural terms is simultaneously an allocation of entitlements; it
establishes the background assumptions necessary to enable consensual
transfer.
useful overviews of the various theories within the economic theory of the firm, see Oliver
Hart, An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1757 (1989)
and Thomas S. Ulen, The Coasean Firm in Law and Economics, 18 J. CORP. L. 301 (1993).
75. See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 74; Fama, supra note 74.
76. On the complexities of shareholder wealth maximization, see Henry T. C. Hu, Risk,
Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment, 38 UCLA L. REv. 277 (1990).
77. See, e.g., Cox, Reflections, supra note 9, at 90-100; Clark, Contracts, Elites and
Traditions, supra note 32, at 1718-26.
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Fourth, as standard or gap-filling contractual terms require supposi-
tions about the attributes of contracting persons, some theory of
attributes is required. It is here in particular that diversity in contract-
arian approaches might arise. The dominant approach, often identified
with contractarian theory itself, is neoclassical economic analysis. The
neoclassical approach employs efficiency, often specified as wealth
maximization, as either a proxy for or substitute for hypothesized
consent.7" Standard terms are thus those terms that maximize social
wealth. Equivalently, standard terms are the terms that would have been
hypothetically agreed to by the majority of rational maximizers.
However, two caveats are in order: the degree of generality with
which persons are to be viewed and the majoritarian default criterion are
debatable matters within a contractarian paradigm. It is at least arguable
that "default rules" tailored to particular transactions or transactors
would be desirable from an efficiency perspective in, at least, nonmarket
(e.g., closely held corporate) settings.79 Moreover, the efficiency
objective may require a standard term specified independently of the
presumed preferences of a majority of corporate transactors.80  It is
efficiency, not predictability or majoritarian preference as such, that
governs neoclassical default terms.
It is important to recognize that the efficiency criterion, like its
utilitarian cousin, is a profoundly collectivist, not an individualist
78. See JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW, 67-132 (1988) (noting
that consent adds nothing to efficiency as a justification where consent is the hypothetical
consent of rational economic actors) [hereinafter COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND THE
LAW].
79. On standard terms versus tailored default rules, see generally Ian Ayres, Preliminary
Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring of Contractual Rules, 3 S. CAL, INTER. L.J. 1 (1993); Clayton
P. Gillette, Commercial Relationships and the Selection of Default Rules for Remote Risks, 19
J. LEGAL STUD. 535 (1990); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for
Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597 (1990). A difficulty with tailoring in the public
issue context is the possibility that it impairs market pricing of terms.
80. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) (generally suggesting that some default rules
should be those not desired by most parties so as to provide incentive to disclose information);
cf. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable
Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820 (1989) (economic desirability
of some mandatory terms); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549 (1989) (noting that economic arguments for mandatory rules); Lewis
A. Kornhauser, The Nexus of Contracts Approach to Corporations: A Comment on
Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1449 (1989) (noting that mandatory background
rules are necessary to contracting).
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normative concept.8' Neoclassical reliance upon individualist, contract-
ualist schema is reliance upon a means to a social end; it is, at least
formally, purely instrumental. Consent, for example, is not central to the
neoclassical scheme; it merely serves an evidentiary role in establishing
efficiency and is in any event present with respect to gap-filling terms
only in the abstract sense of consent to a relationship, not in the concrete
sense of consent to such terms. 2 It would therefore be a mistake to
suppose that the neoclassical economic theory of the firm is a rights
based theory or, ultimately, a theory normatively predicated on the
individual. It is rather a theory of the common good, albeit a good
defined in welfarist terms,83 and one predicated upon some objective
capacity to aggregate individual preferences (as measured, for example,
by judicial guesses about willingness and ability to pay).'
Reliance upon an aggregative welfare criterion may be viewed as an
"individualist" stance in the sense that it declines to evaluate by moral
or social criteria the propriety of a preference; the weight of the
preference is given by its strength (as measured by actual or hypothetical
payment for its satisfaction) in the view or hypothesized view of the
individual.' However, this aspect of the analysis must be qualified by
recognizing that the trade-offs contemplated in establishing a default
term are those of a hypothetical generalized person of a particular
rational, character. Estimates of the strength of (as well as the presence
of) a preference must therefore rely upon some common, shared
perception (more accurately, the perception of such a perception), and
81. See, e.g., POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 376-80 (wealth
maximization is a collectivist organic theory); Gary Lawson, Efficiency and Individualism, 42
DUKE L.J. 53, 83-84, 88, 96 (1992) (stating that social welfare, pareto efficiency and wealth
maximization are normatively collectivist).
82. See, e.g., Craswell, Contractual Settings, supra note 69, at 823 (discussing social
welfare, not markets as such, in the logical prior goal; markets are means).
83. This does not preclude use of economic analysis as a basis for arguments ultimately
supportive of rights based theories or its use as a proxy for a normative commitment to
individualism. Lawson, supra note 81 (Judge Posner employs efficiency as proxy); see
KRONMAN, supra note 61, at 234-35 (discussing economic analysis as proxy for libertarianism);
RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 1-29 (1995) (stating compatibility of pragmatism,
economic analysis and classical liberalism). To the extent that the analysis requires judgments
(as it typically does given the absence of complete information regarding costs and benefits),
underlying normative commitments may be revealed in these judgments. Nevertheless, the
analysis conforms formally to the description in the text.
84. See, e.g., COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW, supra note 78, at 115-29;
Cox, Reflections, supra note 9, at 90-100; Anthony T. Kronman, A Comment on Dean Clark,
1989 COLUM. L. REV. 1748, 1749-51.
85. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW, supra note 70, at 12-16.
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there is in this sense, therefore, a social criterion of value lurking in the
background.86 Market prices, particularly given the Efficient Capital
Market Hypothesis, often serve as this criterion in neoclassical analysis,
as where market price is treated as the normative benchmark for
assessing a "fair price" for shares. A form of "communitarian" reliance
upon common perception may, however, also be invoked, as in claims
that the costs of the duty of care exceed its benefits.
Neoclassical analysis is typically anti-regulatory, in the sense that it
opposes governmental review of or constraints upon managerial
discretion and favors market constraints on that discretion. Nevertheless,
the efficiency criterion is sufficiently flexible to permit regulatory
argument.87 Thus, government "intervention" may be recommended on
efficiency grounds employing, at least formally, the conceptual apparatus
of the neoclassical, contractarian scheme.' Similarly, the individualist
appeal of contractual argument may be employed, particularly through
reliance arguments and "implicit contract" ideas to reach conclusions
inconsistent with mainstream neoclassical views.89 It may be that the
86. Id. at 15-16.
87. Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives, supra note 20, at 597-99. See MARK
KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 12-25 (1987) (discussing indeterminacy
arising from clash between facilitating contract and minimizing contract). Cf. POSNER,
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 363-611 (economic theory so complex that
almost any hypothesis can be made to conform to theory).
88. See, e.g., O'Connor, The Human Capital Era, supra note 41; O'Connor, Socio-
Economic Approach, supra note 37. O'Connor is influenced by the Communitarianism of
Etzioni. See AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY, RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES AND
THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA (1993) [hereinafter ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY];
AMITAI ETzIONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION: TOWARD A NEW ECONOMICS (1988) [hereinafter
ETzIONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION]. She is also influenced by aspects of game theory. See
infra note 89. A further example of an analysis employing efficiency arguments in support of
conclusions inconsistent with mainstream neoclassical views is Alan Hyde, In Defense of
Employee Ownership, 67 CHI. KENT L. REV. 159 (1991) (highlighting the efficiency justifica-
tion for employee ownership of firms) [hereinafter Hyde, Employee Ownership].
89. See Stone, Employees as Stakeholders, supra note 4 (discussing implicit contract);
Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing A
Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189 (1991) (discussing implicit
contract) [hereinafter O'Connor, Restructuring]; LAWRENCE SUMMERS & AUDREI SCHLEIFER,
BREACH OF TRUST IN HOSTILE TAKEOVERS IN CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES (Alan Auerbach ed. 1988) (discussing implicit contract). For an overview of
implicit contracts theory see Sherwin Rosen, Implicit Contracts-A Survey, 23 J. ECON. LIT.
1144 (1985).
The implicit contract approach is closely related to models of the firm employing game
theory. A prominent application within corporate law is John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable
Coalitions: Corporate Governance as a Multi-Player Game, 78 GEO. L.J. 1495 (1990). The line
of argument employed in the present context is to treat "gaps" in express corporate contracts
as giving rise to non-cooperative behavior due to threats of expropriation or defection.
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motivations for pro-regulation positions of these types are traceable to
communitarian commitments, but the arguments fit formally within the
contractarian scheme. Neither contract as a formal analytical device nor
efficiency as an objective compels a particular stance on the question of
governmental action with respect to the corporation,' even though
Nevertheless, these gaps arise within a repeat, iterated or sequential game in which payoff is
maximized through cooperation. Cooperation may be secured in repeat games by means, for
example, of retaliatory strategies, ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION
(1984), by a norm of behavior given credibility through reputation (which reputation then
becomes a valued asset), David Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in
PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 90 (James Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds.,
1990), or by means of referees, MASHIKO AOKI, THE COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY OF THE
FIRM (1984). An obvious application of this line of thought is to treat corporate preservation
of relationships, particularly as threatened by takeover, as preservation of firm value. Another
is to treat management as a referee, rather than as beholden solely to shareholders. A third
is to treat deviation from corporate norms as breach of implicit contract. For a perceptive and
quite persuasive argument along these lines see William W. Bratton, Game Theory and the
Restoration of Honor to Corporate Law's Duty of Loyalty, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW
139 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995).
The point, however, of the game theory exercises in this context is to explain why person
A would risk person B's defection. The game assumes, as Oliver Williamson puts it,
"calculativeness." Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization,
36 J.L. & ECON. 453, 459-63 (1993) [hereinafter Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and
Economic Organization]. Trust in the game means A risked B's opportunism. Id. at 463. An
economic explanation of the decision to take this risk is that the gain, discounted by the
probability of defection is positive. Id. For a use of trust consistent with this usage see Hyde,
Employee Ownership, supra note 88. Another possible view is that the risk was taken because
of trust, where trust is used in a different sense as a value in itself, as where it is characterized
as an instance of altruism. The latter use of trust is indeed communitarian and is Professor
O'Connor's usage. O'Connor, A Socio-Economic Approach, supra note 37, at 1539-45. An
altruistic explanation of "taking the risk" in this context follows from experiments in which
actors do not appear to act on the basis of causal decision theory. These results may also be
explicable on the basis of evidential decision theory, in which case a self-interest explanation
is not ruled out. See ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 41-63 (1993)
(explaining causal and evidential theory in context of "Newman's Problem") [hereinafter
NORZICK, RATIONALITY] and GRAFSTEIN, INSTITUTIONAL REALISM, supra note 61, at 107-28
(utilizing evidential theory to explain institutional influence on choice); cf. Gary Miller, Ethics
and the New Game Theory, in ETHICS AND AGENCY THEORY 117, 121-26 (Norman E. Bonie
& R. Edward Freeman eds., 1992) (cooperative norms within games as serving rule utilitarian
functions). But see KEN BINMORE, GAME THEORY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, PLAYING
FAIR 173-256 (1994) (rejecting evidential theory, other theories of cooperative disposition, but
retaining self-interest, and arguing that theories of cooperative disposition entail games other
than the one-shot prisoner's dilemma) [hereinafter BINMORE, PLAYING FAIR].
90. An example is the corporate stakeholder debate itself. The standard neoclassical
position rests shareholder centrality (particularly in the form of fiduciary obligation owed
solely to shareholders) on the inability of shareholders to protect their interests through
express contract and the ability of others (e.g., employees) to do so, and upon the incentives
of residual risk bearers to make optimal investments. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note
4, at 67-70, 91; Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for
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judgments about these matters or about the "facts" underlying them may
be more or less persuasive in pointing to a particular stance.
Communitarians nevertheless attack several aspects of neoclassical
theory: its treatment of preferences as exogenous (so neither the source
nor the legitimacy of individual preference is examined), its assumption
that persons are self-interested (that they are motivated by a desire to
satisfy their preferences and not by the preferences, needs, or moral
claims of others), its assumption that persons are rational (generally, that
they behave consistently or that they behave as if they were acting
correctly so as to maximize satisfaction of their preferences) and,
therefore, its conception of human behavior as instrumental to prefer-
ence satisfaction. 91  These characterizations of the features of the
neoclassical analytical apparatus are, as generalizations, accurate, but also
exaggerated. Particular theories of the firm will relax one or more of the
features. "Transaction cost" theory, for example, relaxes rationality and
perfect information assumptions.' Indeed, theories of the firm become
interesting (and powerful) precisely because they relax assumptions and
Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON
L. REV. 23, 36-41 (1991). The ability of others to obtain self-protection through contract
depends crucially, however, upon the belief that the standard conditions for efficient express
contract (e.g., full information, ex ante) are satisfied. The obvious countermove, fully within
the categories of argument rendered relevant by the neoclassical framework, is to claim that
these conditions are not satisfied. See, e.g., Stone, Employees as Stakeholders, supra note 4.
There is an alternative neoclassical move: one may seek to evaluate a phenomenon (such
as the corporate takeover) by comparing gains and losses, treating the latter as indeed
unanticipated and as therefore unallocated by contract. This is a species of property right
allocation typical of "gap filling." If gains from the phenomenon exceed losses, the
phenomenon should be encouraged by means of a standard term. Thereafter, gains and losses
will be reallocated through the pricing system. Countermoves will typically fall outside the
economic paradigm: either the cost/benefit calculus is rejected or the pricing system is
challenged on grounds that it fails to account for all losses (values "lost" by reason of the
phenomenon are not properly priced). E.g., Mitchell, Groundwork, supra note 34.
Nevertheless, countermoves are possible within the paradigm. In the first place, the summing
of gains and losses can be controversial. In the context of the takeover, this controversy has
typically taken the form of short- versus long-term perspectives. See, e.g., Thomas Hazen, The
Short-Term/Long-Term Dichotomy and Corporate Law, 70 N.C. L. REV. 137 (1991)
[hereinafter Hazen, The Short-Term/Long-Term Dichotomy and Corporate Law]. Moreover,
the claims that all losses are not accounted for either in neoclassical counting or in the pricing
system can be framed in terms of contract and market failure arguments consistent with the
economic paradigm. See, e.g., Hyde, Employee Ownership, supra note 88.
91. See, e.g., Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty, supra note 4, at 2229-35;
Mitchell, Groundwork, supra note 34, at 1482.
92. WILLIAMSON, INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, supra note 74, at 43-52; cf. POSNER,
OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 83, at 433-37 (treating Williamson as indistinguishable from
"mainstream economics" in his relaxation of assumptions).
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therefore enable a focus upon the consequences of such a relaxation.
The complaints registered against such theories therefore tend to be that
assumptions are insufficiently relaxed.93
However, it should also be recognized that the operational viability
of a theory falling generally within the neoclassical apparatus depends
both upon the stringency with which its assumptions are maintained and
the information it assumes. "Operational viability" means the capacity
of the apparatus to generate "falsifiable hypotheses" and, therefore, its
capacity to generate normative recommendations. Neoclassical theory
seeks by hypothesis to predict behavior, but prediction is employed, in
economic analysis of law, to yield recommendations about law. Control
is an implication of prediction. Relaxation of an assumption renders
prediction problematic. For example, the less rational persons are
assumed to be the less predicable their behavior.
The information problem, moreover, is not merely that of assump-
tions about the information available to the actors studied by the
apparatus, for much can be said, holding other assumptions constant,
about the consequences of incomplete information. Rather, it is a
problem of the information assumed to be in the possession of the
analyst. The point is illustrated by neoclassical analysis of corporate law
"default rules." The rules recommended are those that are "efficient,"
and, equivalently, those that would be chosen by rational parties seeking
to maximize surplus from cooperation, but the appropriate default rule,
given these criteria, requires both assumptions about rational maximiza-
tion as a characterization of behavior and about that which is valued by
"contracting" parties. This is recognized, at least in degree, by the
neoclassical analyst: majoritarian default rules may be trumped by
express agreement because, it is believed, they will not be efficient for
a minority of parties-assuming that the analyst has guessed correctly
about the majority.94
There is therefore a sense in which the analysis is predicated upon a
notion of "individual choice," albeit for reasons instrumental to a
common good. If default rules are non-mandatory, there is room for
93. See, e.g., ETziONI, MORAL DIMENSION, supra note 88, at 178-80.
94. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 35; Richard Craswell, Passing on the
Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L.
REv. 361 (1991) [hereinafter Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules]. On problems of
analyst (e.g., judicial) information, see Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An
Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1992)
(courts decline to act where information absent) [hereinafter Schwartz, Relational Contracts
in the Courts].
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choice. Nevertheless, there is also a sense in which the analysis obviates
any question of "choice." Its predictions (predicated, again, on assumed
information) about what a majority of transactors "would have agreed
upon" is essentially behavioralist' Given the analyst's assumptions,
transactors do not "choose" that which the analyst predicts; the choice
is predetermined by the assumptions.9 6  To the extent that "transaction
costs" inhibit deviation from this prediction, (default terms allocate
transaction costs to those who wish to deviate from them) the prediction
is also self-fulfilling.97
What is distinctive about neoclassical economic analysis as a variant
of contractarian theory is therefore its commitment to a particular form
95. Cf. POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 382 (noting
behavioralism of economic analysis of law generally).
96. James M. Buchanan, Is Economics the Science of Choice?, in JAMES M. BUCHANAN,
WHAT SHOULD ECONOMISTS Do? 39-63 (1979) [hereinafter BUCHANAN, WHAT SHOULD
ECONOMISTS DO].
97. It should nevertheless be recognized that this matter is complicated by the
neoclassical view of markets. If "standard form" agreements in markets are efficiently priced,
persons are compensated for undesirable default terms (bad guesses about efficient terms
made by legislatures and courts) ex ante in price and incentives are created to correct such
terms. To the extent that transactor preferences are heterogeneous, both distinct standard
forms generated by distinct jurisdictions, and the presumption against mandatory terms, permit
choices. This rosy picture requires additional assumption about informational efficiency and
about legal conformity to the neoclassical model. It requires as well, however, the view that
default terms are knowable in advance, or, at least, are matters subject to rational risk
calculation (such that probabilities may be assigned prospectively to their content). Cf. FRANK
H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 19-20 (1957) (distinguishing risk and
uncertainty). They might instead be viewed as random and arbitrary, a possibility enhanced
where they take the form of open-ended standards (as in the case of fiduciary obligation). See
William J. Carney, The ALI's Corporate Governance Project. The Death of Property Rights?
61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 898 (1993) (criticizing fiduciary duty, even as a standard term)
[hereinafter Carney, The ALI's Corporate Governance Project]. On such a view, the
information content of a particular adjudication is minimal, and equilibrium tendencies may
be questioned. Cf. Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Jr., Spontaneous Order and the Coordination of
Economic Activities, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 129 (Lois M. Sparado ed.,
1976) (threat posed by radical subjectivism, based on uncertainty, to tendencies to
equilibrium); but cf Ralph K. Winter, Paying Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors, and
Protecting Managers: Raising the Cost of Capital in America, 42 DUKE L.J. 945 (1993) (treating
fiduciary duty regulation as raising cost of capital, thus implying that market rationally
discounts for effects of uncertain regulation).
It should also be noticed that this market perspective works by its own terms only with
respect to transactors (particularly investors) viewed as remote from the firm. A form of
"institutional perspective" is arguably appropriate for transactors where relationships to the
firm are not subject to the standardized packaging that enables market trading (such as
employees with firm-specific human capital investment and shareholders in closely held firms).
Market pricing (as a form of protection from ignorance) is not invocable from this latter
perspective. Nevertheless, the problem of uncertainty (random and arbitrary content to
default terms) remains.
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of naturalism (the view that persons have an essential nature and that
their behavior is determined by laws implicit in or derived from this
nature). The particular form is "scientism," the belief that human
behavior can be predicted and, therefore, controlled to achieve desired
consequences.
B. Individualist Contract and Neoclassical Contract
Recall that the conceptual wedge by means of which governmentally
determined "contractual" terms are formulated within neoclassical
economic analysis is the contractual "gap"-parties to the corporate
contract fail to specify the terms of their agreement due to "bounded
rationality" and "transaction costs." Recall also that benevolent
government fills these "gaps" by supplying terms the parties would have
agreed to had they specified terms, assuming that the parties are the
rational maximizers contemplated by neoclassical theory. The neoclassi-
cal scheme's individualist, contractarian reputation is preserved by means
of a caveat: the standard terms supplied by efficiency analysis may be
trumped by express agreement to the contrary (corporate law is
"enabling", not "mandatory"). 8 Nevertheless, the scheme is predicated
upon a collective, welfarist, normative commitment, for capacity to trump
is itself justified on the instrumental ground that it yields efficiency. It
is useful to compare this scheme with alternative versions of individualis-
tic or liberal contract.
An obvious difficulty in attempting such a comparison is that there
are many varieties of liberalism. For present purposes, three distinct
theories, roughly derivable from Kant, Hume, and Hobbes, may be
identified.99 It is emphasized that the derivations are rough. Hobbes,
for example, cannot be said to have been a liberal, but his rational
98. See Clark, Contracts, Elites and Traditions, supra note 32, at 1724-26.
99. Reasonably accessible summaries of these sources may be found in Volume 3 & 4
of THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 305-24 (Kant), 74-90 (Hume), 30-46 (Hobbes) (1967)
[hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY]. There are of course other sources for and
species of classical liberalism or of libertarianism left out of this account. The most obvious
missing possibility is a natural rights theory of a Lockean variety. Nevertheless, it would seem
reasonably clear that any classical theory must assume a minimalist rights theory, particularly
a private property rights theory. Such a theory must be minimalist, because, on Hohfeldian
premises, rights require obligations, and it is the point of classical theory to minimize legally
enforceable obligations (indeed, to largely confine these to contract). On this point, as well
as the derivation of property rights, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, PRIVATE PROPERTY
AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 10-18 (1985); ANTHONY DE JASONY, CHOICE, CON-
TRACT, CONSENT:. A RESTATEMENT OF LIBERALISM 91-93 (1991); LOMASKY, supra note 46,
at 111-41.
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contracting scheme can be employed to yield liberal terms. And it is not
pretended that these theorists said anything directly about a social
institution, the modern corporation, about which they were obviously
unfamiliar. The theories postulated here are reconstructions of current
theories derived from ideas with which these theorists are currently
identified, not theories authored by these theorists.
1. The Kantian Variation
The Kantian variation is predicated upon autonomous reason;
freedom is a matter of detached rational assessment and choice of
worthy ends or goods and is justified as necessary to the development of
the moral, full, or complete person."° Moreover, this "ideal of autono-
my" entails a commitment to a universalistic morality: "the right" is
prior to "the good" in the sense that, to be free, one must be detached
from mere desire (and, therefore, from socially contingent ends or goods)
and adhere to moral obligation for its own sake, not for reasons of the
consequences, in terms of goods or ends, of adherence.'0 ' It entails
also, however, a notion of rationalistic self-governance: one achieves this
ideal by rational discovery and adherence to moral obligation, detached
from one's ends, purposes or versions of the good. To be rational is
100. CHANDRAN KUKATHAS, HAYEK AND MODERN LIBERALISM 31-42 (1989);
LARMORE, supra note 54, at 77-90. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF
JUSTICE 1-15 (1982) [hereinafter SANDEL, LIMITS OF JUSTICE]. For accounts of the influence
of Kant on Rawls, see LARMORE, supra note 54, at 118-30; SANDEL, LIMITS OF JUSTICE, supra
at 35-40, 117-22; RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 46, at 251-57. It is the case that
Rawls sought, in A Theory of Justice, to reconcile Kant and Hume, but the communitarian
argument is that this reconciliation failed, in particular by reason of a commitment to the
Kantian notion of detached rationality. SANDEL, LIMITS OF JUSTICE, supra note 46, at 168-73.
101. Universality in Kant is a matter of a set of rules, applicable to all, determined
through applying a Kantian test of universalizability (roughly, the test of the acceptability of
hypothetical application of the rule to all, or "what if everyone did this?"). In Rawls, it is a
matter of building into the original position a perspective of detached rationality. RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 46, at 251-57. See GRAY, LIBERALISMS, supra note 46, at
33-36 (criticizing universality as detached rationality). In his later work, Rawls, in response
to communitarian critics, has sought to relax this universalism. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness:
Political, Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 225, 228 (1985). What seems distinctive
about Kantian rationality is universalism as impartiality: rationality is a matter of detachment
from one's own goods or interests, so one constrains one's pursuit of one's interest (as by
recognizing and conforming to the rights of another) because rationality as impartial
detachment requires one to see the (conflicting) interests of others as on par with one's own.
Moral constraint is thus both a product of exercises in Kantian rationality and, because
detachment is identified with morality, built into that rationality. See THOMAS NAGEL, THE
POSSIBILITY OF ALTRUISM 90-124 (1970) (presenting account of rationality that insists on its
detachment from individual projects, ends, or preferences).
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therefore to be moral, and the morality contemplated is intersubjective-
-something known and capable of being adhered to by all.
In political terms, political neutrality regarding ends, purposes or
goods is predicated in this Kantian account on the ideal of autonomy:
the state should be detached from ends, purposes or goods."° Persons,
within such a regime, are conceived by virtue of this neutrality to be
autonomous choosers of their ends (but also, to the extent they
approximate the Kantian moral ideal, remain themselves detached from
the ends they choose). These notions can be given classically liberal
interpretations, 10 3 but they are most clearly present in various versions
of egalitarian or progressive liberalism." This classification seems
supported by two elements of the "positive" liberty arising from the
ideals of autonomy favored by egalitarian liberals."05 First, and most
102. KYMLICKA, supra note 63, at 199-230; LARMORE, supra note 54, at 77-90.
103. See KUKATHAS, supra note 100, at 167-74 (noting Kant's influence on Hayek).
104. See, e.g., KYMLICKA, supra note 63, at 50-94 (discussing Rawls and Dworkin).
Autonomy is also emphasized in STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP,
VIRTUE, AND COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 203-53 (1990) (viewing
autonomy as rational self-governance) [hereinafter MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES] and JOSEPH
RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 368-95 (1986) (viewing autonomy as a choice among
preserved range of social options).
105. Positive liberty is typically contrasted with negative liberty, but there are many
variations on these themes. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 99, at 221-25; Isaiah
Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118-62 (1969); GRAY, LIBER-
ALISMS, supra note 46, at 45-68; Richard Fallon, Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV.
875 (1994); Charles Taylor, What's Wrong with Negative Liberty, in 2 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS
211-29 (1985) [hereinafter Taylor, What's Wrong With Negative Liberty]. For Kant, negative
freedom was freedom from animalistic impulse and positive freedom was capacity to
universalize or abstract from particular ends. ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE
LAW 90-91 (1995).
Negative freedom is today typically understood as freedom from interference, or in terms
of a realm of independence from direction, particularly of a conscious variety. There is a
sense in which autonomy refers to negative freedom: one is autonomous to the extent free
from coercion or manipulation and therefore engages in choice free from these constraints, but
the rationality condition imposed by this variation on autonomy is a minimalist one, as the
point of negative liberty is freedom from authoritative assessment. GRAY, LIBERALISMS, supra
note 46, at 59. Positive freedom is typically understood as rational self-direction, requiring
capacity for experiment (freedom to), but also requiring "freedom from" irrational impulse,
mere desire or "false consciousness." The latter requirement, entailing a detached rationality
in the sense of a capacity to evaluate and discard unworthy ends, is a basis for libertarian or
classically liberal criticisms of positive liberty, as it implies collective assessment and direction
of such ends. Berlin, supra. Cf. DE JASONY, supra note 99, at 33-51 (criticizing rights theories,
and emphasizing liberty as Hohfeldian privilege). But see Taylor, What's Wrong With Negative
Liberty, supra (defending positive liberty from this attack); Cf. JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES,
STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY 109-140 (1983) (postulating phenomenon of
adaptive preference, criticizing Berlin, criticizing utilitarianism for assuming preferences and
suggesting possibility of collective reformation of preferences through rational public
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discussion) [hereinafter ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES], CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS
REVOLUTION, RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 44-45, 64-67 (1990) (noting that
function of regulation is to alter preferences).
The standard argument favoring positive liberty, made by Taylor and by egalitarian
liberals, may serve to clarify the differences between the egalitarian liberal (and ultimately,
communitarian or neorepublican) view and the libertarian or classically liberal view. The
argument is that "we" assess liberty by reference to a collective background understanding of
the importance of particular interests, so it is not a "general right to liberty" but particular
liberties that are valued. Liberty is not an end, but a means to those ends deemed important,
and (in the communitarian or neorepublican version of the argument) determinations of
importance are to be made through participation in collective deliberation. See, e.g., Ronald
Dworkin, We Do Not Have a Right to Liberty, in LIBERTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 167
(Robert L. Cunningham ed., 1979); KYMLICKA, supra note 63, at 137-45; Taylor, Whats Wrong
With Negative Liberty, supra at 219. Notice that this argument already has built into it a
presumed baseline of collective evaluation, for it is made from the perspective of a collective
choice about liberty. Cf. GRAFSTEIN, INSTITUTIONAL REALISM, supra note 61, at 184-87
(stating that collective choice perspective assumes baseline of collective choice). Notice, also,
that the argument is one of positive liberty in that it contemplates a rational evaluation and
choice of "important" ends. An implication is that socially generated norms-practices and
conventions yielded by "accident"-are themselves subjected to the process of rational
justification contemplated by the argument. Cf. SUNSTEIN, supra at 64-67 (norms subject to
revision through regulation). This does not mean that there are not differences among
advocates of the argument. For example, Dworkin's version treats certain preferred rights
founded in an equality principle, as "trumps" on an assumed utilitarian baseline. Liberals, as
distinguished from communitarians with egalitarian liberal leanings, tend to argue, at least
within a neo-Kantian variation, that rights enable individuals to be detached from and to
evaluate their ends, e.g., MACEDO, supra note 104, at 251-53. Whereas communitarians tend
to push the argument to a point at which the individual rights recognized are ones to political
participation in autonomous collective deliberation. See MACEDO, supra note 104, at 227-240.
A libertarian or classically liberal claim in favor of negative liberty, suggested by the
Humean and Hobbesian variations outlined below, postulates the general right to liberty (as
general right consistent with a formally equal right of all) attacked by the positive liberty
argument. What is important to recognize is that this general right is intimately connected to
a hostility to governmental direction, and, therefore, to a rejection of autonomy as rational
deliberation about ends when this autonomy takes governmental forms. It is therefore
intimately connected to a radical separation of the social and the political, as expressed in the
notion of liberal neutrality. LARMORE, supra note 54, at 91-130; LOMASKY, supra note 46, at
250-54. From a Humean perspective, the relevant baseline is evolved social practice, so a
rational collective autonomy is rejected as a threat to this practice. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK,
Rules and Order, in Vol. I LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: A NEW STATEMENT OF THE
LIBERAL PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 14-15 (1973) [hereinafter HAYEK,
Rules and Order]; MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, Rationalism in Politics, in RATIONALISM IN
POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 6 (1981) [hereinafter OAKESHOTT, Rationalism in Politics]; but
see GRAY, LIBERALISMS, supra note 46, at 90-91 (portraying Hayek as positive libertarian
given Kantian elements); KUKATHAS, supra note 100, at 166-228 (Humean and Kantian
elements in Hayek are contradictory). From a Hobbesian perspective, the baseline is a
multiplicity of incommensurable goods, individually held and pursued with instrumental
rationality. On a Hobbesian account, rational collective deliberation about ends is an
impossibility because it would entail in fact political warfare, not detached deliberation.
JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY, BETWEEN ANARCHY AND LEVIATHAN 147-
65 (1975) [hereinafter BUCHANAN, LIMITS OF LIBERTY]. Negative Liberty is in a sense a by-
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obviously, positive liberty can be understood as possessing the means to
effective pursuit of ends, so one is autonomous to the extent of this
capability. This is a basis for egalitarian distribution. Second, positive
liberty can be understood in terms of critical self-awareness and self-
discipline: one is free to the extent that one engages in a rational
evaluation or ordering of ends, detached from mere desire. This is a
basis for preferring some liberties (such as speech) over others (such as
property) and for treating the importance of a particular liberty as a
matter of an evaluative judgment about the purposes it serves. 06 That
is, "liberty" within egalitarian liberalism tends to be conceived in terms
of intellectual liberty or detached reflection; it is not commercial or
market liberty.
Nevertheless, it cannot be said that Kantian autonomy is alien to
classical liberalism, as Kantian autonomy (and variations on positive
liberty) are often relied upon by classical liberals. In particular, Kantian
autonomy may be employed in justification of classical conceptions of
the law of contract by emphasizing contract as an expression of and
necessary to the exercise of this autonomy.10 7
2. The Humean Variation
The Humean variation on classical liberalism combines a materialistic
element, a skeptical element and a conventionalist element. The
naturalistic element postulates certain regularities of the human
condition, particularly scarcity, dispersed knowledge and self interest
moderated by a limited capacity for "sympathy" (or empathy) and
product of these baselines, a state of affairs left over from the constraints imposed on politics
by virtue of the priority of the social or by virtue of treating government as the product of
mutually advantageous agreement. The standard argument for positive liberty noticed above
therefore assumes two positions rejected by assumptions built into its competitors. It assumes
a Kantian capacity for rational choice of ends, but this is what Hume denied in contending
that reason is the servant of passion. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 413-18
(Selby-Bigge, 2d ed. 1978) [hereinafter HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE]. See
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 99, at 85-87. It also assumes a detached Kantian
autonomy, but this is what is denied by Hobbesian self-interest. See, e.g., LOMASKY supra
note 46, at 182-83, 247-50. But see BINMORE, PLAYING FAIR, supra note 89, at 7-89, 147-59
(attacking Kant, particularly on ground that Kantian rationality is inconsistent with self
interested behavior, but deriving modified Rawlsian difference principle from Humean notions
of reciprocity and sympathy).
106. See, e.g., KYMLICKA, supra note 63, at 137-45.
107. See, e.g., GRAY, LIBERALISMS, supra note 46, at 90-91 (discussing Hayek's Kantian
positive liberty); CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION 9-17 (1981) (Kantian moral basis for obligation to keep promises); cf. WEINRIB,
supra note 105, at 84-113 (defending "private law" on basis of Kant).
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benevolence, that limit (but do not exclusively determine) possible
political and social arrangements. °8 The skeptical element is skepti-
cism about human reason and in particular about human capacity to
rationally construct social orders."° The conventionalist element is a
"conservative" commitment to evolved social practice." Norms as
conventions-understood as customary rules of behavior which
individuals internalize and to which they attach feelings of moral ob-
ligation-respond both to the natural human conditions of scarcity and
self interest and to the limitations of human reason by enabling
"coordination," and "cooperation"' 
-understood as tolerance of and
mutually beneficial advancement of distinct and individually held
purposes. Morality, including the morality of liberal "rights" in a society
of liberal traditions is therefore determined by the material facts of the
human condition as particularly revealed in and expressed by historical
108. DAVID HUME, ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS, APP. II (3d.
Selby-Bigge ed., 1975) [hereinafter HUME, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS]. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 99, at 85-88; KUKATHAS, supra note 100, at 20-31; JOHN GRAY,
HAYEK ON LIBERTY, 58-61, 65-67 (1984); Frank Van Dun, Hayek and Natural Law, The
Humean Connection, in HAYEK, CO-ORDINATION AND EVOLUTION: HIS LEGACY IN
PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 269, 276-81 (Jack Birner
& Rudy van Zijp eds., 1994) [hereinafter Dun, Hayek and Natural Law]. Cf. PAUL RUSSELL,
FREEDOM AND MORAL SENTIMENT, HUME'S WAY OF NATURALIZING RESPONSIBILITY (1995)
(arguing for a naturalistic interpretation of Hume's reconciliation of freedom and causation,
where naturalism is understood as the empirical "fact" of a set of human attitudes,
dispositions, or sentiments). The primary "Humean" contemplated here is Hayek, even
though there are substantial "Kantian" elements in Hayek's thought. Another "Humean,"
albeit one with more egalitarian inclinations is Binmore. See BINMORE, PLAYING FAIR, supra
note 89, at 173-256.
109. See, e.g., Hayek, Rules and Order, supra note 105, at 10-15; F. A. HAYEK, THE
COUNTER REVOLUTION OF SCIENCE 163 (2d ed. 1979). See also OAKESHOTT, RATIONALISM
IN POLITICS, supra note 105, at 6.
110. See, e.g., F. A. HAYEK, Individualism: True and False, in INDIVIDUALISM AND
ECONOMIC ORDER 23-24 (1948) [hereinafter HAYEK, Individualism: True and False]; HAYEK,
Rules and Order, supra note 105, at 17-26; F. A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 59-
65 (1960).
111. There is, however, a potential distinction between problems of coordination and
problems of cooperation. The former, suggested by Hayek's emphasis upon dispersed
knowledge and the informational role of prices, do not entail the conflicts of interest that arise
in the latter, and Hayek may be viewed as having neglected these. See Marina Bianchi,
Hayek's Spontaneous Order, The "Correct" Versus the "Corrigible" Society, in HAYEK, CO-
ORDINATION AND EVOLUTION: HIS LEGACY IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND THE
HISTORY OF IDEAS 237-51 (Jack Birner & Rudy van Zijp eds., 1994) [hereinafter Bianchi,
Hayek's Spontaneous Order]. Hayek's Humean commitment may be said to neglect
Hobbesian insights, but, then, Hume did not conceive of human nature in the relentlessly self-
interested and rational fashion associated with Hobbes, permitting "sympathy" to establish
commitment to "fair play."
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practice."' An implication is perhaps a form of indirect utilitarianism,
functionalism or consequentialism, as successful coordination is
potentially a criterion for assessing social practice." 3 On the other
hand, this variation's skepticism about human reason may dictate a
simple conservative respect for tradition regardless of this criterion.
The "liberal" character of the Humean variation appears to the
extent that the traditions of a particular society are of a liberal character,
and to the extent that coordination and cooperation criteria are
interpreted, individualistically, as serving to maximize the individual's
prospects for advancing his self-interest (that is, his projects or purpos-
es)."' A further aspect of these criteria, and of respect for tradition,
is for "Humeans," in particular F. A. Hayek, the spontaneous order
thesis: coordination and cooperation arise without direction through
spontaneous generation within human interactions of norms and practices
serving these ends."5 Norms serve these functions without being
consciously designed. Notice that a strong implication of spontaneous
order, in combination with skepticism about human reason, is distrust of
conscious, articulate direction (as distinguished from the direction
supplied by norm and practice) and, therefore, a distinction between the
political/legal and social realms. Indeed, there is within "Humean"
thought, particularly as represented by Hayek, substantial reliance upon
inarticulate, tacit or practical knowledge, both as an explanation of
human behavior and as a ground for rejecting direction through the use
of articulated mandate. Since much of human knowledge is tacit, it
cannot be captured in or employed by use of articulate command or
even in articulate discourse."6
112. KUKATHAS, supra note 100, at 23-25.
113. Compare GRAY, LIBERALISMS, supra note 46, at 121-25 (treating Hume as an
indirect utilitarian), with KUKATHAS, supra note 100, at 197 (portraying Hume as a
consequentialist, but not a utilitarian).
114. Hayek's notion, relying on Hume, is that abstract (neutral and formalistic) rules
serve unknown particular ends, so that the relevant consequence is that of maximizing
prospects for individual discovery and achievement of ends not collectively known. See
HAYEK, Rules and Order, supra note 105, at 15-17. But see Norman P. Barry, The Road to
Freedom, Hayek's Social and Economic Philosophy, in HAYEK, CO-ORDINATION AND
EVOLUTION: His LEGACY IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND THE HISTORY OF
IDEAS 141-163 (Jack Birner & Rudy van Zijp eds., 1994) [hereinafter Barry, Road to Freedom]
(criticizing later Hayek's move to a maximum population criterion as a measure of social
success, particularly in THE FATAL CONCEIT (1988)).
115. HAYEK, Rules and Order, supra note 105, at 35-54.
116. F. A. HAYEK, STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 44 (1976). See
MICHAEL POLANYI, THE TACIT DIMENSION (1967) (relying upon by Hayek in Studies);
GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 26-60 (1949) (distinguishing between "knowing how"
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It should be noticed that there are both universal and particularistic
elements to the Humean variation. Although scarcity, self interest, and
limited reason are deemed universals, and serve as limitations on
possible human arrangements in the sense that coordination and
cooperation fail where these limitations are ignored, particular social
arrangements within these limitations may be historically contingent." 7
Moreover, there is within some modem "Humean," thought a "post-
modern" element"' that rejects "scientism," favors a form of "inter-
and "knowing that").
117. Hume clearly thought "sympathy" a natural or universal quality, and self-love one
as well, and treated "utility" (understood as tendency to bring about desirable consequences)
as something with which humans universally sympathize. See, e.g., HUME, PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS, supra note 108, at 178-90. Nevertheless, this did not preclude his recognition of
variations in cultures. See DAVID HUME, ESSAYS, MORAL, POLITICAL AND LITERARY'197-
215 (Eugene Miller ed., rev. ed. 1987) [hereinafter HUME, ESSAYS]. More importantly, Hume
was an anti-universalist in the sense that he rejected natural rights and rationalist contracting
explanations for adherence to moral or legal principle. See, e.g., HUME, ESSAYS, supra at 479-
81 (noting that some moral duties are instinctual; others are not based upon rational contract
but on reflection about practical consequences); HUME, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS, supra note
108, at 255-60 (stating that rules of justice do not arise from contract, but from conventions
which tend to generate peace or order and are natural only in sense necessary to order);
HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, supra note 105, at 569 (stating that rules of justice
are grounded in convention and interest all who desire peace and order). There is therefore
in Hume a functionalism or consequentialism premised upon a universalistic view of human
nature (which view was not that of narrow egoism), but this functionalism concerns the general
tendencies of conventions.
There is of course a further sense in which Humeans are anti-universalists (or perhaps,
anti-foundationalists). Their anti-rationalism or tendencies to "empiricism" and to
consequentialism constitute a form of rejection of Kantian universalism, in particular the
notion that a universal morality may be derived from a "detached" view of the self.
KUKATHAS, supra note 100, at 20-24. See, HAYEK, Rules and Order, supra note 105, at 6, 34
(arguing that one cannot rationally establish ends, but one can rationally identify effective
means to agreed upon ends); cf. SANDEL, LIMITS OF JUSTICE, supra note 100, at 11-13
(identifying Hume with epistemological version of a sociological critique of Kantian
liberalism); see infra note 118.
118. G. B. Madison, How Individualistic is Methodological Individualism? 4 CRITICAL
REV. 41 (1990) (discussing Hayek's brand of individualism consistent with post-modernism).
To the extent that post-modernism is understood as a rejection of empiricism (itself
understood as human reception of sense data unmediated or unstructured by prior conceptual
categories) it is arguably a rejection of Hume, in favor of Kant, so this aspect of Hayek is in
fact non-Humean. See GRAY, HAYEK ON LIBERTY, supra note 108, at 6-26 (Hayek's Kantian
theory of knowledge, as influenced, inter alia, by his cousin Wittgenstein). See also TAYLOR,
PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS, supra note 11, at 71-72 (Kant's critique of Hume's "atomistic"
epistemology insisted upon a background structure by which Humean impressions are
rendered intelligible). On the other hand, Hume's empiricism may be understood as a
rejection of the view that behavior is to be assessed by reference to rational foundations in
favor of the view that it is to be understood instead by reference to the observed givens of
human interaction, RUSSELL, supra note 108 at 71-82. It therefore finds a parallel in Hayek's
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pretivism"" 9 and emphasizes the "social construction" of the individu-
al,'20 without thereby adopting an organic view of society.
121
This last point requires emphasis. If "Humeans" believe that persons
are social products, such that their ends or goods are socially given and
their behaviors largely socially determined, how can they then also
believe that these ends are diverse, held individually and pursued self-
interestedly? A partial answer is that the variety of social ends is a
function of the characteristics of the society in question. A complex,
"modem" society will be characterized by a greater number and variety
of goods than a "primitive" one." Perhaps a more important answer
is that emphasis upon the social is not incompatible with a commitment
to subjectivity."2 If persons are socially constructed, there are impor-
rejection of Misean a priori analysis. Karl Milford, In Pursuit of Rationality, A Note on
Hayek's Counter Revolution of Science, in HAYEK, CO-ORDINATION AND EVOLUTION: His
LEGACY IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 323-40 (Jack
Birner & Rudy van Zijp eds., 1994) [hereinafter Milford, In Pursuit of Rationality].
Hayek's Kantian epistemology does not, however, imply acceptance of detached Kantian
rationality. For Kant, the detached self is ultimately that which permits what would otherwise
be a series of unrelated impressions to be instead unified and coherent. TAYLOR,
PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS, supra note 11, at 15; SANDEL, LIMITS OF JUSTICE, supra note
100, at 12-13. For Hayek, by contrast, the mechanism by which coherence is rendered possible
is social and cultural. See Hayek, Individualism: True and False, supra note 110, at 15;
FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, The Political Order of a Free People, in VOL. III, LAW,
LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: A NEW STATEMENT OFTHE LEGAL PRINCIPLES OFJUSTICE AND
POLITICAL ECONOMY 157 (1979) [hereinafter Hayek, The Political Order of Free People].
119. Compare Taylor, Interpretation and the Science of Man, supra note 13, at 32-34
(criticizing "empiricist" social science on ground that it ignores intersubjective meaning) with
HAYEK, THE COUNTER REVOLUTION OF SCIENCE, supra note 109, at 38-40 (criticizing
uncritical application of the methods of the natural sciences to social science on ground that
it ignores intersubjective meaning). See RAIMONDO CUBEDDU, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE
AUSTRIAN SCHOOL 34-64 (1993); G. B. Madison, Hayek and the Interpretive Turn, 3 CRITICAL
REV. 160 (1989) (portraying Hayek as anti-scientistic interpretivist); JAMES M. BUCHANAN,
WHAT SHOULD ECONOMISTS Do?, supra note 96, at 39-112 (generally criticizing economics
as "objective prediction," relying partly on Hayek).
120. HAYEK, Individualism: True and False, supra note 110.
121. F. A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT, THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM 112-13 (1989)
(rejecting communitarianism) [hereinafter HAYEK, FATAL CONCEIT].
122. Cf. HAYEK, Rules and Order, supra note 105, at 165-76 (criticizing attempts to
return modem society to moralities of primitive cultures).
123. There are a number of possible interpretations of subjectivity. Stephen Boehm, The
Ambiguous Notion of Subjectivism: Comment on Lachman, in METHOD, PROCESS, AND
AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS, ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LUDWIG VON MISES 41-52 (Israel Kirzner ed.,
1982) [hereinafter Boehm, The Ambiguous Notion of Subjectivism]. One is that it refers to
the proper subject matter or unit of analysis of the social sciences (that is, the meaning of
phenomena to the persons experiencing the phenomena, including intersubjective meaning).
HAYEK, The Subjective Character of The Data of the Social Sciences, in COUNTER-
REVOLUTION OF SCIENCE, supra note 109, at 41-60; GRAY, LIBERALISMS, supra note 46, at
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tant senses in which they commonly value ends or goods: a good would
not be recognizable as a good absent a common practice in which and
by means of which it is intersubjectively so recognized."2 4 Moreover,
persons will tend to comply with social "rules": their behavior will be
partially determined by internalized conventions, including in the sense
of unreflective conformity."z  Nevertheless, the particular, call it
marginal, value placed on any good is subjective: it is individually
formulated in comparison with other goods within the peculiarities of
circumstances given that scarcity requires tradeoffs. Subjectivity on this
account is both consistent with social construction of the individual
(unless social construction is implausibly deemed to yield the identity of
persons) and an unalterable "fact," such that it would be operative
within, and tend to subvert efforts to compel conformity to common
valuations.1 6 However, subjectivity is also on this account a normative
98. Notice that an implication of this variation is rejection of unmediated Humean empiricism:
the "facts" viewed by the social scientist are conceived within the theory by reference to which
these facts are approached. Another is the notion that observers are extremely limited in their
knowledge of the assessments made by individuals, so that these assessments are inaccessible
and not subject to detailed control. F. A. Hayek, Economics and Knowledge, in INDIVIDUAL-
ISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 33-56 (1948). See JAMES M. BUCHANAN, 'COST AND CHOICE,
AN INQUIRY IN ECONOMIC THEORY 23-26 (1978) [hereinafter BUCHANAN, COST AND
CHOICE]; James M. Buchanan, Is Economics the Science of Choice?, in WHAT SHOULD
ECONOMISTS Do?, supra note 96, at 39-63. A third but related notion is that costs, understood
as opportunity costs, are subjective, such that substitution at the margin is unpredictable,
uncontrollable and inherently individual, see HAYEK, FATAL CONCEIT, supra note 121, at 97-
98 (equating marginalism and subjectivism). See also DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY
AGREEMENT 47-59 (1986) (defending subjectivist account of value).
124. Hayek, Individualism: True and False, supra note 110. It may therefore be argued
that there are organic elements in Hayek's thought in tension with the "methodological
individualism" implied by a commitment to subjectivity. Barry, supra note 114, at 144-46;
ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW, How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 151 (1991);
Ulrich Witt, The Theory of Societal Evolution, Hayek's Unfinished Legacy, in HAYEK, CO-
ORDINATION AND EVOLUTION: HIS LEGACY IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND THE
HISTORY OF IDEAS 183-87 (Jack Birner & Rudy van Zijp eds., 1994).
125. HAYEK, Individualism: True and False, supra note 110.
126. F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, in INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC
ORDER 77-78 (1948). Neoclassical economics may also be said to advocate subjective value,
but it also assumes the possibility of objective measurement by reference to equilibrium under
perfect competition as a policy norm. James M. Buchanan, Introduction: LSE Cost Theory
in Retrospect, in LSE ESSAYS ON COST 1-18 (James M. Buchanan & G. F. Thirlby eds., 1973);
Harry Garretson, The Relevance of Hayek for Mainstream Economics, in HAYEK, CO-
ORDINATION AND EVOLUTION: HIS LEGACY IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND THE
HISTORY OF IDEAS 95-97 (Jack Birner & Rudy van Zijp eds., 1994) [hereinafter Garretson,
The Relevance of Hayek for Mainstream Economics].
The epistemological problem with central planning-that the knowledge necessary to
economic coordination under it is not available to the planners - follows from subjectivity
understood as individual knowledge of trade-offs, at least if some version of welfare is the
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commitment, as it implies state neutrality. That commitment is further
reflected in the "Humean" account of social rules, as these are interpret-
ed as "abstract" and "procedural," enabling coordination of individual
"plans" in pursuit of individually held ends, but not directive of these
ends. 7
A final important aspect of the Humean variation is that it does not
rely upon rational calculation of cost and benefit either as a depiction of
human behavior or as an explanation of rules or norms. Hume, of
course, relied upon "sympathy" or empathy, a limited capacity to
vicariously experience the welfare of others, as well as self-interest, to
explain behavior, and both Hume and Hayek relied upon uncalculating
norm compliance in their depiction of that behavior." Both viewed
norms as conventions, evolved rules tending to serve in the long run (but
not necessarily in the circumstances of a given case), coordination or
cooperation, understood in terms of mutual advantage.
3. The Hobbesian Variation
It is evident that Hobbes may be cited as a basis for economic
analysis of the firm and as a basis for economic analysis of human
behavior generally. There are, however, variations on Hobbesian
rational calculation that yield moralities consistent with classically liberal
themes. The Hobbesian variations in question employ Hobbes' rational
self-interest supposition to construct a contractarian explanation of
existing or preferred human arrangements, but deny that this method
yields Hobbes' version of Leviathan." 9 The basic argument starts with
the proposition that persons are partial to their projects: they are "self-
interested" in the sense that they have reasons to prefer their projects
and no reasons, or less powerful ones, to assess these projects from an
objective of central planning. For an overview of the central planning debate consult Willem
Keizer, Hayek's Critique of Socialism, in HAYEK, CO-ORDINATION AND EVOLUTION: His
LEGACY IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 207-31 (Jack
Birner & Rudy van Zijp eds., 1994) [hereinafter Keizer, Hayek's Critique of Socialism].
127. HAYEK, The Political Order of Free People, supra note 118, at 153-76; HAYEK,
Rules and Orders, supra note 105, at 35-36. Cf. OAKESHOTT, ON HUMAN CONDUCT, supra
note 64 (generally distinguishing rationally-directed orders and purpose-independent orders
and favoring latter version of "civil society").
128. HUME, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS, supra note 108, at 178-90. HAYEK, Individualism:
True and False, supra note 110, at 23-25.
129. BUCHANAN, LIMITS OF LIBERTY, supra note 105; GAUTHIER, supra note 123;
LOMASKY, supra note 46; JAN NARVESAN, THE LIBERTARIAN IDEA (1988).
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impersonal, detached viewpoint. 3 ° It then argues that the source of
"morality" (or of rights) may be found in the agreement of self-
interested actors seeking mutual advantage.'
Three aspects of such Hobbesian theories are of particular interest.
First, Hobbesians reject the Kantian conception of rationality as
detached impartiality in favor of an instrumental conception: impartiality
is denied by a premise of partiality to one's own purposes or goods and
rationality is a matter of efficacious pursuit of these purposes or
goods.132 Second, moral constraint is explained by rational self interest.
It is not something shared by virtue of autonomous reason divorced from
individually held ends, nor is it something explained in part by a human
capacity for sympathy. Rather, it is something rational persons would
impose on themselves because it serves their ends. The notion is that,
in contexts of human interaction, gains from cooperation are possible.
Some Hobbesians, call them neo-Hobbesians, claim, for example, that a
rational persons will cooperate ("trust" in the sense of "risk defection")
if (1) the gain he expects from mutual cooperation exceeds the payoff
from expected mutual defection (non-trust or non-cooperation), and (2)
he assigns a sufficiently high probability of cooperation from the other(s)
engaged in the interaction.1 33  Contrary to the predictions of standard
130. GAUTHIER, supra note 123, at 21-59; LOMASKY, supra note 46, at 19-34. This
notion of partiality does not require in any of these thinkers a "narrow egoism;" it requires
merely an individuated conception of the good, understood in terms of subjectivism.
GAUTHIER, supra note 123, at 47-59; LOMASKY, supra note 46, at 244-46; cf. LARMORE, supra
note 54, at 71-73 (even if all ends were benevolent, there would be no unanimity of opinion
about the content of the good life).
131. For an overview and critique, see KYMLICKA, supra note 63, at 125-32. The
statement in the text equates moral constraint and rights, but this is an oversimplification of
Gauthier's view. See infra note 133.
132. GAUTHIER, supra note 123, at 6-7, 236-37; LOMASKY, supra note 46, at 42-45, 247-
50; cf. LARMORE, supra note 54, at 77-90 (rejecting Kantian rationality as source of
motivation). But see GAUTHIER, supra note 123, at 344-51 (retaining species of autonomy as
some capacity for reflective choice of ends).
133. GAUTHIER, supra note 123, at 157-89. Gauthier's particular theory is that the
content of the moral constraint to which bargainers would agree from an original position
conforms to "minimax relative concession" in division of surplus, one that typically yields
equal or proportional shares of surplus to contributors. See id. at 129-56. Moreover, Gauthier
distinguishes rights from moral constraints yielded by this bargaining by treating the former
as initial starting points. See id. at 190-232. These starting points are generated in his theory
by an interpretation of the "Lockean proviso" that follows Nozick, in effect a variation on a
pareto criterion (one is entitled to a thing if one's acquisition leaves others no worse off as
measured by one's hypothetical absence from the scene). Id. at 203-05. Nevertheless, the
theory predicates these rights on mutual self-interest. See id. at 216-17. Lomasky, by contrast,
predicates rights, understood in terms of moral constraints, on an evolutionary process by
which mutual advantage in compliance is recognized; or at least becomes dominant, among
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forms of rational choice and game theory, as well as strains within
neoclassical economic theory of the firm, neo-Hobbesians predict
cooperation on the basis that persons cultivate and communicate
cooperative dispositions." 4 One implication is that moral constraints
are sustainable as practices to the extent that they serve self-interest.
Another is that practices should be interpreted by reference to this
framework.
Third, neo-Hobbesians argue that moral constraints, founded in
rational self-interest, serve as a basis or framework from which and
within which persons come both to value these constrains as goods and
to value participation with others in instrumental activity.135 There are
a number of interrelated thoughts here. Persons engage in purposive or
instrumental activity because they value the ends served by that activity,
but value, as well, the activity; the activity of striving is essential to
human fulfillment, but fulfillment requires instrumentalism.1 36  Persons
comply with rational constraints-those that maximize their expected
payoffs given the expected actions of others-but come to intrinsically
persons who are partially empathetic or altruistic. LOMASKY, supra note 46, at 62-83.
Lomasky's Hobbesianism is therefore moderated by a Humean device. Narveson generally
follows Gauthier's rational choice/contract approach, but finds both Gauthier's minimax
relative concession criterion and his distinction between moral constraint and rights
unnecessary. NARVESON, supra note 129, at 187-97. Binmore rejects both minimax relative
concession and Gauthier's reliance upon disposition as a basis for non-defection in the one-
shot prisoner's dilemma. BINMORE, PLAYING FAIR, supra note 89, at 78-84, 179-87. He
nevertheless suggests a social contract (set of ethical conventions) predicated on "enlightened
self-interest" and "reciprocity." See BINMORE, PLAYING FAIR, supra note 89, at 1-92. For
present purposes, these differences are unimportant. The principal "Hobbesian" point is that
cooperation, including non-defection for self-interested reasons, has its source in self-interest
and is sustained by self-interest.
134. GAUTHIER, supra note 123, at 165-89; LOMASKY, supra note 46, at 70-71, 244-45.
The argument here is distinct both from an arguments from strategy (such as tit for tat) in
repeated play, see ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984), and from
arguments from reputation. See DAVID M. KREPS, GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC
MODELING 65-87 (1990); David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, supra
note 89. The notion, at least in Gauthier and perhaps in Lomasky, is one of the disposition,
rather than calculation. Cf. NOZICK, RATIONALITY, supra note 89, at 50-59 (relying upon
evidential decision theory and symbolic utility-utility from conformity to a person's view of
the kind of person he wishes to be-to generate cooperation). But see BINMORE, PLAYING
FAIR, supra note 89, at 173-256 (rejecting dispositional theories as solutions to prisoner's
dilemma).
135. GAUTHIER, supra note 123, at 330-55; LOMASKY, supra note 46, at 101-110.
136. GAUTHIER, supra note 123, at 331-35. Jon Elster, obviously a theorist operating
partially within rational choice and just as obviously proceeding from a distinct political
perspective, takes a similar view of the dependence of the intrinsic value of activity on its
instrumentalism. ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES, supra note 105, at 43-108; Elster, Self-Realization
in Work and Politics, supra note 11, at 127, 130-31, 148-50.
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value constraints having this instrumental character; persons cooperate
with others in search of their individual ends, but come to value
intrinsically this cooperation. To the extent that neoclassical economic
analysis may be deemed a branch of Hobbesian thought, it typically
ignores (and perhaps rejects) this notion of valued constraint. Consider
the matter of the constraint of the norm of promise keeping. For the
legal economist, the matter of keeping, or not, a promise entails a
rational cost/benefit calculation in which performance or breach are
purely instrumental. For Hobbesians entertaining a valued constraint
hypothesis, performance itself may be valued, and may be weighed as
such in this cost/benefit calculation.
4. Some General Distinctions
Three initial questions arise from this summary of distinct positions
with a "liberal" camp: (1) what are the principal distinctions between the
positions, (2) what are the distinctions between these positions and
neoclassical economic analysis, and (3) what are the implications of the
positions for a contractual conception of the firm.
It would seem reasonably clear that the positions, if employed by a
classical liberal, have in common commitments to a private sphere
immunized from requirements of public justification, and, therefore,
commitments to a neutral and confined version of the state that
precludes "state perfectionism" (endorsement by or pursuit of a good by
the state). On a classical interpretation of each, all define this sphere at
least in part in terms of several property rights and all reject redistribu-
tionist notions, including those founded on positive liberty as affording
equal means to satisfaction of individual ends. Moreover, each would
seem to support some version of a classical contract theory, one deeming
contract (and legal enforcement of contract) justified by the "freedom"
of the individual to pursue his autonomously chosen or socially given
ends and, therefore, one predicated upon some version of consent.'37
137. For contractual theories predicated on freedom and consent, see, e.g., CHARLES
FRIED, CONTRACT As PROMISE (1981); Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract,
supra note 73. Fried's theory relies upon Kantian autonomy, FRIED, supra at 9-17. Barnett's
relies heavily upon Hayek. Barnett, The Sounds of Silence, supra note 73. This leads to
distinct conceptions of consent, reflected in the distinction between subjective and objective
views of contract. Craswell, Philosophy of Promising, supra note 73, at 524-25. Kantian
autonomy would seem to require "true" subjective consent and to justify, at least on some
variations of positive liberty, substantial judicial control of the conditions under which contract
was formed. Cf MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1993)
(generally presenting a balanced account of contract, linking issues of meaning and scope of
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Nevertheless, there are important distinctions between the positions.
The Kantian view implies, at least as an ideal, detached capacity for
evaluation both of available ends or goods and of the social arrange-
ments within which these are pursued. Rationality is on this view a
matter of this evaluation. An implication of this non-instrumental view
of (ideal) human reasoning is a non-consequentialist view of ethics; the
moral is not a function of consequences, so adherence to the moral is
required even though it may generate undesirable consequences. The
Hobbesian, by contrast, either denies or de-emphasizes detached
evaluation of ends, asserting in its place self-interest as partiality to given
ends or goods. Rationality, for the Hobbesian, is the instrumental
rationality of achieving given ends at least cost, including by means of
reciprocal constraint on this activity. An implication of this instrumental
view of reasoning, evident in utilitarianism and in economics, is a
consequentialist view of ethics; that which is "moral" is to be judged by
its consequences. The Humean view shares, in degree, the Hobbesian's
partiality postulate, rejecting the Kantian's detached rationality about
ends. 13' However, the Humean denies the completeness of this postulate.
Instead, partiality is constrained by moral obligation, and although the
substantive content of obligation may have its origin in self-interest and
mutual advantage, obligation is conventional and the sense or sentiment
of obligation is partially founded in empathy, not rational calculation.1 39
consent to autonomy and welfare values). Hayekian sociology implies reliance upon common,
intersubjective meaning and therefore conventional understandings of behavior, and might be
expected to formulate less exacting standards for assessing whether a contractual choice
reflected an expression of "free will."
138. For Hume, reason is the servant of "passion." HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN
NATURE, supra note 105, at 413-18. Hayek may be viewed as rejecting the notion of human
nature in favor of cultural determinism. KUKATHAS, supra note 100, at 90-91, 128. However,
it is reasonably clear that for Hayek, man is a partially purposeful creature, that purposes are
diverse and that value, at the margin, is subjective. What distinguishes Hayek is that these
matters are treated in terms of dispersed "knowledge" or information. Hayek, Individualism:
True and False, supra note 110, at 13-14; Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, supra note
126, at 77-78. Of course, if dispersed knowledge includes knowledge of individually held
purposes, this distinction breaks down. Cf. Bianchi, supra note 111, at 240 (noting that
cooperation problems entail conflicts of interest that cannot be reduced to problem of
dispersed knowledge).
139. HUME, TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, supra note 105, at 484-501. See Hayek,
Individualism: True and False, supra note 110, at 13-14 (rejecting narrow egoism). Whether
there is a real distinction between Humeans and Hobbesians on this point is problematic.
Compare GAUTHIER, supra note 123, at 236-38, 308-09 (making the distinction), with
LOMASKY, supra note 46 at 62-79 (deriving rights in part from an appeal to empathy). See
BUCHANAN, WHAT SHOULD ECONOMISTS DO?, supra note 96, at 52-63 (arguing in favor of
subjectivism and questioning homo economicus). Indeed, the theorists here identified, roughly,
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Moreover, the Humean denies that human behavior may be explained
by instrumental rationality understood in terms of calculational
efficacy. 40 Persons, according to the Humean, act purposefully,14'
but often incompetently; social conventions in the strong sense of
institutional patterns having causal efficacy'42 serve as sources of ends
or goods,143 as structures defining that which is instrumentally intelligi-
as Hobbesians tend to combine a "constructivist" Hobbesian social contract theory with
Humean elements. See, e.g., BUCHANAN, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY, supra note 105, at 182 n.
4, 187 n. 7; BUCHANAN, WHAT SHOULD ECONOMISTS Do?, supra note 96, at 93-114;
LOMASKY, supra note 46, at 68-73; GAUTHIER, supra note 123, at 327-29.
140. "Rationality" may be understood as referring to the self-interest postulate, to the
formal rules of rational choice (e.g., consistency) or to both. AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHICS AND
ECONOMICS 12-28 (1987); Amartya Sen, Rational Behavior, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DIC-
TIONARY OF ECONOMICS 68-76 (1987). Calculational efficacy refers to the second of these
possibilities. Hayek, and the Austrians following him, question calculational efficacy.
However, limits on this species of rationality may be of at least three types: (1) deviations
from consistency, see Thaler, supra note 21, at 63-106, (2) deviations from the optimum due
to complexity and limited computational capacity, see, e.g., HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF
MAN 202 (1957), and (3) ignorance (in the sense of dispersed information not coordinated).
The Austrian view emphasizes the last of these. See Esteban F. Thomsen, PRICES AND
KNOWLEDGE, A MARKET PROCESS PERSPECTIVE 63-116 (1992). Cf Keizer, Hayek's Critique
of Socialism, supra note 126, at 221-29 (in socialist calculation debate, Mises emphasized
calculational limitations, complexity and incentives, whereas Hayek emphasized ignorance and
need for discovery of dispersed knowledge).
141. See ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, THE MEANING OF MARKET PROCESS, ESSAYS ON
MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 195-208 (1992) (defending purposefulness interpretation of
self-interest) [hereinafter KIRZNER, THE MEANING OF MARKET PROCESS]. Compare James
M. Buchanan, The Domain of Subjective Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral
Philosophy, in METHOD, PROCESS, AND AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS, ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
LUDWIG VON MISES 7-20 (Israel Kirzner ed., 1982) (distinguishing active choice and passive
routine and claiming both are phenomenon), with Karen I. Vaughn, Subjecticism, Predictability
and Creativity: Comment on Buchanan, in METHOD, PROCESS, AND AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS,
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LUDWIG VON MISES 21-29 (Israel Kirzner ed., 1982) (discussing routine
as product of learning).
142. By causal efficacy is meant a capacity to motivate or to so structure perception as
to limit perceived alternatives. Cf. Ronald Jepperson, Institutions, Institutional Effects and
Institutionalism, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 143-63
(Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991) (contrasting institutional and methodologi-
cally individualists analyses in part on ground that former treats institutions as causes). It
should be noticed that, while Hayekian analyses are committed to methodological
individualism, they are also "institutional" within Jepperson's meaning. They are methodologi-
cally individualist in asserting that individuals are the sole observables and in asserting that
institutions (like preferences) should not be taken as given (so they are explained as the
unintended products of individual interaction).
143. It would seem obvious that goods or ends are social products in the sense that they
cannot be individually invented from whole cloth (though they may be individually invented
as variations upon the socially given, such that a good is social only at a given level of
generality). Interestingly, Hayek can be read as asserting the distinct additional claim that
persons know the goods they seek through a process of interpersonal discovery, such that
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ble and as moderators of incompetence given an imperfect human
tendency to calculational efficacy.1" The Humean tendency to explain
norms or social rules as instrumental but to view persons as followers of
these rules implies traditionalist ethics: the Humean, albeit a consequen-
tialist of sorts, rejects fine tuned consequentialist assessments and
therefore opts for the morality implicit in or revealed by convention.
Humeans and Hobbesians may therefore be said to be committed to
distinct conceptions of contractarianism. Hobbesians explain human
behavior, moral norms, and institutional patterns in terms of contract, as
products of rational exchange, and favor contract as the formal legal
(state-enforced) means of human interaction. Humeans explain
behavior, norms, and institutions as conventions, or products of
evolutionary processes that tend to generate order of a classically liberal
variety, not as rational bargains, but also favor contract as the occasion
for state enforced interaction. There is, perhaps, a more radical
distinction. Reliance upon socially generated norms for purposes of
ensuring social order may be viewed as an alternative to state enforced
contract. Humeans favor the norm alternative; Hobbesians tend to favor
the contractual one. The Hobbesian tendency, when pushed, generates
a form of legal centrality: human relationships are reconceived in
contractual terms and the state is assumed to have a central role in
formulating and enforcing these terms.
Still, the matters distinguishing Humean and Hobbesian positions are
less severe than those separating them from the Kantian position. They
share a rejection of Kantian detachment and a commitment to the notion
that morality, and certainly law,145 must be predicated on a recognition
these goods are not givens, but subject instead to a process of revision. KUKATHAS, supra
note 100, at 97-98. This view resembles the communitarian claim that persons must discover
within their culture their goods (rather than invent or choose them through detached
rationality), but the political, conversational means to this end advocated by communitarians
is rejected.
144. For Hayek, rationality is itself a social phenomenon, not a property of the
individual; reason is an interpersonal process, not one articulated (as through politics), but
revealed in action and introspection. See Hayek, Individualism: True and False, supra note
110, at 8-9, 15.
145. There are, however, a number of complexities to the point. First, Hobbesian
theorists tend to derive "morality" and "basic moral rights" from a prudential, contractual
framework within which partiality to one's ends is basic, but to indicate that legal (or political)
instantiations will vary with cultural context. See GAUTHIER, supra note 123, at 340-42;
LOMASKY, supra note 46, at 103-05. A separation of law and morality is a potential
interpretation. Second, Humeans may be viewed as distinguishing law from morality by
treating "justice" as predicated solely upon partiality (interest) and morality as arising from
empathy or sympathy. See GAUTHIER, supra note 123, at 308-09 (so viewing Hume). Cf
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of individual partiality to diverse ends, and therefore a conception of law
as modus vivendi, that is, as a prudential means to ensuring peace.'46
If one is to make judgments about or claims on others in moral terms,
morality must be an intersubjective phenomenon, but it is not for
Humeans and Hobbesians, as it is in Kant, an objective obligation
independent of ends or independent of its instrumental efficacy in
achieving desired ends. Agreement about the dictates of morality,
therefore, largely rests for Humeans and Hobbesians upon intersubject-
ive appreciation of the utility or prudential usefulness of moral dictates,
upon habitual compliance with conventions originating in such utility
and, in Hume, upon sympathy as limited vicarious pleasure from the
welfare of others.147
Rejection of Kantian detachment implies that Humean and Hobbes-
ian positions are compatible with the communitarian notion that persons
are socially constructed in the sense, at least, that purposes, projects or
ends are largely given. Insistence upon partiality nevertheless places
limits on sustainable social institutions under both positions. Moreover,
the distinctions between the Humean's emphasis upon rule or norm
governed behavior and the Hobbesian's emphasis upon rational
calculation can be exaggerated. The neo-Hobbesian notion that persons
LOMASKY, supra note 46, at 228-54 (distinguishing basic rights from morality). Hayek's
version of liberal neutrality (abstract general rules) has its source in his "dispersed knowledge"
conception of partiality (and skeptical view of the capacity of authority to discover a common
substantive good), but neutral law for him is a matter of deriving it from an evolved social
practice interpreted as neutral and facilitative. If law is derivative, the distinction between law
and morality is unclear. On the other hand, if the social practice to be legally enforced must
be of a particular type, the distinction may reappear. FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, The Mirage
of Social Justice, in Vol. II LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: A NEW STATEMENT OF THE
LEGAL PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 56-78 (1976) [hereinafter Hayek,
The Mirage of Social Justice]. For overviews of Hayek's theories of law consult Norman P.
Barry, The Road to Freedom, Hayek's Social and Economic Philosophy, in HAYEK, CO-
ORDINATION AND EVOLUTION: HIS LEGACY IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND THE
HISTORY OF IDEAS (Jack Birner & Rudy van Zijp eds., 1994); GRAY, supra note 108, at 56-78;
Symposium, 23 SW. U. L. REV. 425 (1994). Third, nevertheless, the Humean and Hobbesian
theories under consideration seem clearly to contemplate a neutral state (one precluded from
endorsing a good) not because such a state reflects an ideal of detached evaluation, but
because partiality (or partiality as ignorance) demands it.
146. LARMORE, supra note 54, at 70-77 most clearly expresses the modus vivendi view,
but it is a notion consistent with Hayek, KUKATHAS, supra note 100, at 225-27, and with the
thrust of the Hobbesian analysis. Cf COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 73, at 65-72
(markets serve function of enabling stability given diverse conceptions of good, are, contra
Gauthier, a form of cooperation, and this commitment to stability is Humean, rather than
Hobbesian or Kantian).
147. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, supra note 105, at 186-90, 195, 499-500;
HUME, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS, supra note 108, at 213-18.
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come to value the rules or norms that constrain instrumental action at
least suggests that norm compliance need not entail continuous rational
calculation in each instance of such compliance. The neo-Hobbesian
effort is to explain norms, rules and rights in terms of rational calcula-
tion, not necessarily human acts of compliance in these terms. Persons
on such an account of norms, may behave "as if" rational, even when
they are subjectively non-calculating."
What distinguishes neoclassical economic analysis from these
positions? It should be apparent that the Humean and Hobbesian
rejection of Kantian detachment is reflected in the legal economists'
assumption of exogenous preference. Neoclassical analysis assumes
individually held ends or goods (without inquiring into their legitimacy
or source) and analyzes the instrumental pursuit of these ends on the
further assumptions of partiality (self-interest) and calculational efficacy
(compliance with the formal requirements of rational choice).'49 The
Humean, but not the Hobbesian, will assert partial objections to these
features of the economist's analysis: assumptions about calculational
efficacy are for the Humean in doubt, and, while partiality may be
assumed, the economist's specification of that which individuals seek,
made in service of prediction, violates the Humean's commitment to
subjectivity.' The Humean is skeptical about calculational efficacy,
148. GAUTHIER, supra note 123, at 326-29; LOMASKY, supra note 46, at 72-74;
NARVESON, supra note 129, at 144-45.
149. See Amartya Sen, Rational Behavior, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS 68 (1978); AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 10-12 (1987).
150. The argument here attributed to a "Humean" position is that contemporarily made
by the "Austrian School" attack on neoclassical economics (derived, in part, from Hayek, The
Use of Knowledge in Society, in INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER, supra note 126).
For accessible summaries of the Austrian school see, e.g., Michael E. DeBow, Markets,
Government Intervention, and the Role of Information: An "Austrian School" Perspective, With
An Application to Merger Regulation, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 31 (1991); Roy E. Cardato,
Subjective Value, Time Passage, and the Economics of Harmful Efforts, 12 HAMLINE L. REV.
229 (1989); Don Bellanto & Philip K. Porter, A Subjectivist Economic Analysis of Govern-
ment-Mandated Employee Benefits, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 657 (1990); Christopher
T. Wonnell, Contract Law and the Austrian School of Economics, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 507
(1986). It should be noted that, as a matter of intellectual history, the Austrian position
cannot be said to have been derived directly from Hume (or the Scottish Enlightment
generally); its origins, albeit diverse, are Austrian. See generally RAIMONDO CUBEDDU, THE
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE AUSTRIAN SCHOOL (1993); Richard Ebeling, Austrian
Economics-An Annotated Bibliography: The Austrian Economists, in AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS,
A READER 3-39 (Richard Ebeling ed., 1991). Nevertheless, its skepticism about rational
design of social institutions and traditionalist respect for undirected order is Humean in spirit.
At a general level, the Austrians (and other economists, such as James Buchanan
influenced by them) claim that value (and therefore opportunity cost) is a matter of the
evaluation by persons in particular contexts, a calculation inaccessible to observers. See, e.g.,
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Buchanan, LSE Cost Theory In Retrospect, in LSE ESSAYS ON COST, supra note 126; E. C.
Pasour, Jr. Cost and Choice, Austrian vs. Conventional Views, in AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS, A
READER, supra at 281-303. This does not preclude inter-subjective recognition of a good as
a good; rather it precludes observer specification of the particular value of a recognized good
relative to other goods and to particular persons in particular contexts. See Richard Ebeling,
Toward a Hermeneutical Economics: Expectations, Prices and the Role of Interpretation in a
Theory of the Market Process, in SUBJECTIVISM INTELLIGIBILITY AND ECONOMIC
UNDERSTANDING 39,46-52 (Israel Kirzner ed., 1986). Cf GAUTHIER, supra note 123, at 53-55
(making similar argument). It should be noted that there is a debate within Austrian circles
about the degree of subjectivism that should be assumed, particularly in the context of
uncertainty about the future and therefore about the possibility of coordination. See, e.g.,
Norman Barry, Commentary, in AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS, PERSPECTIVES ON THE PAST AND
PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE 45, 51-52 (Richard M. Eberling ed., 1991). It should also be
noticed that there is an ambiguity in the notion of subjective value. It may refer to the
inability of an observer to detect the valuation of another (the problem of observer
knowledge), in which event it is abstractly possible that valuations will be identical among
persons even though they cannot be observed. It may refer to the particular chooser's lack
of complete knowledge (the problem of chooser knowledge), in which event it is abstractly
possible that there is a common valuation given complete information, even though this
complete information cannot be observed. It may refer to the (asserted) difference between
choosers, such that it is claimed that, given that choosers possess equivalent and full
information, they would still (or potentially still) make distinct choices. The first of these
possibilities expresses skepticism about prediction and control, the second skepticism about
perfect information assumptions and the third a claim about the distinctiveness of individual
persons. All three appear present in Austrian thought.
An Austrian claim is that neoclassical analysis assumes objectivity. See e.g., ROY E.
CARDATO, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND EXTERNALITIES IN AN OPEN ENDED UNIVERSE, A
MODERN AUSTRIAN PERSPECTIVE 4-10 (1992) [hereinafter CARDATO, WELFARE ECONOM-
ICS]; Garrestson, The Relevance of Hayek for Mainstream Economics, supra note 126, at 94-
108; S. C. Littlechild, The Problems of Social Cost, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN AUSTRIAN
ECONOMICS 77-93 (Louis Spadaro ed., 1978). This claim may seem odd, as economists within
a neoclassical tradition also claim that their theories rest at least aspirationally on an
approximation of subjective choice. See, e.g., POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra
note 70, at 12-16. The Austrian claim may be understood in a number of ways. First, the
claim may be that, to the extent neoclassical analysis (and particularly welfare economics)
specifies a welfare function, it is expressly objective, and this objective measure is unrelated
to "utility" (understood as satisfaction). This seems clearly to be the case: wealth, if specified
as the objective, is specified to avoid the problem of interpersonal comparison of utilities.
Lawson, supra note 81, at 92-96; COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW, supra note
78, at 105-11. Cf. David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract
Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1843-44 (1991) (noting that the taboo on interpersonal
comparison is violated in assumptions about uniformity of transactors in hypothetical contract)
[hereinafter Charney, Hypothetical Bargains]. This objective measure is undertaken so as to
enable the welfare analysis, so this Austrian complaint would then seem to be either that
wealth is a poor proxy for utility; cf. Herbert Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law and Economics,
78 CAL. L. REV. 815 (1990) (making a diminishing marginal utility variation on this claim).
See Israel M. Kirzner, Another Look at the Subjectivism of Costs, in SUBJECTIVISM,
INTELLIGIBILITY AND ECONOMIC UNDERSTANDING, supra at 140,148-51 [hereinafter Kirzner,
Another Look].
Second, the Austrian claim may be understood in terms of the incompleteness or
inadequacy of the neoclassical analyst's information. This problem is partially recognized by
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mainstream legal economists in their preference for voluntary (pareto superior) allocations
over directed allocations. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 70, at 15. The
Austrian variation is to challenge equilibrium prices as an adequate reference. Consider this
neoclassical argument: given a perfect competitive equilibrium, the opportunity cost of a
commodity is the same for all consumers-the market price (dollars that must be given up for
the commodity). One Austrian response to this reasoning is that the utilities given up are not
the same as the dollars given up. Kirzner, Another Look, supra at 150-151. Another is to
question equilibrium, as the Austrian view is that, while there is a tendency to equilibrium (a
point denied by sufficiently radical subjectivists), it is not a state of the real world. If
equilibrium is not a real state, prices are information, but not objective information, as they
are incomplete reflections of a constantly changing state of affairs. See CARDATO, WELFARE
ECONOMICS, supra at 95-99 (criticizing Coasian property rights analysis and mainstream
economic analysis of law generally for reliance on assumption that market prices reflect all
relevant information). A further implication is that competitive equilibrium is not a
benchmark or criterion for assessment of real world phenomena, or a state to be mimicked.
If the real world is one of constant change, a static equilibrium state is not one that can or
should be directed. See, e.g., GERALD P. O'DRISCOLL & MARIO J. RIzzo, THE ECONOMICS
OF TIME AND IGNORANCE 22-27, 140-42 (1985).
Third, the Austrian claim may be understood as one about the fictitious character of
social cost: one cannot contemplate efficiency as a state of equalizing all cost and benefit (or
of internalizing the social cost, or cost to others, of one's activity) because there is no "one"
available for engaging in this activity. That is, if cost is subjective, and if there is no group
mind, then there cannot be such a thing as a social cost. See, e.g., BUCHANAN, COST AND
CHOICE, supra note 123, at 70-74; Kirzner, Another Look, supra at 151-55. There is another
way of putting this point. In Coasean terms, externalities generate inefficiency only in the
presence of transaction costs, so the notion of externality and the notion of transaction costs
become equated. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960).
Neoclassical analysis of law recommends rules or allocations that conform to a hypothetical
state of affairs, one without transaction costs. The Austrian claim is that this hypothetical
state of affairs is illegitimate because it requires a fictional, objective estimate. Kirzner,
Another Look, supra at 152-55. An implication is that "efficiency" is not a state independent
of transaction costs. For example, a decision not to bribe a polluter where the neighbor
values use of the air more than the polluter but transaction costs preclude exchange cannot
be said to be inefficient because there is no one who can say that in fact the neighbor values
use of the air more than the polluter in the absence of an actual exchange. See COLEMAN,
MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW, supra note 78, at 135-50 (discussing Buchanan); CARL
DAHLMAN, THE PROBLEM OF EXTERNALITY IN THE THEORY OF MARKET FAILURE, A
CRITICAL EXAMINATION 209 (Taylor Cowen ed., 1988) (externalities imply no welfare
problem where transaction costs recognized as constraints).
Notice, however, that this claim is implausible to the extent that it is interpreted as
denying the existence of externality; surely actor X's activity may impose costs on actor Y as
Y perceives them, even if they can impose no "social cost" as a fictive social mind would
perceive them. A more plausible interpretation is this: it can be granted that Y experiences
a subjective cost from X's activity, but it is not possible to adjudicate the conflict between X
and Y by reference to an authoritative estimate and comparison of the benefit to X of the
activity and the cost to Y of the activity. This conclusion would seem to preclude most of
neoclassical economic analysis of law. But see DAHLMAN, supra at 231-32 (Coasian analysis
permits comparative institutional assessment). However, it also presents a problem for the
Austrian economist. The Austrian can say that the conflict can be "efficiently" resolved by
agreement between X and Y (because the Austrian defines efficiency as voluntary
agreement-i.e., as plan coordination), but agreement requires assumed allocation of initial
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but even more skeptical about the economist's "scientism" and "con-
structivism." ' ' The Humean is therefore a traditionalist because, he
claims, the economist lacks the "information" necessary to her analysis
and because, he further claims, the analysis misrepresents, through
oversimplification, the complexities of human interaction. The neo-
Hobbesian, however, may also be a traditionalist: if norms (and
sustainable legal arrangements) have their origins in rational bargaining,
they are both entitled to respect on this basis and potentially forces
structuring what is conceivable to persons who do not directly perceive
rights (to engage or not in X's activity). However, the Austrian's subjectivism apparently
precludes him from saying anything (at least in terms of efficiency) about this allocation. See
CARDATO, WELFARE ECONOMICS, supra at 99 (an "ethical approach," rather than efficiency,
must be invoked to allocate rights); cf. POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note
8, at 442-53 (traditionalism, including Hayek's, provides no basis for critique of practice);
COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW, supra note 78, at 145-50 (Buchanan's subject-
ivist realism precludes social choice unless these assumptions are relaxed); KIRZNER, THE
MEANING OF MARKET PROCESS, supra note 141, at 186-88 (Hayekian critique of welfare
economics generates Panglossian risks).
It should be noticed, however, that this self-disabling does not necessarily preclude the
Austrian from saying something political or moral. Austrians tend to think they can say
something about institutional structure (as distinguished from hypothetical exchange or
allocation within structure). Specifically, they favor institutional structures of fully specified
property rights and voluntary exchange, arguing that such structures serve plan coordination
as a normative commitment. See, e.g., CARDATO, WELFARE ECONOMICS, supra at 99-108;
KIRZNER, MEANING OF MARKET PROCESS, supra note 141, at 189-92, 209-276. But see
Lawson, supra note 81, at 96-97 (questioning whether this criterion can survive radical
subjectivist critique). Similarly, Austrian "conservatism" or "traditionalism"-the tendency
to favor adherence to evolved custom or convention even where such adherence may not be
"wealth maximizing" in particular circumstances from a neoclassical perspective-may be
explained as a solution to the problem of the disabling implications of subjectivism. Social
norms, because not rationalistically directed (e.g., not consciously designed to serve the end
of maximizing social wealth) are not products of an "objectivist" error. Given an
evolutionary hypothesis to the effect that norms serving coordination will win out in cultural
competition, see HAYEK, FATAL CONCEIT, supra note 121, a species of indirect utilitarianism
is implied. See, e.g., Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Sr. & Mario S. Rizzo, Subjectivism, Uncertainty and
Rules, in SUBJECTIVISM, INTELLIGIBILITY AND ECONOMIC UNDERSTANDING, supra at 252-67.
151. See supra note 150. The Humean is also skeptical about the Hobbesian's
"constructivism," as the Humean views society as an historical artifact, not as a contractual
design. See HAYEK, Rules and Order, supra note 105, at 9-10 (Hobbes criticized as rationalist);
HAYEK, FATAL CONCEIT, supra note 121, at 12 (Hobbes wrong in postulating pre-social man).
Hume, of course, attacked Hobbes on the ground that the "social contract" assumed a social
practice of contracting. HUME, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS, supra note 108, at 151. This Humean
hostility to "constructivism" is reciprocated. See POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE,
supra note 8, at 433-53 (attacking "Neotraditionalism"). For an interesting account of the
distinction between the Neoclassical and Hayekian positions, see David Charny, Illusions of
a Spontaneous Order: "Norms" in Contractual Relationships, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1841
(1996).
1997] THE PUBLIC, THE PRIVATE AND THE CORPORATION 443
this instrumental rationality.1
52
Humean, and perhaps neo-Hobbesian traditionalism is in substantial
tension with the economist's insistence upon depicting behavior in terms
of rational calculation. Consider this point in terms of the threat posed
by game theory, or, at least, that aspect of game theory that depicts
human behavior in terms of variations on the prisoner's dilemma, to
neoclassical contract: pure rationality may preclude contract, or result
in inefficient contract, and particular bargaining results (or equilibria)
cannot therefore be predicted. Humeans and neo-Hobbesians may be
viewed as addressing (or anticipating) this problem; Humeans by
injecting empathy and uncalculating, norm-governed behavior, neo-
Hobbesians by redefining rationality.'53  Both measures may be
characterized as rendering arms-length, mutually beneficial contract
dependent upon a background condition of expected compliance with
norms that constrain rational pursuit of narrowly construed self-
interested ends.
It is true that the economist shares Humean and Hobbesian
commitments to the "fact" of individual partiality to the particular end
or good individually held, so she shares the notion, contrary to
utilitarian moral hopes, that individuals are motivated by this partiality.
But the economist remains also committed to maximizing a common, at
least formally measurable end; individual motivation is to be manipulated
(through incentives) to achieve this end.5 4 It is also true that the
economist, like the Humean and the Hobbesian, has no substantive
conception of a common good, but the economist nevertheless seeks to
maximize, through a common impersonal and impartial standard, the
152. See, e.g., GAUTHIER, supra note 123, at 330-55. Moreover, it is at least questionable
whether Hobbes shared the Hobbesian's faith in human rationality. See Micheal Oakeshott,
Introduction to THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN vii (Oxford 1948).
153. See supra note 89.
154. For examples of this characterization of utilitarianism, see, e.g., GAUTHIER, supra
note 123, at 7, 52, 341; LARMORE, supra note 54, at 49-50, LOMASKY, supra note 46, at 53-54.
For Hayek's similar characterization and critique of utilitarianism see HAYEK, Mirage of Social
Justice, supra note 145, at 17-23.
Judge Posner (then Professor Posner) sought to distinguish utilitarianism and wealth
maximization in RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 48-87 (1981). The major
ground for such a distinction is that wealth maximization adopts a species of subjectivism: it
is cautious about pronouncements about value (and utility) and thus tends to rely on revealed
preference in markets. See id. at 79-84. Nevertheless, these pronouncements are permitted
in cases of "market failure." Id. at 79. And revealed preference in markets remains a means
to an end, that of serving "wealth" as a common denominator. See POSNER, PROBLEMS OF
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 370-77 (wealth maximization as organic concept).
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sum of individually held goods. 55 What distinguishes Humeans, and
perhaps neo-Hobbesians, is in part their insistence that (a type of)
"morality" is a meaningful category. The type in question, "coordina-
tion" of diverse and partially held ends, has consequentionalist elements,
but it is not a notion captured by "scientific" maximization of a common
quantity,156 for it entails a commitment to, as well as description of
persons both as individuated project pursuers and as "honorable"
cooperators-beings who comply with norms necessary to the mutually
advantageous coordination and cooperation of individuated project
pursuers. The economist, by contrast, tends to deny that morality, at
least for purposes of predictive analysis, is a meaningful category. What
tends also to distinguish Humeans is their denial that maximization of a
common quantity is an epistemic possibility.157
155. The standard, in classical utilitarianism, is weighted by intensity of feeling
"happiness." The standard, under wealth maximization, is weighted by the willingness and
ability to pay. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 70, at 12-16. The
distinction between these quantified standards and the "coordination" criterion employed by
Humeans (particularly Hayek) might be interpreted as one between a mutual advantage
theory and a "interpersonal additive welfarism." RUSSELL HARDIN, MAGIC ON THE
FRONTIER: THE NORM OF EFFICIENCY, 1987, 1990-98 (1996). If so, the Humean's normative
commitment to "coordination" can be understood as one to the institution of contract, but
there remains the problem that this criterion says little about initial allocations. See supra note
150.
156. GAUTHIER, supra note 123, at 5-7; LOMASKY, supra note 46, at 19-34.
157. See HAYEK, Mirage of Social Justice, supra note 145, at 17-23 (noting that
utilitarianism, which is understood as explicit effort at social level to achieve just end state, was
criticized on ground of lack of sufficient knowledge). However, Hayek was a consequentialist
of sorts. See id. at 17 (approving of "means utility," or functionalism). He has been
characterized as an indirect utilitarian. GRAY, HAYEK ON LIBERTY, supra note 108, at 58-61
(Hume and Hayek as indirect utilitarians). More specifically, Hayek's conservative
traditionalism was founded on the notion that spontaneously generated and evolved social
rules would serve the objective of coordination of diverse individual "plans." Such rules are
therefore respected for the consequentialist reason that they serve the end of coordination,
and this consequentialism is distinguished from Benthamite utilitarianism by the absence of
an effort to achieve a precise, measurable end and a refusal to subject such rules to a criterion
of justification having such precise, measurable (rationalistic) features. The difficulties,
however, are that (1) it is not clear why traditionalism should be expected to yield liberal
norms, e.g., GRAY, LIBERALISMS, supra note 46, at 95; and (2) it is not clear how Hayek's anti-
rationalism can be reconciled with any form of consequentialism. KUKATHAS, supra note 100,
at 191-201; cf. POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 433-53 (Hayekian
traditionalism provides no leverage for criticizing practice). On the other hand, perhaps there
is a basis for reconciliation, albeit a messy one: Hayek may be viewed, given that he is
committed to a set of classically liberal normative criteria, as proposing "modesty" or an anti-
hubristic "rationalism," in the sense that he advocates a set of institutional arrangements
thought to have desirable (consequentialist) tendencies but denies that any form of precise
prediction concerning welfare as satisfaction is possible. Judge Posner argues that such an
approach is "a mood rather than a method of analysis." Id. at 443. Perhaps, but the Hayekian
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What does all this imply for corporate law? Perhaps nothing. In the
first place, the Kantian, Humean, and Hobbesian variations on a
classically liberal theme are too abstract and general to warrant a claim
that particular recommendations follow from them,'58 and the themes
critique of "constructivist rationalism" places in question "methods of analysis."
It may be questioned whether the distinction between the economist's common
denominator and the classical liberal's coordination criterion is sustainable. See supra notes
135, 155. Maximizing coordination may mean maximizing civil peace or maximizing the
channels for successful pursuit of individually held projects or maximizing knowledge, etcetera.
For the classical liberal, the means by which this maximization is to occur is an institutional
structure entailing (1) a set of negative rights conferring moral space for pursuit of individually
held ends; (2) a contractarian structure enabling exchange as a means to these ends; and (3)
a formal equality of rights and of access to this structure. Are these not, however, also
typically the features recommended by the legal economist as means to the end of welfare?
And are the justifications for both the classical liberal's and the economist's recommendations
not instrumental and consequentialist? A possible basis for distinguishing the economist's and
the liberal's consequentialism is that the former supports the argument that the recommended
institutional structure is contingent upon its efficacy in promoting welfare, whereas the latter's
consequentialist argument is not necessary to his commitment to that structure; the liberal has
necessitarian arguments (e.g., that the structure is compelled by the nature of man or by the
realities of the human condition) as well as consequentialist ones. This distinction, however,
understates the commitment of both positions to the consequentialist argument; neither is
likely to be convinced that the structure fails to generate predicted consequences. A second
possible basis for distinction is that the liberal's consequentialism tends to take an indirect or
rule utilitarian form and the economist's an act utilitarian form: the liberal (especially the
Humean one) treats the structure as in some long term sense yielding maximization; the
economist is more inclined to a case by case assessment of maximization. Apart from the
proposition that the liberal's commitments to the structure are independent of the
consequential arguments employed to support it, this second distinction would explain the
liberal's insistence upon the inviolability of negative rights and the economist's (and
utilitarian's) insistence upon continuously dispensing with or redefining them in service of
maximization.
Even given these distinctions, however, is that which is to be maximized in the two
positions distinct? Perhaps not: maximizing chances for successful pursuit of projects might
be understood as maximizing prospects for allocating to highest valued use, where "chances"
and "prospects" are understood in rule or indirect utilitarian senses. On the other hand,
maximizing utility in a strict sense is maximizing the sum of human satisfaction, and the
economist's devotion to welfare may be understood in this strict sense as ultimately dependent
upon satisfaction as the common denominator. This may be so even though wealth is formally
independent of satisfaction and therefore not subject to objection from the problem of
interpersonal comparison; wealth appears to be employed in economic analysis as a
(problematic) proxy for satisfaction. The distinction may therefore be that coordination is
independent of satisfaction in the sense that it is a value in itself, not a proxy for sa'tisfaction.
If so, the liberal's conception of human flourishing is one of maximized chances for successful
pursuit as such, not as a means to happiness. Cf. HAYEK, Mirage of Social Justice, supra note
115, at 23 (our ignorance precludes utilitarian project of maximizing pleasure).
158. See GAUTHIER, supra note 123, at 342 (noting that his theory does not consider
concrete questions of "political procedure and institutional design"); LOMASKY, supra note 46,
at 107 (particular instantiations of basic rights will vary with community). Cf. POSNER,
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 55 (complaining that "autonomy" theorists
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within even one of these variations may point in distinct directions.
Consider the Humean variation. Humean traditionalism would seem
generally to suggest a derivative conception of law, one in which legal
norms are derived from social ones.159  It also suggests, however, a
separation of the legal and the social, such that a "neutral" legal
formalism would characterize the former and an evolving social morality
the latter.6 ' If a coordination criterion is employed, so that only those
norms tending to yield coordination of individual plans become
candidates for incorporation into law,'6 ' it remains necessary both to
supply some content for the coordination norm and to reconcile this
consequentialism with traditionalism. Moreover, Humean traditionalism
faces a substantial difficulty when it confronts a society of heterogenous
traditions. A contractarian tradition is a potential response to heteroge-
neity, but it is also a tradition in competition with other traditions.6
generate conflicting recommendations from similar premises); Craswell, Philosophy of
Promising, supra note 73, at 508-10 (various substantive values advocated by liberal theorists).
159. See HAYEK, Rules and Order, supra note 105, at 85-88, 94-123.
160. See HUME, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS, supra note 108, Appendix III. For Hayek,
proper law is neutral and formal in the senses that (1) it has no end or purpose independent
of the expectations of those subject to it, (2) it establishes a protected domain for the
individual, and (3) this domain is established by the predictability of law (it "falls out" of the
"rules"). See HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY, supra note 110, at 142, 207-09. On
the other hand, he (later, under the influence of Bruno Leoni) treats these features as arising
out of the situational logic and traditionalism of common law method. HAYEK, Rules and
Order, supra note 105, at 94-123. See BRUNO LEONI, FREEDOM AND THE LAW 58-94 (3d ed.,
1991). For criticisms of the resulting tensions see GRAY, HAYEK ON LIBERTY, supra note 108,
at 61-71, GRAY, LIBERALISMS, supra note 46, at 89-102, KUKATHAS, supra note 100, at 148-65.
161. HAYEK, Rules and Order, supra note 105, at 119. See Robert D. Cooter,
Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy, 23 SW. U. L. REV. 443 (1994) (selection of
efficient norms for incorporation into law) [hereinafter Cooter, Decentralized Law].
162. See GRAY, LIBERALISMS, supra note 46, at 99 (noting that Oakeshott, unlike Hayek,
recognizes competing "constructivist" tradition). It is often thought that this problem of
competing traditions obviates liberal neutrality. Cf MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES, supra note
104, at 260-77 (liberalism is non-neutral). To the extent, however, that traditions in
competition with liberalism advocate non-neutrality (as in the case of communitarian insistence
upon state selection and enforcement of goods), it is not surprising that liberalism is "non-
neutral" about neutrality; nor is this species of non-neutrality a telling threat to liberal
neutrality. Potentially more telling is the problem of adjudicating clashes between liberal
rights; it is then difficult to see how these adjudications can be made without some evaluation
of the competing ends for which the competing "rights" were exercised. See GRAY,
LIBERALISMS, supra note 46, at 140-60. Hayek's solution resembles neoclassical accounts of
default terms in contract: Once a term is established, known, and predictable, it is possible
to plan one's activities so as to conform to or circumvent it (as though pricing). Neutrality
"falls out" of formalism. An objection is that this fails adequately to preserve "freedom," but
this objection may ignore the minimalist version of (property) rights contemplated. If rights
in the Hohfeldian sense of the enforceable obligations of others are minimized, liberty, in the
Hohfeldian sense of privilege may be maximized. DE JASONY, supra note 99, at 33-51.
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There is a further problem: the corporation, for the "Humeans"
considered here, is not typically viewed as a "spontaneous order."
Rather it is viewed as a "directed order," one characterized not by
spontaneous coordination of diverse purposes, but by subordination of
diverse actors to particular (albeit instrumental) purposes through
rational planning.163
Consider also the neo-Hobbesian variation. It is possible to rule out
on Hobbesian premises a corporate law predicated on pure altruism; if
morality is grounded in self-interest understood as partiality to individu-
ally held ends, legal and nonlegal corporate norms must be explicable by
reference to and are sustainable only if consistent with a species of
cooperative self-interest, even where they become themselves valued.
There is, however, no dearth of "Hobbesian" justifications for communit-
arian corporate norms. A significant strand of corporate communitarian
thought justifies its proposals for (mandatory) legal norms on the basis
that they rationally serve mutual (long-term) interests.1" So Hobbes-
ian premises may not yield unique conclusions.
Nevertheless, it is the contention here that Humean and Hobbesian
themes can serve as explanations of diverse contractarian positions within
corporate law debates.165 In the first place, it is possible to view them
as informing mainstream neoclassical analysis of the firm, despite the
tension between the formally collectivist commitments of the neoclassical
apparatus and the individualistic commitments of classical liberalism.
From a neoclassical economic point of view, the individualistic commit-
ments of classical liberalism justify contract (as by grounding it in a
163. HAYEK, Rules and Order, supra note 105, at 48-52. Cf HAYEK, Political Order of
a Free People, supra note 118, at 89-90 ("organizations" should not be subject to "discretionary
supervision" by government, but their activities may be restricted to greater degree than
individuals). Although the matter is not free from doubt, Hayek's views may be consistent
with an immanent contractarian view of the firm. His conception of contract was expressly
one that treated contracts as largely constructed as "standard forms" and therefore as matters
largely determined by legal norms. F. A. HAYEK, Free Enterprise and Economic Order, in
INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 110 (1948). He also treated the law of corporations
as a subspecies of this point. Id. at 116. His "contractual" view of the corporation reflects,
moreover, the tension in his thought. On the one hand, government should not impose "rigid
limits" or have "considerable powers of direct interference" over them; on the other, they are
largely products of legal decision (rather than purely "free contract") and may be legally
limited (particularly if their size inhibits "competition"). Id.
164. See, e.g., Hazen, The Short-Term/Long-Term Dichotomy and Corporate Law, supra
note 90 (emphasizing long-term mutual benefit); O'Connor, Socio-Economic Approach, supra
note 37 (enhance worker productivity by means of participation); Stone, Employees as Stake-
holders, supra note 4 (mutual benefit within implicit contract).
165. See infra notes 206-16 and accompanying text.
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principle of consent), but fail to provide determinate guidance for
interpreting express agreement or for establishing the background norms
that will control a contractual relationship in the absence of express
agreement.166 As it is essential that the law assume some background
understanding, perhaps there should be no classically liberal objection to
rendering this understanding consistent with that of rational joint wealth
maximization. 67 If so, liberal concerns with autonomy, negative liberty,
etcetera are satisfied within the neoclassical account of contract by
rendering (the analyst's specification of) rational joint wealth maximiza-
tion optional, a non-mandatory norm that may be trumped by express
agreement. Moreover, this background norm is obviously consistent with
Hobbesian partiality and rationality"6 a plausible means of facilitating
"coordination,"' 169 and arguably consistent with consent.' While it is
166. Craswell, Philosophy of Promising, supra note 73, at 513-16. Cf. Charny,
Hypothetical Bargains, supra note 150, at 1825-29 (identifying varieties of "autonomy" theories
and their potential implications). Craswell and Charny both use an "autonomy" label to refer,
broadly, to contractual theories predicated on the value of individual "freedom." I therefore
view them as not limiting their analyses to Kantian variations on the freedom theme. See
Charny, Hypothetical Bargains, supra note 150, at 1825-26 (liberal autonomy serves range of
values). In fact Hayek recognized these arguments at an early point:
[B]eware of the error that the formulas "private property" and "freedom of contract"
solve our problems. They are not adequate answers because their meaning is
ambiguous. Our problems begin when we ask what ought to be the contents of
property rights, what contracts should be enforceable, and how contracts should be
interpreted or, rather, what standard forms of contract should be read into the infor-
mal agreements of every day transactions.
F. A. HAYEK, Free Enterprise and Competitive Order, in INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC
ORDER, supra note 163, at 113 (emphasis added) (paper first delivered 1947).
167. Richard Craswell, Default Rules, Efficiency and Prudence, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISCI-
PLINARY L.J. 289,294-301 (1993). Cf. Charny, Hypothetical Bargains, supra note 150, at 1851-
69 (efficiency as converging with and supplementing autonomy and other paradigms).
168. Gauthier's express reliance upon the economist's version of rational choice is
suggestive, even if his conclusions (e.g., division of surplus proportional to contribution) may
be debated. See GAUTHIER, supra note 123, at 315-29.
169. The legal economist's notion that she is seeking to mimic the market under
circumstances where the market is inoperative (e.g., because of transaction costs) is suggestive.
See POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 83, at 463. The Hayekian emphasis on "coordi-
nation" differs in that it tends to deny that the knowledge necessary to this effort is attainable,
see supra notes 109-128, 135, 150, 155, 157, and accompanying text. Therefore, in its belief
that the adjudicative effort should be in institutional design rather than particular allocations.
However, the line between institutional design and particular allocation blurs if general (non-
particularized or non-tailored to context) rules are generated by neoclassical analysis. In that
event, subsequent contracting parties are confronted with a background norm they can price
or contract around, in apparent keeping with Hayekian recommendations. If these
recommendations are taken as requiring merely a specified set of several entitlements plus
"freedom of contract," the grounds for specification may be arbitrary, and even an
epistemically hubristic specification would therefore seem to suffice.
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the case that the economist justifies this scheme (including the opt-out
privilege) on the ground that it serves a collective end, the recommenda-
tions yielded by the scheme may not be inconsistent with classically
liberal commitments.1
7 1
In short, the contractual, enabling and anti-mandatory stance of
mainstream economic analysis of the firm is conceptually attractive to the
anti-regulatory bias of the classical liberal, and this stance can be
rendered through particularized judgment compatible with that liberal's
commitments to subjectivity, constrained knowledge and a derivative
conception of law. For example, although the neoclassical economist
claims that no one owns the corporation," this claim may be rendered
functionally indistinguishable from a penchant for conceiving of the
corporation as shareholder property73 by adding the neoclassical
economist's further claims that the shareholder's unspecified and
unspecifiable contract and the desirable incentives implied by the
shareholder's residual status counsels a shareholder wealth maximization
criterion.174 The neoclassical economist's tendency to respect the survival
properties of common practice on an assumption of presumed efficien-
cy'75 parallels Humean respect for evolved norms. These coincidences
may be attributable to the fact that the neoclassical economist and the
classical liberal share many common assumptions, in particular method-
ological individualism and the postulate of self-interest in human
behavior, even though these assumptions may be given distinct interpre-
tations.Y7 6
170. See Barnett, Sounds of Silence, supra note 73, at 906-11 (stating when implicit
understandings and conventions run out, that which is rationally efficient may serve as default
term to which parties can be taken as consenting).
171. Cf. RICHARD POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 83, at 11-29 (adopting a
stance of combining "pragmatism," economics and "liberalism"). Posner's version of classical
liberalism is derived from Mill. Id. at 23-29. This enables retention of the "scientism" of the
utilitarian tradition, a tradition criticized in Humean variations on the classically liberal theme.
See supra note 150.
172. Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 1426-28.
173. Cox, supra note 6, at 236-40.
174. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 35-39.
175. Id. at 31.
176. See supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text. In particular, the self-interest
postulate is turned into a rather loose "purposeful behavior" postulate by Austrians. Israel
M. Kirzner, Self-Interest and the New Bashing of Economics, 4 CRITICAL REV. 27 (1990).
Moreover, Hobbesians are quick to reject "narrow egoism" as the meaning of partiality or self-
interest. See, e.g., GAUTHIER, supra note 123, at 87, 187-89; LOMASKY, supra note 46, at 159,
244-46. Cf LARMORE, supra note 54, at 71-72 (noting the problem of diverse goods held
partially would exist even if all persons benevolent).
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
An alternative explanation of coincidence is that the apparatus of
efficiency analysis does not generate determinate solutions. As earlier
noticed, 77 it is at least formally possible to employ variations on the
apparatus to yield recommendations inconsistent with the positions of the
neoclassical mainstream. Mainstream positions, given also by formally
correct manipulations of the apparatus, may be attributable to judgments
informed by values outside the apparatus. In short, although efficiency
analysis may be employed to support "statist intervention," the
coincidence of neoclassical economic and classical liberal recommenda-
tions may reflect use of the efficiency apparatus as a proxy for common
commitments. 178
5. Facilitation and Formalism
Apart from the possibility that classical commitments inform
judgments within neoclassical analysis, Humean and Hobbesian themes
may serve both as explanations of features of corporate law doctrine and
as bases for normative theories of corporate law. Consider two possible
implications of classical liberalism concerning law: legal facilitation and
legal formalism. By facilitation is meant the notion that the law's
function is to facilitate pursuit of individually held goods, purposes or
ends. In the hands of some, this notion suggests that the law should
provide what contracting parties "would have wanted" even where they
failed to address the matter, and is a justification for legally supplied
"default terms" and interpretive norms that invoke hypothetical
consent. 79 In the hands of others, however, the notion may be taken
further, to suggest that a set of mandatory norms as background
conditions to contracting are essential. If, as Humeans, neo-Hobbesians
and some aspects of game theory suggest, a moral commitment to
cooperation as constrained pursuit of self interest is essential to contract,
perhaps the role of corporate law is to supply an assurance of this
177. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
178. Cf. Lawson, supra note 81, at 77 (hypothesizing that Judge Posner employs wealth
maximization as a proxy for moral intuitions). The proxy characterization seems clear in THE
ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 154, and largely confirmed, albeit with recognition of
potential tensions, in OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 83. Notice that the proxy thesis
generates some irony. Committed welfarists tolerate liberal commitments on the basis that
they tend to serve welfare. Clark, Contracts, Elites and Traditions, supra note 32, at 1716-17.
The classical liberal tolerates welfarist analysis on the basis that it tends to serve "liberty."
179. Craswell, Philosophy of Promising, supra note 73, at 503-05; Charny, Hypothetical
Bargains, supra note 150, at 1819-21.
[Vol. 80:391
1997] THE PUBLIC, THE PRIVATE AND THE CORPORATION 451
commitment.8 ' If Humean insistence upon the importance of norms
is conceded, facilitation implies both that law should be derivative from
practice and that law should be evaluative of practice: norms should be
incorporated into law to the extent consistent with a coordination
criterion or an efficiency criterion.'1
8
By "legal formalism" is meant a refusal to facilitate, or, at least, to
push facilitation this far. More specifically, a court committed to legal
formalism would tend to insist upon expressions of "actual consent"
(albeit perhaps of objective or conventional varieties) before "interven-
ing," and would therefore tend to dismiss claims not grounded in such
expressions, leaving losses "where they fell."'" Thus, legal formalism,
180. William Bratton, Game Theory and the Restoration of Honor to Corporate Law's
Duty of Loyalty, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, NEW PERSPECTIVES ON LAW, CULTURE,
AND SOCIETY 139-183 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995).
181. Cooter, Decentralized Law, supra note 161; Robert Cooter, DeCentralized Law for
a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating The New Law Merchant, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996) (emphasizing, however, the structural conditions under which
norms are generated). For a critical view of this stance, see Eric Posner, Law, Economics, and
Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697 (1996).
182. Cf. Charney, Hypothetical Bargains, supra note 150, at 1827 (portraying formalist
as conventionalist). This understanding of formalism may be controversial. In some accounts,
formalism is associated with a failure to appreciate the complexity of circumstances,
indeterminacy, competing values, etcetera and insistence upon conformity to unitary,
universalistic or foundational propositions. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW
104-11 (1974). For a corporate communitarian identification of corporate contractarianism
with such a species of formalism, see Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty, supra note
4, at 2235-45. As employed here, formalism is a device by which complexity, indeterminacy,
and competing values are recognized and unitary, universalistic or foundational propositions
(at least of certain types) are rejected, in the sense that the effort is to limit occasions for
authoritative pronouncement. Cf. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 52-54 (2d
ed. 1995) (contradiction between bargain theory of contract and absolute liability given
contract potentially resolved on theory of limiting litigation). Indeed, Gilmore's conception
of (properly constrained) law, deemed anti-formalist in his account, resembles Hayek's, where
Hayek speaks in a "formalist" mood. Compare GILMORE, AGES OF AMERICAN LAW, supra
at 109-110 (noting that law's function from mood of skeptical relativism is to settle disputes
under generally conceived principles), with HAYEK, Rules and Order, supra note 105, at 112-18
(proper law is not purposeful in sense of a desire for bringing about a desired end-state, but,
rather an expression of principles implicit in an undirected order). There is of course an
element of "pin the tail on the formalist" in all of this: formalism is commonly thought to be
a "bad" and, therefore, a useful label to attach to one's opponent in debate. It should be
suspected that what is really going on in the attachment of such a label is disagreement about
which normative principles are to be derived from practice or deemed supported by consensus.
Formalism has multiple but perhaps interrelated definitions, typically supplied by its
critics. One such definition equates formalism with legal autonomy: the law is independent
of and not subject to assessment or intrusion from realms (e.g., the realm of the moral or the
realm of the economic) outside it. Another definition equates formalism with a single correct
answer thesis: it is both possible and desirable that there be correct applications of a legal rule.
Formalism is often therefore identified with textualism-the belief that the meaning of a rule
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as here depicted, is about minimizing governmental decision. Formalism
resides in textual statements of the rule and that these statements therefore mandate particular
correct applications. This identification, albeit an effective polemical tool for undermining
formalism, is clearly erroneous: a belief that there are right answers but that these are to be
found in principle, or coherence or communal practice rather than texts remains a formalist
belief if formalism is a right answer thesis. Indeed, Hayek's formalism resembles Dworkins'
in its depiction of mechanism. Barry, Road to Freedom, supra note 114, at 152. Cf. LEONI,
supra note 160, at 94 (distinguishing textualist and non-textualist understandings of certainty
in law).
These definitions are related when viewed from the perspective of the value they seek to
implement. That purpose or value is a rule of law notion: law should be stable and predictable
so that persons can know in advance what the state will require of them and conform their
conduct to these requirements. This value, although related to "formalism" as that term is
employed here, does not adequately capture the meaning of the term as so employed. The
difficulty is that a pervasive authoritarian legal system might nonetheless be a predictable one.
Formalism as the term is employed here requires legal minimization, as well as predictability.
It perhaps therefore requires an assumption, in Professor Schauer's terminology, that the legal
system is non-comprehensive, or, at least, that it entails a permissive comprehensive default
rule. A legal system, such as a common law system, may be viewed as comprehensive if it
purports to provide answers to all disputes. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES,
A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE
224 (1991) [hereinafter SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES]. The view that a "gap" in the
law or in a contract is something to be judicially filled assumes such a comprehensive view and
further assumes that there is no comprehensive default rule. Id. at 225. A comprehensive
default rule is one that either permits the action complained of where a gap exists (so the
plaintiff loses unless she can invoke a pre-existing rule) or prohibits it (so the plaintiff wins
where a gap exists). The legal realist's assumption that "private" decision is necessarily
traceable to "public" or "political" decision would seem to be correct if it is understood as
asserting that a default rule in a comprehensive system is the source of the plaintiff's power
to prevent the defendant's complained of action or of the defendant's to prevent the plaintiff's
(or, by virtue of such a default rule, to charge a price for foregoing this power). On the other
hand, a comprehensive default rule that permits that which is not expressly prohibited (given
that this entails some interpretive range for specifying that which is express) operates to confer
"jurisdiction" precisely because it confers power (on the defendant). That which the defen-
dant does is not a matter predicted either by a substantive rule (since there is a gap) or by the
default rule (since, prospectively, it by its nature declines to address the defendant's conduct).
Cf. SCHAUER, supra at 158-62 (viewing rules as conferring jurisdiction). The realist is correct
that a permissive default rule is "political" in the sense that it reflects a position about the rule
and the competence of officials wielding the particular forms of coercive power that are those
of the state. She is not correct, in the formalist's view, in thinking that this means the
defendant's acts are the decisions of those officials, or in presuming that these acts are matters
to be collectively evaluated (in terms, e.g., of their effects on collective welfare). A conscious
collective choice about an action is a possibility, but it is an existing reality only if there is an
actual mechanism by which such a collective choice is made. GRAFSTEIN, supra note 61, at
182.
On some depictions of the common law, including Professor Schauer's, id at 174-81,
formalism understood as non-comprehensive or as entailing a permissive and comprehensive
default rule would be inconsistent with the common law's conferral of comprehensive authority
on judges. On the other hand, formalism may have been approximated by the common law
in some eras. Id. at 179-80; cf. LEONI, supra note 160, at 76-94 (viewing common law as
derivative from social norms, predictable and consistent with classical liberalism).
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is typically depicted in terms of the rigidity of the "rules" it recommends,
but this rigidity is a means to minimization. To say that the law should
examine the "substance" rather than the "form" of a transaction (as in
the case of defacto merger) is to say that a governmental agent should
decide in at least some respects the merits of the transaction, in terms of
some collective "policy" or value. To say that form should be respected
(as in the case of the "independent significance" of transactional forms)
is to deny this.1 13  Formalism is also typically depicted as postulating
the law's autonomy, but this depiction, too, may serve formalism as that
term is employed here. Claims that the law is not autonomous are
claims that it is or should be consciously, rationally and purposely shaped
by criteria external to it-a political morality, efficiency, etc. "Formal-
ism," as the term is employed here, minimizes governmental decision, so
it also minimizes the extent to which purposive pursuit of criteria
"outside it" shape decisions."8 If Humean insistence upon the impor-
183. See, e.g., Rothschild Int'l Corp. v. Liggett Group, Inc., 474 A.2d 133 (Del. 1984);
Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 11 A.2d 331 (Del. 1940). Notice that formalism can be
non-facilitative. Consider, for example, the formalism of judicial efforts to demand conformity
to formal corporate norms in the context of closely held corporations. See, e.g., McQuade v.
Stoneham, 189 N.E. 234 (N.Y. 1934) (invalidating agreement impinging on director authority
on basis that this formalism preferable to judicial inquiry into director motives). So formalism
can be inconsistent with contractarian stances where it invokes a mandatory term in service
of minimizing governmental decisions.
184. On the identification of formalism with the law's autonomy see, e.g., GARY MINDE,
POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END 20-21,
78-79 (1995); POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 14-16; ERNEST
WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 22-55 (1995).
It might be argued that formalism is impossible, that governmental choice inevitably
occurs, but the argument is misdirected. There is of course a governmental choice, but this
does not obviate the distinction in the text. Indeed the argument is employed precisely
because those making it object to the freedom (or power) formalism confers on "private"
actors. The objection is unintelligible unless formalism is possible. SCHAUER, PLAYING BY
THE RULES, supra note 182, at 214. So the real objection is not to the possibility of formalism
but to its normative desirability. Id.
What, however, is meant by the concession that a governmental choice is inevitable? The
concession operates at a number of levels. First, there is obviously a choice between
competing political moralities in adopting formalism as a stance. In neutrality terms, a
commitment to "neutrality" is not neutral about neutrality. Second, there is obviously a choice
in the empowering of some class of persons (or place holders) that is implicit in the formalist's
adherence to a "general rule" (or refusal to undo that which some member of that class has
done). Thus, Delaware's "equal dignity" rule, supra note 183, empowers corporate planners.
On the other hand, there is no (formal) choice about what is to be done with the power thus
created, for underlying the formalist stance is the claim that this will be determined by the
interaction of the empowered and forces outside law. (The analogous neoclassical claim is that
market pricing and the incentive generated by it will adjust so as to render the "disem-
powered" not so). There is therefore no government choice about what is to be done even
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tance of norms is again conceded, formalism implies substantial
reluctance to legally enforce norms or to evaluate them on the basis of
external criteria.85
In what senses may facilitative and formalist conceptions be deemed
consistent with a contractual conception of the corporation? Both may
be viewed as suggesting a contractual conception in the sense that they
would enforce express consensual agreement and generally eschew
mandatory terms. The facilitative conception is contractarian to the
extent that the facilitative terms it recommends are the product of a
rational constructivist exercise in hypothetical contract. The formalist
conception is obviously not contractarian in just this latter sense: it
rejects this rational constructivism.8 6 But the formalist conception is
contractarian in a further sense: it emphasizes freedom from state
enforced obligation not traceable to a formal, private invocation of the
state (as through express "consent"), and, therefore, renders behavior
subject to the forces of non-legal social practice.
Facilitation and formalism may be derived from Humean and
Hobbesian themes. Facilitation has a roughly Hobbesian thrust to it:
the sovereign provides a means by which persons may cooperate in
achieving their self-interested ends, a means they are unable to provide
for themselves. 87 This ambition is consistent both with Hobbesian
though there is government choice about the structure within which it is to be done. Critics
of formalism implicitly recognize this by insisting that there should be a governmental choice
about what is to be done.
185. Cf. Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's
Search For Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996) (questioning derivative
law aspects of Uniform Commercial Code); Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, The
Enforceability of Norms and the Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1913 (1996)
(viewing employment at will doctrine as rendering norm of good cause discharge legally
unenforced).
186. See HUME, TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, supra note 105, at 455-76. Cf. Carney,
ALI's Corporate Governance Project, supra note 97 (proposing a property approach and
rejecting contractual, or at least regulatory approaches to corporate law).
187. However, Humeans, in some moods, are facilitators. Cf. Hayek, Free Enterprise and
Competitive Order, supra note 163, at 115-16 (noting the legal specification of background
rules is inevitable and specification should be that which is conducive to a competitive system).
On the other hand, Hayek, in his more libertarian moods, may be read as an extreme
formalist. See POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 57 (viewing Hayek
as an advocate of clear rules known to all and not subject to interpretation). Perhaps Hayek's
position is ultimately incoherent. GRAY, LIBERALISMS, supra note 46, at 97. However, he
may be read as seeking "facilitation" through predictable "general rules" and as objecting to
detailed, case-specific rules in service of substantive (non-facilitative) purposes. Cf. Charny,
Hypothetical Bargains, supra note 150, at 1821 (using general and idealized default rules versus
particular and non-idealized default rules). For a facilitative approach based largely on
Hayekian premises, see Barnett, Sounds of Silence, supra note 73, at 874-95.
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emphasis upon means-ends rationality and with the conviction that the
Hobbesian analyst possesses the means of implementing that rationality
on a large, political-social scale. Formalism has a roughly Humean
theme to it: conventions as norms provide the means by which
coordination of diverse purposes is achieved and facilitation assumes a
capacity for rational prediction and control of consequences the Humean
denies. The role of law, for Hume, was limited to preservation of stable
and predictable property rights rigidly enforced; interaction within this
framework was to be primarily non-legal."M
A species of facilitation is the expressed position of mainstream
neoclassical analysis of the firm: corporate law is to provide a standard
form agreement or set of default terms, the content of which is
determined by an exercise in rational hypothetical contracting.
Moreover, legal economists (even ones with classically liberal inclina-
tions) attack formalism on grounds that borrow heavily from the legal
realist tradition (and from social choice theory more generally): some
set of background understandings is essential for contract given the
limitations of language (and consequent need for interpretation) and
given limitations on information and rationality (and consequent need
for gap fillers).,8 9 The formalist is therefore thought by the economist
to be wrong in supposing that a judicial refusal to interpret is possible
and that a refusal to supply terms is not itself a choice of terms. On
some views, this line of argument obliterates the public/private distinc-
tion." On the facilitative view under discussion, that distinction is
preserved by an acceptability criterion: The state is constrained in the
interpretations and default terms it supplies because these (ought to be)
non-mandatory, and the "private" will prevail over the "public" if
contracting parties do not accept supplied terms.' Thus, the Coase
The Hobbesian basis for facilitation may be grounded in Hobbes' notion that obligation
requires law. A Humean basis may be derived from the notion, suggested particularly by
Oakeshott, that society has so disintegrated that rules backed by law are necessary for order.
DEVIGUE, RECASTING CONSERVATISM, supra note 26, at 121-22.
188. HUME, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS, supra note 108, at App. III.
189. See, e.g., Craswell, Philosophy of Promising, supra note 73, at 503-05; Charny,
Hypothetical Bargains, supra note 150, at 1816-19, 1819 n.21.
190. See, e.g., Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of
Contract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 697 (1990) (employing arguments in the legal realist
tradition against consent theory of contract).
191. See Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law, 3
S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L. REV. 389, 397-403 (1993) (arguing that if default rule is
unacceptable, parties will opt out, where benefit of doing so exceeds contracting cost)
[hereinafter Scwartz, Default Rule Paradigm]. Moreover, and given that persons are in a
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Theorem in effect operates as the legal economist's version of both the
reality and priority of a private realm, while maintaining the legal
realist's premise that a "public," legal decision (allocation of entitle-
ments) underlies that realm: absent transaction costs, an allocation of
entitlement (e.g., a background or default term) is essential, but initial
public allocations do not matter, as private reallocation will trump "the
public."' 92 The legal economist becomes a facilitator at the point at
which she is inclined both to recognize transaction costs (particularly
where these are broadly defined to include strategic or opportunistic
behavior) and to assume competence in a "public" agency to specify the
allocation that would occur in their absence. As earlier noticed,
however, facilitation can include a Humean recognition of the impor-
tance of socially generated norms, as through use of efficiency criteria in
the selection of norms for legal enforcement. 93
The formalist's countercharge is that legal facilitators are paternal-
ists,194 and incompetent ones. This point might be characterized as a
Hobbesian "discipline" hypothesis: "gap filling," whether in service of
fairness or efficiency, is undesirable because rational contracting persons
will learn from their mistakes (in failing to anticipate and specify) if the
law, by insisting upon relatively express agreement, declines to correct
them. 5 It is, however, a point that may be grounded in a number of
Humean views. Formalism is at least a possible implication of the
contentions, again pushed rather far, that value is subjective, that central
authority lacks information necessary to detailed allocation, and that
stable entitlements and reliance upon social norms or conventions are
therefore better means of coordinating diverse purposes than cost benefit
analyses. 9 6
position to associate or not as they wish, an effort to conform relationships to public norms
inconsistent with private interests will be circumvented, as through the pricing mechanism.
Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules, supra note 94.
192. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 150.
193. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
194. Cf. Clark, Contracts, Elites, and Traditions, supra note 32, at 1718-76 (making the
paternalism charge from non-formalist perspective).
195. Charny, Hypothetical Bargains, supra note 150, at 1826. A discipline hypothesis is
suggested by some aspects of Austrian economic theory in the spirit of Hayek. See generally
Wonnell, supra note 150.
196. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text. Examples in recent commentary
that rely on these themes (without thereby necessarily adopting a fully formalist stance)
include Cooter, Decentralized Law, supra note 161 (law should be derived from efficient
social norms); Schwartz, Default Rule Paradigm, supra note 191, at 404-06 (noting that court's
lack of information constrains its ability to supply defaults); Alan Schwartz, Relational
Contracts in the Courts, supra note 94 (noting that courts will decline to go beyond terms of
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Consider in particular the last of these contentions: it is a point, in
the hands of some facilitators, that justifies reliance on convention as a
source of law and use of efficiency as a criterion for determining which
conventions should be incorporated into the law."9' The formalist
suggests, however, a different spin on the point: undirected social
practice is preferable to law, so law, even law incorporating convention,
should be minimized. 9 ' Implicit in the formalist's stance is rejection
of the legal realist's claim that a refusal to decide is necessarily a legal,
political or public decision,'99 for there is a "decision-making" struc-
agreement where lack of information exists about relational terms). Cf. Clark, Contracts,
Elites, Traditions, supra note 32, at 1726-46 (emphasizing and giving presumptive force to
tradition).
197. Barnett, Sounds of Silence, supra note 73, at 874-95 Cooter, Decentralized Law,
supra note 161, at 446-50.
198. This spin is implicit in claims that law should be derived from socially generated
norms and in the anarchist strains in Hayek's thought. LOMASKY, supra note 46, at 108-09.
Lomasky argues that reliance on social norms would eliminate "rights" (including Libertarian
property rights). This would seem true in a sense and not in another. The Humean
conception is that rights (and morality generally) arise out of an implicit understanding
grounded in self-interested reciprocity: persons recognize that it is in their interest to defer
to another provided the other defers to them. HUME, TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, supra
note 105, at 489-90. Therefore, they are not rights in the Kantian sense in that they are not
rationally justified (where rationality is understood in terms of access to a binding moral
principle without reference to a self-interested motive). See BINMORE, supra note 89, at 127-
31 (viewing rights as conventions sustaining equilibria in "game of life"); EDNA ULLMAN-
MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS 84 (1977) (viewing norms as conventions). The
anarchist implication of all this requires another premise: that the conventions thus generated
will be self-sustaining without legal coercion. Cf. ELLICKSON, supra note 124 (arguing a theory
of social norms and presenting evidence of their efficacy independent of law within "close-
knit" contexts); JOHN OWEN HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER, LAW AND THE
JAPANESE PARADOX (1991) (examining Japan in which Japanese social order is explained in
terms of social recognition of authority as entitlement to command not backed by coercion,
and therefore on non-legal social control, but without cultural belief in universal moral values).
An alternative premise is that law is in some degree necessary, a premise that will generate
a limited version of the role and function of law, along "formalist" lines, if coordination
remains the objective and if the competence of law, government or the "political" is deemed
modest. Cf. ELLICKSON, supra note 124, at 181-82 (viewing law as cure for "social failure" to
generate efficiency); RICHARD EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 28-29 (1993) (arguing
that spontaneous order theories fail when they move from particular trading communities to
general societies). For a cost-based explanation of why non-legal sanctions may be preferred
to legal ones, see David Charny, Non-legal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV.
L. REV. 373 (1990) [hereinafter Charney, Non-legal Sanctions].
199. See, e.g., KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 87, at 102-9;
Robert Hale, Bargaining, Duress and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM L. REV. 604 (1943);
Robert Hale, Force and the State: A Comparison of Political and Economic Compulsion, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 149 (1935); Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873
(1973) (offering a critique of formalist elements in post-Lochner era).
The Legal Realist point may be understood as one that equates the legal and the social
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ture, spontaneous, self-regulating social order, that is said by the
formalist to be an alternative to formalized, collective, conscious, and
purposeful legal structure. The formalist claim is this: the legal realist's
view smuggles in an unarticulated assumption that all decisions are
collective in a formal, purposeful sense and this assumption is erroneous
in the absence of such a formal, purposeful procedure."°
Is this formalist position a mistake? It is if (mis)characterized as
denying that an implicit allocation of entitlement (or a "default term")
underlies the law's refusal to assess behavior in service of some "public"
purpose. To say, for example, that there is no fiduciary obligation within
a category of corporate relationships is in effect to entitle persons to act
in a fashion inconsistent with what such an obligation, if recognized,
would require. And to favor a regime of several property and enforce-
ment of express contract is clearly to favor with state power a particular
institutional structure over other institutional alternatives. These points,
however, are not denied by the formalist. Rather, the formalist notion
is precisely that a legal refusal to recognize an obligation of this sort
confers "power" to make choices on persons not compelled to justify
their acts in terms of common goods or public purposes. Formalism
allocates decision making authority to the realm of "contract" or to the
realm of the vicissitudes of an inarticulate "spontaneous order," and
finds this allocation good precisely because it distrusts articulate, rational,
purposeful "public" decision (a reason that explains the typical intellectu-
al's hostility to formalism). The formalist's position is not that no
entitlement is allocated by the law's refusal to decide, but, rather, that
entitlements should be so constructed and allocated as to minimize the
occasions for articulate public justification."0 '
(as by denying the formalist's distinction) and as one that denies that liberal neutrality is
possible. KELMAN, supra note 87, at 327-22 n. 60. In its transformative moments, the Realist
argument appears intent upon overcoming the "social" given that persons are constructed by
it. See Gary Peller, The Classical Theory of Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 300 (1988) (arguing
that mistake in classical law was not formalist "intellectual error," but "false" conception of
human condition that denies community). See also Johnson, Individual and Collective
Sovereignty, supra note 4, at 2235-45 (linking communitarian commitment to attack upon
formalism as desire for legal certainty).
200. Cf. GRAFSTEIN, INSTITUTIONAL REALISM, supra note 61, at 179-82 (arguing that
social choice theorists assume a baseline under which property is product of political decision;
public choice theorists assume property is ex-ante private). Along these lines, Posner states
the "idea that everything is really public is as metaphysical and unpragmatic as the idea that
there really is a realm of purely private action." POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 83,
at 281.
201. Cf. F.A. Hayek, Free Enterprise and Competitive Order, supra note 163, at 112-16
(recognizing the necessity of legal specification of property rights and of default terms in
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It should be noticed that legal economists, despite their expressed
preference for facilitation, can be formalists in just this sense. The
economist inclined to minimize the presence of transaction costs and to
distrust the competence of public agencies to specify the allocation that
would occur in the absence of such costs is inclined to formalism. 2
Indeed, much of mainstream neoclassical analysis, albeit often expressed
in facilitative terms, may be formalist in the sense suggested here. The
tendency of the analysis is to postulate a default term that minimizes
governmental decision (employment at will is an example), and to justify
this in part on the basis of an assumption that the costs of overcoming
this term by express agreement are minimal.2 3 The minimal private
cost assumption, however, is at least problematic, and may reflect a
belief that an alternative default term entailing greater degrees of
governmental decision (such as a good cause discharge term) will, given
governmental incompetence, entail greater social cost.
It also should be noticed that formalist rejection of the legal realist's
assumption regarding the necessity of collective decision is not necessari-
ly rejection of the legal realist's account of the nature of human decision.
The realist account emphasizes the underdetermined character of rules
and either (under the strand of legal realism associated with Llewellyn)
practical and largely inarticulable reasoning dependent upon convention
and tacit understanding or (under the strand of legal realism associated
with scientism) instrumental rationalism.' °  The formalist can agree
with the version of this account that emphasizes practical and inarticul-
able reasoning, but thinks the realist is wrong in supposing that it is
necessarily the judge (or other law giver) who engages and must engage
in the bulk of this activity. Formalism seeks to allocate decision making
authority (including "decision" as unarticulated and perhaps largely
unexamined rule following) to a non-legal, "social" realm, but the
mechanism by which this is to be accomplished need not entail a
positivist's conception of legal rules. (Indeed, Humean formalists can be
contracts, but advocating that these should enable a "competitive order").
202. Ronald Coase is a candidate for this appellation. Cf. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW,
supra note 83, at 406-25 (criticizing Coase).
203. See David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law: Foundations and Law
Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, NEW PERSPECTIVES ON LAW,
CULTURE AND SOCIETY, 1, 3-9 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) (criticizing this tendency)
[hereinafter Millon, Reform Strategies].
204. See KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER, supra note 61, at 209-270 (recounting these
strands of the realist tradition and associating the latter with both economic analysis of law
and critical legal studies).
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quite Wittgensteinian in their accounts of human language). 5 It
requires instead a normative commitment to the formalist's favored
allocation, quite possibly effected through "judgment" as tacit or implicit
understanding of the meaning of this commitment in contextual practice.
Formalism is supposed to be dead, but much of corporate law may
be viewed as reflecting the formalist view. Consider, for example, strong
versions of the business judgment rule,2" the judicial insistence upon
express limitations on managerial discretion in debt contracts, 7 the
reluctance of at least some judges to impose "good faith" or fiduciary
limitations on controlling shareholders0 8 and, for an example on the
edge of "corporate law," the employment at will doctrine.2 9 Consider,
also, a formalist stance within neoclassical economic analysis of the firm:
securities pricing in an informationally efficient market obviates fairness
justifications for legal interventions on behalf of shareholders.' The
thread at least stringable through these examples is the formalist denial
of the legal realist's assumptions. Although efficiency explanations of
the examples are clearly available, so, too, are Humean explanations
grounded in skepticism about judicial access to information necessary to
efficiency calculations. 211
205. See GRAY, HAYEK ON LIBERTY, supra note 108, at 13-16, 49-50. But see id. at 23-
24.
206. See Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d. 776 (Ill. Ct. App. 1968).
207. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y.
1989).
208. See Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc. 815 F.2d. 429, 448-49 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J.
dissenting).
209. See Charny, Non-legal Sanctions, supra note 198, at 417-25 (addressing employment
at will from perspective of non-legal regulation, but questioning the doctrine); Rock &
Wachter, supra note 185 (defending employment at will as desirable non-enforcement of social
norm); Andrew Morriss, Bad Data, Bad Economics and Bad Policy: Time To Fire Wrongful
Discharge Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1901 (1996) (defense of at-will doctrine in part on basis of
judicial incompetence).
210. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 25-34.
211. In each of the cited instances, there is a judicial refusal to recognize obligations that
are not contractually express and in each this refusal is justified by an appeal to judicial
incompetence. There is also in each a judicial assurance that the complaining parties or the
class within which they are members may protect themselves through express contract, are
protected by the market (e.g., through ex ante price reflecting the risk of the event of which
they complain) or are protected by means of informal, non-legal sanctioning mechanisms (e.g.,
reputation).
It may be said that there is also in each instance an assumed baseline representing, in
effect, a judicial decision about proper activities or, at least, allocations of power. Consider,
for example, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y.
1989). There, the court declined to require fiduciary duty or good faith constraints on a
leveraged buy-out having adverse wealth consequences for bondholders and positive ones for
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There are of course also counterexamples. Fiduciary obligation to
shareholders is at least difficult to reconcile with formalism unless it
takes the now largely discredited form of categorical do's and don'ts.
212
It is possible to view fiduciary obligation as consistent with that brand of
facilitation deeming legal enforcement of a background morality essential
to contract, and, therefore, to a contractual theory of corporate law that
nevertheless includes such mandates.213 There is also clearly a justifica-
shareholders. The court, inter alia, declared that the implied covenant of good faith cannot
give bondholders rights inconsistent with the bond indenture (the contract). The contract,
however, was silent on the matter of the event (LBO) in question so a claim of inconsistency
required an assumed baseline-that the corporation (functionally, its shareholders) may engage
in any act not expressly precluded by the contract.
Critics of the decision on the basis of this assumed baseline can say things like "the law
is not neutral." It should be noticed that neoclassical economic analysis, and Hobbesian
facilitation, concede this point, at least in the sense that they concede that assumed baselines
require justification in the form of claims about probable agreement among hypothetical
rational actors or claims about the wealth maximizing tendencies of the assumed baseline.
What is distinctive about the formalist view is that it denies that such claims may be viably
made; a denial equally applicable to claims about alternative baselines. These denials raise,
however, an obvious question: what justification is then left for the implicit choice of
baselines?
One possibility is "tradition" incorporated into law: the proper baseline is that which best
reflects the social practice of which the event in question is a part or is representative. This
is a possibility in many cases, but a questionable explanation of decisions such as Metropolitan
Life, because the expectations of bondholders under the managerialist practice threatened by
leveraged restructurings were arguably (but problematically) defeated in that case. See
William W. Bratton, Jr., Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory In A Time of
Restructuring, 1989 DUKE LJ. 92, 135-42. Another possibility entails attacking the premise
that an implicit choice of baselines is or ought to be purposive in the way that neutrality critics
and Hobbesian facilitators suggest. Consider another of the court's rationales for its decision
in Metropolitan Life: neither a fiduciary obligation nor a good faith obligation should be
recognized because neither can be limited in a way that promised a principled constraint on
judicial discretion. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. at 1520-21, 1525. The threat posed by
both obligations is the displacement of "private" discretion by the "public" discretion of state
officers (judges). It is of course the case that a choice of baselines predicated on a concern
with limiting state power confers private power. (How much power and how systematically
depend upon the efficacy of the non-legal and contractual protections relied upon as
alternatives to fiduciary obligation and good faith duty). This, however, is not particularly
troubling, at least to a formalist; it is the purpose as well as effect of constraints on public
power to confer private power. It is also the case that private power is in a sense traceable
to a "public" choice of baseline, but this does not warrant a conclusion that particular
exercises of private power are instances of public acts or decisions. The absence of a state
mechanism for decision is sufficient justification for a descriptive claim that private decision
is possible.
212. If, for example, the duty of loyalty categorically precluded interested director
transactions, it would exhibit formalist features. The obvious objection to such a prohibition
is that it fails to facilitate mutually beneficial exchanges.
213. Burgman & Cox, supra note 9, at 359-65.
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tion for fiduciary obligation in state maintenance of tradition, at least to
the extent that the obligation's content can be tied to a tradition.214 So
fiduciary obligations can be justified in terms of Humean and neo-
Hobbesian themes and tied to a facilitative, rather than formalist
treatment of these themes. Fiduciary obligation has obviously been
challenged with some success by legal economists, who would render it
a default term expressing merely that to which rational parties would
have agreed (or that which is consistent with maximizing a common
quantity).215 It has also, been challenged by more clearly formalist
arguments, as in proposals to abandon it.216 Nevertheless, fiduciary
obligation has largely survived in mandated doctrine, so it may fairly be
said to constitute a facilitative exception to a strong formalist theme
within corporate law.
It has thus far been suggested that formalism is a conceptual
possibility (in the sense that it is not defeated by legal realist argument)
and is in fact a prominent feature of contemporary corporate law. If
these propositions are assumed, the question remains whether formalists
can consistently maintain a formalist stance, particularly when contem-
plating the corporation. Formalism as here depicted is the judgmental
following of a meta-rule to the effect that legal direction should be
minimized, but this meta-rule has as its point the preservation of an
undirected or "spontaneous order" within which individuals pursue their
individually held and valued purposes. Minimized law is supposed to
enable this order by means of stable entitlements and enforcement of (at
least relatively express) promises. "Coordination" is in part a matter of
this state enforcement and in part a matter of socially generated
conventions, mores or norms consistent with commitments to respect for
214. Consider, for example, the "tradition" of deeming shareholders owners of the firm.
That tradition might be enforced through strong forms of fiduciary obligation.
215. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 110-26.
216. Carney, ALI's Corporate Governance Project, supra note 97. See DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (permitting opting-out of the duty of care). Cf. Revised Uniform Partnership
Act §§ 103(b) (3) and (4), 404 (1994) (limiting opt-out but also limiting scope and content of
partner obligations); Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379-81 (Del. 1993) (presence of
statutory close corporation provisions preclude judicial intervention). Cf. William W. Bratton,
Self-Regulation, Normative Choice, And The Structure of Corporate Fiduciary Law, 61 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1084 (1993) (depicting ALI Principles of Corporate Governance as generating
regulatory framework for fiduciary self-regulation, but basing this upon a participatory
dialogue).
More generally, "formalism" has recently enjoyed something of a resurrection. Robert
A. Hillman, The Triumph of Gilmore's The Death of Contract, 90 Nw. U.L. REV. 32, 38-41
(1995). See generally Antonin Scalia, The Role of Law As A Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175 (1989); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988).
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entitlements and the keeping of promises. There would seem, however,
to be three problems in thinking formalism is a means to these ends.
First, the corporation is in Humean, particularly Hayekian terms a
"directed order," not a spontaneous one. It appears at least facially to
subordinate individuals to a common purpose and to do so through quite
rational direction. Formalism may exacerbate this distinction. If
formalism entails a legal refusal to enforce norms, either of social or of
local, relation-specific varieties, might this not have the effect of
enhancing the corporate tendency to rational, centralized direction?
Second, formalism, if its point is to preserve an individualistic state
of affairs of the sort indicated, depends not only upon conventions,
mores or norms having a particular substantive content (respect for
entitlements and promise keeping), but upon the survival and efficacy of
these. A variation on communitarian critiques of markets is that they
undermine the norms supporting them, particularly by rewarding rational
calculation. It is an implication of neoclassical economic models of
rational self-interest that moral commitment may be dispensed with in
favor of properly designed incentive structures. Ironically, formalists and
communitarians thus share a belief in the necessity of commitments and
communitarians and neoclassical economists may share a belief in the
threat posed to moral commitments by rational calculation. If communi-
tarians are correct in their depiction of the effects of rational calculation,
and legal economists wrong in their faith in rational calculation, a
formalist refusal to enforce expectations arising from norms and
conventions (or "implicit contracts" as distinguished from express ones)
may undermine the social foundation on which formalism rests. It
should be obvious that this possibility is a basis for a species of
facilitation that would insist upon legal enforcement of a background
morality, as through incorporation by law of norms reflecting such a
morality.
Third, even if facilitators, like legal realists, exaggerate in presuming
that, because the law must inevitably fill gaps in contracts, law directs
behavior within these gaps, it remains the case that a judicial refusal to
purposely fill a gap nevertheless fills it. Such a refusal entitles, at least
in the sense of a Hohfeldian privilege,217 for example, a corporate
employer to discharge employees "arbitrarily" absent formal agreement
217. Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied In Judicial
Reasonings, 23 YALE LJ. 16 (1913) (distinguishing rights and privileges); cf. SCHAUER,
PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 182, at 168 (distinguishing permissions from rules
requiring or forbidding behavior).
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to the contrary or corporate management to adversely affect the market
value of corporate bonds absent formal indenture restrictions on
managerial discretion. Some criterion for allocating, or at least for
recognizing such entitlements would seem necessary. While legal
minimization is such a criterion, it may, standing alone, be an inadequate
one, even for the limited purpose of maintaining a contractual regime.
Resort to convention, to the allocation implicit in some practice, is a
plausible further candidate for gap filing, but this clearly implies some
incorporation of norms into law. (Indeed, at a higher level of abstrac-
tion, enforcement of formal contract itself is largely parasitic upon a
practice of making, keeping or excusing promise). If some incorporation
is inevitable, some criterion both for determining when this should be
done and for adjudicating perhaps equally inevitable conflicts among
norms is required. Perhaps such a criterion is itself discernable from
practice, but an alternative is a criterion, such as efficiency, "outside"
practice. And even if efficiency is deemed itself to be the principle
implicit or latent in practice, the act of purposely seeking efficiency is
one in substantial tension with the formalist impulse precisely because
that act is both evaluative of and potentially distortive of practice.21
Can formalism survive these problems? Consider first the matter of
the corporation as a "directed order." The Humean view that the
corporation is a "directed order" finds a parallel in a standard criticism
of classical liberalism from egalitarian or "progressive" perspectives. The
criticism is that classical liberalism is myopic in its concern with the
coercive power of the state; it fails to account for or to be concerned
with formally private power (or, in legal realist accounts, with the state
sources of private power).1 9 This criticism is often made in particular
with respect to the corporation. "Private power" is in this context the
hierarchical authority of management and is thought, by the terms of the
critique, to be unaccountable, unconstrained or arbitrary.20 A commun-
itarian variation on the criticism is the alleged alienation generated by
218. Cf. Richard H. Pildes, The Destruction of Social Capital Through Law, 144 U. PA.
L. REv. 2055 (1996) (arguing that law can destroy valuable norms).
219. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875,
883-84 (1994).
220. The standard case for the absence of accountability is ADOLF A. BERLE &
GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (rev. ed. 1968).
A critique of bureaucratic power in a communitarian vein is Ian MacNeil, Bureaucracy, supra
note 35. For further examples, see, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, Two Models of Corporate
Governance: Beyond Berle and Means, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM (1988); Frug, supra note
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rationalized, private bureaucracy. Implicit in the critique, at least in its
standard form, is an imagined alternative state of freedom from the
private power of rationalized bureaucracy. In the communitarian form
of the critique, at least in its neo-republican variation, the alternative is
an imagined state of collective, deliberative autonomy. In the norm-
centered variation of communitarianism, the alternative is an imagined
state of common commitment to a shared morality of an egalitarian type.
The neoclassical economic account of the firm responds to this
critique in part by way of treating efficiency as justification, and in part
by way of recharacterizing bureaucracy in terms of facilitative con-
tract. 2 ' Private power as a threat to the individual is reconceptualized
as the mutually beneficial means by which diverse individual ends are
advanced. Humean formalism, in partial contrast, concedes that the
corporation entails strong elements of rationalized bureaucracy in its
"directed order" characterization. Humeans nevertheless seek to
subjugate that bureaucracy. They do so in part by treating these
elements as embedded within and moderated by a complex (ultimately
unknowable and uncontrollable) "system" of convention and of
competition within this "system,,,2' and in part by denying that large
221. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 1-39.
222. See HAYEK, Rules and Order, supra note 105, at 47-52; Hayek, The Meaning of
Competition, in INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 92-106 (1948) [hereinafter Hayek,
The Meaning of Competition]; Hayek, Free Enterprise and Competitive Order, supra note 163.
There are, again, substantial tensions in Hayek's thought. See supra note 157, 166, 187.
It is, for example, reasonably clear that he viewed the corporation as a directed order, distinct
from the spontaneous order of the market, and that a degree of quite "constructivist" legal
direction is appropriate with respect to it. Hayek, Free Enterprise and Competitive Order,
supra note 163, at 116. Nevertheless, Hayek is best interpreted as confining this direction to
institutional framework, particularly in service of "competition." See id. Note that
competition, for Hayek, is not the "perfect competition" of neoclassical economics; rather it
is absence of state-conferred "privilege." See Hayek, The Meaning of Competition, supra. Cf.
RONALD COASE, ESSAYS ON ECONOMICS AND ECONOMISTS 86 (1994) (favoring Adam
Smith's view of competition as process of rivalry over neoclassical view of competition as
condition of high elasticity of demand); POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 83, at 419
(criticizing Coase); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, WHITHER SOCIALISM? 109-38 (1994) (rejecting
perfect competition as price taking in favor of competition as, apparently, a form of rivalry).
There are, of course, a number of rubs here. One is that some basis for assessing matters
of degree of legal direction is necessary. Another is that some basis for distinguishing
"privilege" from (legitimate) entitlement is necessary. Hayek's views on corporate law answers
to such questions were undeveloped. Moreover, it is not entirely clear whether a "formalist"
label, as that label is employed here, is entirely appropriate for Hayek, given that he has often
spoken in quite facilitative terms. See supra note 166. Nevertheless, his derivative conception
of law emphasizes a traditionalism that is at least a variation on the formalist theme. HAYEK,
Rules and Order, supra note 105, at 86. See KUKATHAS, supra note 100, at 187-88 (later
Hayek less confident of our capacity to rationally modify tradition and therefore more inclined
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scale rationalized bureaucracy can survive within such a system, at least
without adopting measures of decentralization within it and therefore
undermining its (at least as popularly conceived) character.2 3
The corporation on this formalist account is both constrained and
enabled by an institutional framework characterized by several property,
contract, markets and competition, but, as importantly, by undirected
conventions, norms and practices operating within the corporation and
among its actors. These are constraints on power because informal
sanctions follow from deviation, because self-interest supports them and
because they are not objects of authoritative evaluation. Notice that
this turns rational bureaucracy on its head: it asserts that, while the
corporation entails "centralized planning," it cannot survive, at least
under competitive conditions, without decentralization (for reasons, for
example, of access to information) and is highly dependent upon
commitment to norms (perhaps those associated with Puritan ethics)
given limitations on rational control (e.g., "costly monitoring"). 24 The
notion of a "corporate culture"-including one that contains elements of
mutual obligation generating "trust"-is not alien to a Humean account
of what nevertheless remains a relationship of exchange.
The argument that the corporate "directed order" is nevertheless one
dependent upon and largely governed by informally generated norm
systems raises, however, the second of the noted objections to formalism.
to passively accept spontaneously generated social traditions). In short, the depiction in the
text is suggested by Hayek, but it is not claimed that it is an accurate representation of all his
positions.
223. The contemporary argument explaining internal decentralization is technology
driven, but also recognizes the impact of increased competition. Roy Helfgott, Labor Process
Theory vs. Reform in the Workplace, 6 CRITICAL REV. 11 (1992). An argument Hayekian in
spirit and is that centralization runs into problems of human fallibility and localized
information. Compare HAYEK, Rules and Order, supra note 105, at 49 (emphasizing that rules
of an "organization" must be general, permitting discretion, given decentralized knowledge),
with HAYEK, Political Order of a Free People, supra note 118, at 78-80 (arguing that large
corporate size undesirable but government power to direct size is greater threat).
Ironically, given communitarian distaste for markets, it may be the case that corporate
bureaucracy is in decline (as through corporate restructuring) "because of" market pressure.
224. Cf. JAMES M. BUCHANAN, ETHICS AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS 60-88 (1994)
(discussing ethical constraint mimicking exchange and as reflected in Puritan ethic as
generating mutual benefit); BUCHANAN, WHAT SHOULD ECONOMISTS Do?, supra note 96, at
201-17 (discussing dependence of markets on ethics). Buchanan, as a rational contracting
theorist, might best be deemed "Hobbesian" and he is surely a "facilitator" at levels of general
institutional design, but his rejection of "objective" estimates of efficiency arguably places him
within the "formalist" camp depicted here. The point about monitoring costs is obviously that
these costs would be excessive if no moral commitment of "Puritan" varieties could be
assumed.
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If corporate bureaucracy is constrained by and dependent upon both an
institutional framework entailing market competition and conventions,
norms and commitments, the claim that market rationality undermines
conventions, norms, and commitments threatens the formalist's sanguine
view of the corporation.
Consider a concrete example of a criticism of this type, one
associated with corporate communitarians: the corporation is dependent
upon "trust," but rational calculation (particularly as reflected in the
market for control) undermines "trust."' There would thus seem to
be an "empirical" issue dividing formalists and communitarians: can
"society," understand the corporation as a complex of common
normative commitments (or a corporate culture, similarly understood)
that survive within a market order?.2 6 Both contractarian formalists
and contractarian facilitators will predict survival: markets are themselves
undirected norm systems and it is not in the rationally conceived interest
of market actors to destroy or undermine valuable corporate cultures.
It is, however, doubtful whether this empirical issue is resolvable. A
reason, to anticipate arguments to come later here, is that the formalist
and the communitarian have quite distinct understandings of "society,"
and in particular of the complex of norms in question. The formalist and
the communitarian may agree, in degree, about the limits of rational
calculation, and even agree that such matters as "trust" are essential, but
this does not mean that they agree about the normative matter of the
substantive content of "trust." This question of the normative distinc-
tions between the formalist and the communitarian is explored here
later, but may for now be foreshadowed by asserting that the formalist's
commitment is to the norm of honesty and the communitarian's to the
norm of solidarity. The distinction is suggested by the matter of "trust":
225. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 DUKE L.J.
425 (1993).
226. Cf. TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS, supra note 11, at 207 (recognizing
competing versions of "civil society," including one resembling "formalism" as it is depicted
here, but predicting that it will fail in competition with successful "corporatist" economies such
as Japan and Germany). This is an old theme. See generally Albert Hirschman, Rival
Interpretations of Market Society: Civilizing, Destructive, or Feeble, 20 J. ECON. LIT. 1463
(1982) [hereinafter Hirschman, Rival Interpretations of Market Society]. It is one occasionally
shared by conservatives. Irving Kristol, When Virtue Loses All Her Loveliness-Some
Reflections on Capitalism and "The Free Society," 21 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 3 (1971). Taylor's
claim, at least as of the dates of this writing (1994-96) is ironic given the substantial economic
difficulties encountered both by Japan and Germany, particularly those of corporatist
Germany. See Redesigning the German Model, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 27,1996 at 41; Unhappy
Families, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 1996 at 23.
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communitarians tend to speak in terms of relationships of trust-trust as
an end or objective in itself. Contractarians, including Humean ones,
tend instead to speak of trust as a means, even if a valued one, of
coordination or cooperation-as necessary to the pursuit of diverse other
purposes.227
Apart from this obstacle to the empirical question of the effect of
markets on norm systems, a formalist answer to the charge that markets
threaten norms is to take refuge in his skepticism about rational
direction. The difficulty with the market threat argument from a
formalist perspective is that it assumes a capacity to identify the norm to
be preserved, the nature of the threat posed and appropriate measures
of preservation. It is these capacities, particularly when they are to be
exercised through an articulate, purposive legal process, the formalist
denies. For example, a formalist answer to the communitarian claim that
preservation of corporate trust requires fiduciary obligation to non-
shareholder constituencies or requires worker participation programs is
not to deny that a species of trust is essential, or to deny that it may be
vulnerable to breach of trust from ignorance or hubris, or to deny that
worker participation may be a valuable innovation. Rather, the formalist
answer is to both deny that these matters can be evaluated by the
centralized authority implied by communitarian mandate and to assert
that they can and will be in varying degrees recognized and resolved
locally, largely through inarticulate trial and error processes.
This formalist faith in decentralized, non-legal (in the sense of state-
centered) practice raises, however, the third of the noted objections to
formalism. It was earlier rhetorically asked whether a formalist can
consistently maintain his formalism when confronting the corporation
and argue that he can by depicting the corporation as embedded in and
dependent upon an undirected, "social" order. Nevertheless, there is a
sense in which the answer to this question must be "no." The formalist
who pushes this claim about legal incompetence too far risks becoming
an anarchist.22 Anarchy would seem precluded by formalist commit-
ment to legal enforcement of "property rights" and express contract.
However, the formalist's commitment to such legal enforcement raises
the problems, clearly identified by facilitators, that entitlements must be
specified, that incomplete agreement requires at least some state reliance
upon criteria outside agreement and that state reliance upon socially
227. See supra note 89.
228. See LOMASKY, supra note 46, at 108-10 (noting that Hayek's spontaneous order
risks anarchy).
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generated norms requires some criterion for evaluating the norms to be
incorporated into law. The formalist inclined to avoid anarchy will make
concessions to facilitation, particularly in the form of reliance in law
upon norms derived from social practice or perceived expectation. Such
reliance will necessarily be selective, and this selectivity might well be
governed by some variation upon an efficiency theme. Certainly it will
be governed, at some level of abstraction, by individualist normative
commitments. If contractarians favor promise keeping and communitar-
ians favor solidarity, incorporated norms will be those reflecting the
former of these alternatives. The formalist's state incompetence thesis,
however, will render him disinclined to accept legal mandates, rules
conferring discretion on state functionaires, or case-specific governmental
calculations of cost and benefit. That these matters are ones of degree
subjects the formalist to charges of ambivalence and ambiguity, indeed
of compromising the formalist ideal of predictability.
The formalist's vulnerability in this respect parallels the moderate
communitarian's vulnerabilities: the formalist must make concessions to
the state to avoid charges of anarchism and the communitarian must
limit the state to avoid charges of organic state perfectionism. Both tend
to resort to the claim that they favor a state-enforced institutional
structure within which detailed behavior is not state-directed, but the
communitarian's tendency with respect to this institutional gambit is to
demand articulate justification in terms of a common good, and the
formalist's tendency is to reject articulate justification in favor of
spontaneous, self-governing social process. The formalist's state
incompetence thesis may therefore be described as a "mood" rather than
a theory, 9 in particular, a mood of skepticism about ambition in law.
However, a "mood" is potentially something that, when grasped, can
serve as a basis for predicting the decisions of persons entertaining the
mood and, if the formalist's incompetence thesis is correct, all that is
available to us as a basis for prediction. 3
229. See POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 443 (discussing
traditionalism as a mood); cf. Daniel Farber, The Ages of American Formalism, 90 Nw. U. L.
REV. 89, 100-106 (1995) (distinguishing formalist method from formalist psychology and
suggesting latter may overwhelm former); Paul Brest, Who Decides? 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 661,
662 (1985) (noting that originalism is possible by reference to judicial attitude).
230. Consider, by way of illustration, the problem of leveraged restructurings. Such
restructurings have had, at least in some instances, two consequences generating calls for legal
limitations: wealth transfers from shareholders to debtholders and business failures (in the
sense of subsequent inability to meet debt obligations). One species of complaint is therefore
"unfairness;" another is that the traditional wisdom of avoiding "excessive leverage" should
be reaffirmed. A formalist stance suggests that neither complaint would warrant legal
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III. THE COMMUNITARIAN PERSPECTIVE
The communitarian model is difficult to describe for a reason shared
with the contractarian model-the diversity of views it encompasses.
This effort nevertheless identifies features of the model, derived in part
from the positions of corporate law commentators who have articulated
communitarian commitments and in part from general communitarian
literature.
Communitarians generally attack what they conceive to be "atomism"
or self-interested individualism. Atomism is a feature of contractarian
and neoclassical economic theory in the corporate law context.23' It is
a feature of these, and in some but not all instances "liberalism" in the
more general communitarian literature. 2 Communitarian attacks on
atomism parallel sociological, institutional and organizational attacks on
neoclassical economics, which parallel may explain the tendency of
communitarians to rely upon sociological, institutional, and organization-
intervention, at least on grounds of unfairness, but what of "intervention" on grounds of
traditional wisdom (the "norm" of conservative leverage)?
The formalist's governmental incompetence thesis suggests that moderate leverage cannot
be directed (how much leverage is immoderate?). It suggests, on the other hand, at least some
distrust of "rationalistic" theories of the virtues of leverage (e.g., that the traditional wisdom
can be jettisoned in the interest of preventing managerial waste of free cash flow). It suggests,
as well, both that private actors will make mistakes (so the formalist, unlike the neoclassical
analyst, cannot rely upon the projected rational behavior of such actors) and that there will
be a tendency to self-correction (the traditional wisdom will reassert itself).
Where does this leave the formalist? Probably in about the same place as the neoclassical
analyst, but without the latter's strong predictions about efficient outcomes. The formalist will
be an agnostic about the virtues of leveraged restructurings and concerned about excessive
leverage, but not in a degree that would justify "excessive" directive constraints upon it. Cf.
Douglas S. Baird, Fraudulent Conveyances, Agency Costs, and Leveraged Buyouts, 20 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1991) (employing economic analysis that, albeit expressing faith in eventual empirical
assessment of costs and benefits, suggests degree of agnosticism and favors an "insolvency
rule" limitation on leverage on the ground that it limits scope of judicial inquiry and resembles
the business judgment rule in this respect).
231. See, e.g., Lyman Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty, supra note 4, at
2223-28; Lyman Johnson, Corporate Life and Corporate Law, 68 TEX. L. REV. 865, 894-96
(1990) [hereinafter Johnson, Corporate Life]; Lawrence Mitchell, Groundwork, supra note 34,
at 1478-81; O'Connor, Socio-Economic Approach, supra note 37, at 1535-36.
232. See, e.g., BELLAH, supra note 24, at 287-89 (1991); BELL, supra note 58, at 36-40;
ETZIONI, MORAL DIMENSION, supra note 88, at 6-11; ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE
204-05 (1981); SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE, supra note 100, at 59-65;
Charles Taylor, Atomism, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 187 (1985) [hereinafter
Taylor, Atomism]; RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 104, at 390-95. The attack
on liberalism is particularly evident in MacIntyre. Taylor and Raz are typically viewed as
liberals.
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al literature in support of their positions. 3  (For convenience, this
literature is hereafter in this part labeled "institutional").
The institutional position asserts that fundamental units of analysis
are institutions, that individual behavior is predominantly routinized, and
that the individual is cognitively constructed by his institutional
environment, such that experience is conceived by the individual in terms
of rules, norms, scripts or schemes institutionally given.' 4 Communit-
arians employ these features of the institutional position or parallel
claims in attacking contractarian, liberal, utilitarian and neoclassical
economic analysis descriptively, typically through the short-hand claim
that individuals are "socially constructed." (For convenience, liberal,
utilitarian and neoclassical economic positions are now labeled contract-
arian, with the caveats, however, that there are contractarian and liberal
positions that share at least versions of the institutional position, so the
extent to which contractarian positions are "atomistic" is problematic). 5
233. See. e.g., Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty, supra note 4, at 2226-29;
ETzIONI, MORAL DIMENSION, supra note 88, at 93-113. Cf. HAYEK, COUNTER REVOLUTION
OF SCIENCE, supra note 109, at 367-400 (identifying and criticizing common features of Comte
and Hegel). Maclntyre emphasizes "practices," distinguishing instrumental "institutions," but
his understanding of practice resembles a non-instrumental conception of institution.
MACINTYRE, supra note 232, at 183.
234. For an overview of institutional thought, contrasting traditional and neoinstitutional
approaches, see Paul DiMaggio & Walter Powell, Introduction, to NEW INSTITUTIONALISM,
supra note 142, at 1-38; W. Richard Scott, Unpacking InstitutionalArguments, in NEW INSTITU-
TIONALISM, supra note 142, at 164-82; but see GRAFSTEIN, INSTITUTIONAL REALISM, supra
note 61, at 184-187 (arguing that dominant forms of institutionalism are merely conventiona-
list).
235. However, neoclassical analysis is about institutional determinates of behavior in the
sense that (1) it treats individual behavior as determined by the incentive structure faced by
persons, and (2) it seeks to explain institutions in functional terms. It is deterministic in the
sense that it is behavioralistic. POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 381-
82.
It is of course the case that neoclassical analysis is methodologically individualist and that,
in a broad sense, the sociological tradition is hostile to methodological individualism. But even
this point of contrast is misleading. The individual in neoclassical analysis is not the "free
chooser" he is sometimes made out to be in sociological critique. He is instead a creature
stripped of individuating characteristics who responds, behavioristically, to manipulation of
institutional structure.
Moreover, a focus on the individual is essential, and conceded to be so, even by analysts
intent upon giving institutions causative roles; institutions are not observable independently
of individual behavior. See, e.g., Jepperson, supra note 142, at 163 n. 33 (only individuals have
ontological status, unless one follows Hegel); Friedland & Alford, Bringing Society Back In:
Symbols, Practices, and Institutional Contradictions, in NEW INSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 142
at 949-50 (noting that behavior makes sense only by reference to non-observable symbolic
relations and symbolic relations make sense only in terms of behavior).
Of course many communitarian theorists do follow Hegel, at least to the extent of
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
The principle points of contrast 6 between contractarian and
institutional positions, at least as seen from institutional perspective,
therefore appear to be these: (1) For the contractarian, the basic unit of
analysis is individual choice; for the institutionalist, the basic unit is the
institution or collective, social entity. The contractarian therefore tends
to see stable patterns of behavior as "caused by" individual choice; the
institutionalist sees them instead as causing individual behavior; (2) for
the contractarian, preferences are exogenous (given, not further
examined); for the institutionalist, the source of preference is the point
of inquiry; (3) for the contractarian, choice is "free,"in the sense, at least
that individuals engage in acts of selection among alternatives within a
structure of incentives; for the institutionalist, behavior is at least in
substantial measure predetermined, in the sense, at least, that conceiv-
able action is institutionally defined; (4) for the contractarian, human
action is purposeful, calculating or rational; for the institutionalist, human
action is unconscious rule, script or schema compliance.
Although communitarian positions on the nature of persons and of
their relationship to community or society parallel and often rely upon
institutional analysis, these positions may also be traced to the perhaps
related development of communitarian political philosophy, derived from
sources as otherwise diverse as Aristotle, Rousseau, Hegel, and
Heidegger. 7  However, a particular communitarian may hold only
rejecting universal morality in favor of community based morality, emphasis on the public (and
rejection of the private). CHARLES TAYLOR, HEGEL AND MODERN SOCIETY (1979); Drucilla
Cornell, Toward A Modern/Post-Modern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 291
(1958). There are, however, "conservative" theorists with classically liberal inclinations who
also "follow" Hegel. Oakeshott, for example, may be viewed as attempting a reconciliation
of Hegel and Hobbes. GRAY, LIBERALISMS, supra note 46, at 207. Finally, there is nothing
in methodological individualism that precludes a substantial causative role for society in the
construction of individual identity. Madison, supra note 118. Of course, this point may
depend upon one's definition of methodological individualism. If one means that individual
behavior is the sole observable, there is no inconsistency between methodological individual-
ism and institutionalism. If one means that there are no institutional "causes" of individual
behavior, there is an obvious conflict. If one means that there is a complex interaction
between individual behavior and institutional phenomenon, such that behavior is simultaneous-
ly caused by such phenomenon and a cause of such phenomenon, conflict would seem to
depend on just how "radical" one's emphasis might be.
236. The points of contrast that follow in the text are derived from Jepperson, supra note
142, at 143-63; Friedland & Alford, supra note 235, at 237-63; James B. Zimarowski, Michael
J. Radzicki & William A. Wines, An Institutionalist Perspective on Law and Economics
(Chicago Style) in the Context of United States Labor Law, 35 ARIz. L. REV. 397 (1993).
237. See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 235 (discussing Hegel); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE,
WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988) (discussing Aristotle); BELL, supra note 58
(discussing Heidegger).
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some of the positions. Moreover, and as will become apparent below,
only some of the positions, and only some interpretations of or variations
on a given position, are identifiable with a particular normative or
political commitment. More specifically, although each of the positions
to be examined are relied upon as grounds for commitments and
proposals associated with "progressive," "socialist" or "left-wing"
perspectives, variations on most are relied upon as well for commitments
and proposals associated with "conservative," "classically liberal," and
even "libertarian" perspectives. The implication is that the positions do
not compel particular substantive outcomes. Perhaps this point can be
interpreted as a claim that a variety of normative commitments are
"communtarian," but the term "communitarian" will be reserved here
for those perspectives that employ the examined positions for purposes
of justifying the egalitarian, participatory or altruistic commitments
associated with "progressive" theorists.
It should also be recalled that communitarianism appears divisible
into two branches, a neo-republician branch, devoted to displacement of
individualized, contractual decision or choice and its replacement with
pervasive participatory and democratic procedure, and a norm-centered
branch, devoted to state enforcement of socially generated norms of
egalitarian, altruistic varieties."8  Moreover, there may be a division
within the latter branch between a contractarian wing that would employ
these norms as default terms and a mandatory wing that would require
adherence to them regardless of express agreement to the contrary.239
Corporate communitarians within the norm-centered branch tend to
adhere to the mandatory position.240 These divisions suggest both
degrees of "radicalism" and distinctions in institutional focus. 24  The
norm-centered branch, particularly its contractarian wing, assumes a
238. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
239. The contractarian wing is suggested by, e.g., MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL
CONTRACT, supra note 35; Feinman, supra note 35. There is also a division within this wing
between those who would rely upon general social norms and those who would rely instead
upon the norms or expectations generated within a particular relation. Schwartz, Rational
Contracts in the Courts, supra note 94, at 275. Notice that this division is also reflected in a
national versus local community focus. On distinctions between the communitarianism of
relational theory and sociological theory, see Ian MacNeil, Rational Contract Theory as
Sociology: A Reply to Professors Lindenbery and De Vas, 143 J. INSTIT. & THEORETICAL
ECONOMICS 272 (1987).
240. See, e.g., Bratton, Public Values and Corporate Fiduciary Law, supra note 4
(justifying mandatory terms on basis of dialogue theory).
241. See Simon, What Difference, supra note 5, at 1702 (criticizing norm-focused reform
of fiduciary obligation as ineffectual absent broad institutional reform).
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court-centered institutional focus and advocates a normative commitment
to be implemented through a common law method arguably consistent
with existing practice. The neo-republician branch, at least where
applied in the corporate context, advocates rather radical institutional
restructuring.
Finally, it should be noted that communitarianism may be further
divided into national and local varieties. Indeed, there is a tension
within general communitarian theories between advocacy of Tocque-
villian intermediary associations standing between the state and the
individual, requiring a measure of autonomy from the state, and
advocacy of a national community with common normative commit-
ments. 242 The tension is reflected in corporate communitarianism: if
particular corporations are viewed as particular, localized communities
they must presumably enjoy substantial independence from the state, but
if national markets present a threat to the communitarian normative
vision or prediction about the substantive practices of these communities,
common normative mandates are implied.243
Given these divisions or tensions as background, communitarian
positions are now addressed. These positions are descriptive or
methodological, they concern the matters of the nature of persons, the
relationship between persons and society or community, and the method
by which persons and this relationship is to be best understood. From
these positions communitarians derive their substantive commitments.
The burden of the argument to be made here is that these substantive
commitments are not justified by the positions.
A. Social Construction
First, and paralleling the institutionalist's cognitive construction of the
individual, communitarianism claims that individual identity is constituted
or constructed by community.24  Contractarians are therefore said to
242. James W. Torke, What Price Belonging: An Essay on Groups, Community, and the
Constitution, 24 IND. L. REV. 1, 18-22 (1990). See TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS,
supra note 11, at 204-224 (invoking intermediary organizations but insisting upon political
forms).
243. Compare Lyman Johnson, Sovereignty Over Corporate Stock, 16 DEL. J. CORP. LAW
485 (1991) (rejecting uniform federal securities regulation in one-share, one-vote controversy
as threat to federalism), with Johnson, Corporate Life, supra note 231, at 875, 934 (celebrating
Delaware judiciary's arguable effort to conform corporate law in takeover context to
underlying social norms and recognizing that Delaware corporate law is generally authorita-
tive).
244. See supra notes 231-32. Useful overviews of communitarian theory include Slomo
Avineri & Avner de-Shalit, Introduction to COMMUNITARIANISM AND INDIVIDUALISM, supra
[Vol. 80:391
1997] THE PUBLIC, THE PRIVATE AND THE CORPORATION 475
ignore the social origin of individual identity, individual preference and
the structures within which individual behavior is enabled and rendered
intelligible to the persons engaged in that behavior. An implication is
that behavior is "caused by," in some particularly strong sense, social
norms, rules, structures etc., rather than by purposive or rational choice.
A particularly strong causal hypothesis is implied because an
emphasis on social construction of the individual is not, in some forms,
incompatible with contractarian commitments. Thus, some contractar-
ians accommodate social construction and institutionalism by treating
individual, purposive choice as occurring within systems of norms and
institutional structures viewed as incomplete constraints 45 and by
postulating functional, enabling explanations for these structures. 246
Humean and Hobbesian accounts may be viewed, for example, as
functional or instrumental in treating norms or conventions as enabling
coordination of diverse, individually held purposes or ends or as
advancing enlightened self-interest.247 Communitarians (and institution-
at 1-11; JACK CRITrENDON, BEYOND INDIVIDUALISM, THE RECONSTITUTING THE LIBERAL
SELF 13-37 (1992); KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 63, at
199-37; LARMORE, supra note 54, at 91-130; MACEDO, supra note 104, at 9-38; NANCY
ROSENBLUM, ANOTHER LIBERALISM, ROMANTICISM AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF LIBERAL
THOUGHT 152-86 (1987). For an attack on communitarianism (and other forms of "anti-
liberalism") see STEPHEN HOLMES, THE ANATOMY OF ANTI-LIBERALISM (1993). For a
critique based largely on a denial that "community" existed in the historical past, see DEREK
L. PHILLIPS, LOOKING BACKWARD, A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF COMMUNITARIAN THOUGHT
(1993).
245. See, e.g., BUCHANAN, WHAT SHOULD ECONOMISTS Do?, supra note 96, at 94-112;
Robert Bates, Macropolitical Economy in the Field of Development, in PERSPECTIVES ON
POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 89, at 34. Judge Posner provides a succinct
overview of sociological and economic versions of institutional patterns in RICHARD POSNER,
SEX AND REASON 22 (1992) (noting that "constructivists" emphasize power, exploitation,
malice, ignorance, accident, and ideology while economists emphasize incentives, opportunities,
constraints, and social function).
246. See, e.g., Douglas North, Institutions and a Transaction-Cost Theory of Exchange,
in PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 89, at 182-94 (discussing
institutions as means of overcoming complexity, incomplete information). The "neo-institu-
tionalism" of "transaction-cost economics," e.g., WILLIAMSON, INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM,
supra note 74, is clearly an effort to explain organizational or institutional patterns in
functional terms, while retaining self-interested behavior assumptions and an efficiency
criterion for assessment. Oliver Williamson, The Logic of Economic Organization, in THE
NATURE OF THE FIRM, supra note 74, at 90. An alternative (but perhaps no less functional)
explanation of such patterns is to attribute them to the pursuit and perpetuation of the
interests of the powerful. For an overview, consult Paul Marginson, Coercion and Cooperation
in the Employment Relationship: Efficiency and Power Theories of the Firm, in CORPORATE
CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 4, at 147-64; Dallas, supra note 220.
247. See supra notes 109-136 and accompanying text. Hobbesian functionalism or
instrumentalism, applied to "norms" as conventions to which moral commitments have been
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alists) tend to reject functional or instrumental explanations (as by
finding practices inconsistent with efficiency)248 and emphasize the
cognitive dimension of social construction: both ends (preferences) and
means to these ends are socially determined and these are experienced
as natural or inevitable, such that alternatives are not contemplated.249
In communitarian terms, moreover, "constraints" are experienced as
values in themselves, not as instrumental means to individually deter-
mined ends." (In particular, norm compliance occurs independently
of self-interest, so behavior, according to communitarians, cannot be
attached, should be understood in terms of the origin of these norms in some species of
rational calculation or contract. Humean functionalism or instrumentalism can be understood
in terms of conventions arising from mutual recognition of and "sympathetic" appreciation of
their utility (usefulness) given the "circumstances" of scarcity and self-interest. Neither view
would necessarily exclude the historical possibility of norm-formation through trial and error
processes. Sociological functionalism would seem distinct in that it tends to conceive of norms
as products of a group mind, or at least infers function from postulated collective purpose,
rather than from a set of "methodologically individualist" precepts.
248. ETZIONI, MORAL DIMENSION, supra note 88, at 114-35,166-80; DiMaggio & Powell,
Introduction, supra note 234, at 9-11. The anti-functionalist argument is made in the corporate
context in Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty, supra note 4, at 2231-32. There are,
however, ambiguities in the notions of functionalism or instrumentalism that should be noted.
Much of the sociological, institutional and "law and society" traditions entail "functionalism"
of a sort, typically postulating norms as serving such functions as the survival of social units
or serving (or perhaps constituting) values, such a solidarity, e.g., Ian MacNeil, Exchange
Revisited: Individual Utility and Social Solidarity, 96 ETHICS 567 (1986), and communitarians
seem clearly to wish to select norms or restructure practices to serve the ends (e.g.,
participatory state of being) they prefer. The anti-functionalism or anti-instrumentalism in
question may therefore perhaps be best understood as a claim that norms do not serve ends
communitarians disapprove (e.g., "selfish" ones). Indeed, perhaps communitarian anti-
functionalism is sociological functionalism: theorizing about norms as concepts explaining
behavior as distinguished from predicting norms from postulates of behavior. See generally
BARRY, SOCIOLOGISTS, ECONOMISTS AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 52.
249. See, e.g., BELL, supra note 58, at 40-41; ETZIONI, MORAL DIMENSION, supra note
88, at 93-113; DiMaggio & Powell, Introduction, supra note 234, at 19-27.
250. In general communitarianism, this notion is expressed in the ideas that "true
freedom" is experienced within constraint, TAYLOR, HEGEL AND MODERN SOCIETY, supra
note 235, at 157, and in the notions that the good is a common good of shared ends, SANDEL,
LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE, supra note 100, at 183, or is a good found or
discovered by inhabiting a social role, MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 232, at 204-05.
In corporate communitarianism, it is suggested by emphasis upon corporate relationships as
ends-in-themselves. See, e.g., O'Connor, Socio-Economic Approach, supra note 37, at 1539-46
(discussing trust as end in itself); O'Connor, The Human Capital Era, supra note 41, at 930
(same). Simon, Social Republican Property, supra note 37, at 1343-44 (discussing protection
of relationships through inalienability). However, the communitarian argument typically
entails a claim that existing, individualist institutional patterns should be reformed to enable
relationships viewed as ends in themselves. See, e.g., Mitchell, Groundwork, supra note 34
(arguing that corporate actors should be freed from narrowly defined economic roles so as to
behave as moral persons).
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explained as simply a pursuit of self-interest).
Nevertheless, there are a number of questions that may be raised
both about the meaning of the social construction thesis and about its
efficacy as a basis for distinguishing liberal or contractarian positions.
First, and despite communitarian emphasis on the notion of social
construction, the communitarian use of the notion is conventionalist."1
Communitarians tend to say both that persons are socially constructed
and that they may by design be reconstructed: both institutions, norms
etcetera and the individuals constituted by them are "plastic" in that they
may be altered by collective choice. s22 This latter claim requires an
additional "ought" for its implementation, the ought that alteration
should occur, but questions may be raised about the "can." If persons
are socially constructed in a very strong sense, what enables the
communitarian (or the collective procedure she contemplates) to stand
outside social practice, particularly one deemed excessively atomistic, and
criticize or reform it? A strong version of social construction is in
tension with a reformist agenda.
Second, and particularly given communitarian emphasis upon the
plasticity of persons and institutions, the social construction thesis may
be understood as an attack upon "naturalism"-the notion that persons
have an essential nature and are governed by "laws" they do not control,
or, and even in the absence of such a nature, are governed by a set of
conditions (scarcity, dispersed knowledge) that necessitate a limited
range of possible human responses. This interpretation of strong forms
of the social construction thesis would clearly distinguish even Humean
varieties of contractarianism or liberalism, but at a substantial cost in the
plausibility of the thesis. Communitarian attacks upon neoclassical
economic depictions of the "essential nature" of persons may be credible,
given that the neoclassical ambition is to predict behavior, and prediction
requires a capacity in the neoclassical analyst to specify preference."5 3
However, this credibility trades upon the narrowness and specificity of
the economic depiction. A strong claim that self-interest, more broadly
construed, is a mere artifact of historically contingent social arrange-
251. By conventionalist in the present context is meant the idea that conventions may
be changed, particularly through conscious direction. Cf GRAFSTEIN, supra note 61 (generally
attacking institutionalism on the ground that it is conventionalist and advocating an
institutional view that treats institutions as deterministic structures of human games).
252. See, e.g., Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty, supra note 4, at 2231
(advocating choice of good and rejection of bad norms); Mitchell, Groundwork, supra note
34, at 1481 (advocating rejection of current social role of management).
253. See supra note 150.
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ments (as distinguished from a weaker claim about the contingency and
potential variety of social modes of expression of such a broadly
construed human nature) lacks plausibility. 4
A viable response to these points is that communitarians do not make
such a strong claim. Rather, they make the claim that persons are
socially constructed "in part."" A difficulty with this understanding
of the claim is that liberals, even those who rely upon Kantian autonomy
as the central motif of their liberalism, are perfectly happy to concede
that persons are socially constructed "in part" without thereby deeming
their commitments threatened by the concession. 6 Moreover, there
are liberals, particularly of Humean varieties, who, as we have seen, both
reject Kantian autonomy and accept versions of social construction.5 7
Indeed, they ground their liberalism on the epistemic impossibility both
of standing outside practice and of engaging in a conscious, collective
reordering of practice, 258 or, at least, a reordering beyond incremental
adjustment.
The point is this: the difficulty with the plausible notion that persons
are "in part" socially constructed, is that it compels nothing in particular.
As Professor Gardbaum has demonstrated, one cannot derive a
substantive communitarian agenda from the premise of social construc-
tion; such an agenda does not follow from the premise." There are
at least three ways of seeing that this is so. First, as just indicated, the
premise is shared by a variety of substantive positions, including
transformative communitarianism, conservatism, and some varieties of
254. At least it lacks credibility for this writer and one dares say many others as well.
This question of human nature may constitute the fundamental point in dispute and the
ultimate source of irreconcilable difference between contractarian and communitarian
perspectives, and one not susceptible to resolution.
255. See, e.g., SANDEL, LIMITS OF JUSTICE, supra note 100, at 142-52; J. M. Balkin,
Ideology as Constraint, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1141-45 (1991), Johnson, Individual and
Collective Sovereignty, supra note 4, at 2229-35.
256. KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 63, at 208-13.
257. See, e.g., Hayek, Individualism: True and False, supra note 110, at 6-13; GAUTHIER,
supra note 123, at 6-8, 236-37, 343-44; LARMORE, supra note 54, at 77-85; LOMASKY, supra
note 46, at 42-47.
258. HAYEK, Mirage of Social Justice, supra note 145, at 8-30. It should be noted that
Hayek's theory of mind resembles Kant's theory in important respects. KUKATHAS, supra
note 100, at 47-59. It is detached Kantian autonomy that Hayek's social constructionism
denies. See id. at 175-77.
259. Gardbaum, supra note 51. See KUKATHAS, supra note 100, at 217-27 (claiming
Hayek not subject to communitarian critique).
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liberalism."6 Indeed, the position is shared by varieties of classical
liberalism bordering on libertarianism. 61 Second, the social construc-
tion thesis is consistent with an individualistic, contractarian conception
of our particular society. It is possible to imagine or to identify
"gemeinshaft" communities26 in which ritualized routine dominates,
but ours is a society that has constructed persons as individual choos-
ers. 63 If it had not done so, communitarian critiques of this individual-
ism ' would be unintelligible. Third, if the social construction of
individual "identity" means that individual purposes, preferences, ends
or projects are socially determined, this implies nothing about the social
order in which they should, as a normative matter, be worked out.
Still, there must be something to moderate, "in part," social
construction that warrants the communitarian belief that it is a powerful
260. Gardbaum, supra note 51, at 697-705. For variations of the theme, see e.g., James
Buchanan, Domain of Subjective Economics, supra note 141, at 7 (portraying individual
behavior as both active and reactive). See also Friedland & Robert Alford, supra note 235,
at 255-56 (noting that at a concrete individual and organizational level, instrumental behavior
is constrained but not determined by institutions); Jepperson, supra note 142, at 157-58
("[R]ational choice often includes institutional elements and institutionalism often addresses
adaptive responses."); Elinor Ostrom, Rational Choice Theory and Institutional Analysis:
Toward Complimentarily, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 237,239 (1991) (discussing choice within the
set of permitted actions given by rules). Cf BUCHANAN, WHAT SHOULD ECONOMIST Do?,
supra note 96, at 95, 210-16 (recognizing persons are to a large degree programmed; markets
require minimum set of moral standards); LUDWIG MISES, HUMAN ACTION 42-43 (3d ed.
1966) (stating that methodological individualism is not inconsistent with significance of
collective wholes); HAYEK, CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY, supra note 110, at 36 (stating that
man is creature of civilization); FRANK H. KNIGHT, FREEDOM AND REFORM 84 (Liberty Press
ed. 1982) (stating that individuals are largely formed by social process); HAYEK, THE
COUNTER-REVOLUTION OF SCIENCE, supra note 109, at 149-50 (discussing how men use social
knowledge in form of habits, institutions and concepts).
261. If libertarianism is defined to mean a commitment to a pre-social, pre-political
conception of persons as rights bearers, it is facially incompatible with the social construction
thesis. If it is defined instead to mean a general commitment to "individual liberty" and
hostility to government, it resembles the classical liberalism of theorists like Buchanan, Hayek
and Knight, all of whom recognize forms of the social construction thesis. See the citations
to works of these theorists, supra note 260. Gardbaum suggests that the social construction
thesis precludes libertarianism, Hobbesian social contract theory and rational choice theory.
Gardbaum, supra note 51, at 692. It perhaps precludes versions of these that purport to be
complete descriptions of human behavior. It would not, in moderate form, preclude, for
example, a theory of rational choice as a partial description. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, 'THE
CEMENT OF SOCIETY (1989) nor does it, as Gardbaum recognizes, supra note 51, at 692 n.22,
preclude a normative commitment to, e.g., libertarianism.
262. In Tonnies distinction, community is limited to primitive, closely-knit, communal
societies. FERDINAND TONNIES, GEMEINSHAFT AND GESELLSCHAFT (Charles P. Loomis ed.
& trans., 1940) (1887).
263. Gardbaum, supra note 51, at 703.
264. See MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 232, at 244-55.
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basis for critique. To what "liberal" or "contractarian" or "individualist"
view is the moderate social construction thesis a threat? The thesis is a
threat to extreme views of individual autonomy, as it suggests that
persons do not "freely choose" their ends. Perhaps, then, the point of
the social construction thesis is to delegitimize liberalism by claiming that
its basis in this strong, Kantian conception of autonomy is false.265 This
would work, would constitute something in particular following from
social construction, if individual autonomy were indeed the sole available
basis for or version of "liberalism," but it is not the sole basis. Humean
and Hobbesian varieties of liberalism are not grounded in any strong
form of autonomy.2 66 They are grounded, instead, on diversity within
the socially given.
Consider: even if ends are socially determined, this implies common
ends only at extreme levels of abstraction; at more concrete levels, there
are (particularly within individualist cultures) a vast variety of socially
given and partially determined ends. It does not follow that these ends
are social "property" subject to conscious social direction, for it is as
consistent with social construction to claim that the individual's ends,
albeit socially given, are the individual's "property" subject to the
individual's (conscious, unconscious or partially conscious) direction.
Indeed, this conclusion follows, within Hobbesian and Humean schemes,
from the "fact" of diverse socially given ends within modern societies
and recognition of subjectivism or marginalism within the intersubjective
reality of the socially given. Human interaction is no doubt made
possible by common understandings, structures of intersubjective
meaning, etcetera, but this does not preclude differences in individual
valuation of ends, goods, projects or preferences. Person A is capable
of recognizing person B's preference as a preference by virtue of the
social construction of shared meanings, but A and B can and do engage
in trades (contracts) because their marginal subjective valuations, their
trade-offs between mutually recognized "goods," even understood as
valued and "moral" ways of being, differ.267
Perhaps, however, this emphasis on socially constructed ends mistakes
the communitarian point. Perhaps means to ends are socially construct-
ed: even though persons have diverse (or diversely valued) purposes,
265. See generally SANDEL, LIMITS OF JUSTICE, supra note 100 (criticizing Rawls'
Kantian constructivism).
266. See supra notes 109-148 and accompanying text.
267. GAUTHIER, supra note 123, at 49-59; Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society,
supra note 126, at 78; Ebeling, supra note 150, at 44-52.
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and even if their behavior is partially a matter of their pursuit of these
purposes, that behavior is nevertheless channelled in socially approved
ways.26 Perhaps, also, this is what is meant by the communitarian
notion that norms are not means, but ends-in-themselves: the social
channeling or structuring of behavior so constructs individual perception
that the distinction between ends and means breaks down. Conformity
to that which is socially deemed moral becomes an end to which
individual purposes are subordinated or reconciled, so behavior is not
merely instrumental to individual purposes. 69 Call this interpretation
a norm commitment variation on social construction.
There is surely a great deal of validity to this variation on the social
construction theme. It is not possible to account for common under-
standings of the expected and of the admirable without granting that
validity. To what "liberal" or "contractarian" position, however, is this
variation a threat? The most obvious candidate is neoclassical economic
analysis, at least given a particular interpretation of that analysis.
Neoclassical analysis assumes preferences and treats human behavior as
rational pursuit of these preferences. It does not seem particularly
threatened by its treatment of preferences as given (exogenous, or not
objects of inquiry), for it is then merely incomplete as a full explanation
of human behavior. The social construction thesis suffers from a similar
infirmity: it treats the norms or values said to determine individual
identity as exogenous to the analysis by declining to explain their origins
(as in rejecting instrumental accounts).27 Nevertheless, what may be
threatening about social construction is the prospect that the economic
story about rational pursuit of given ends is erroneous.
For example, consider the matter of cooperation through agreement
(for example, through an "implicit contract" between management and
employees regarding job security).27 Why do persons keep, or not,
their promises? According to the rational pursuit of given preferences
268. Marleen O'Connor, How Should We Talk About Fiduciary Duty? Directors Conflict
of Interest Transactions and the ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance, 61 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 954, 963-69 (1993); Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty, supra note 4, at 2233-
34; Mitchell, Groundwork, supra note 34, at 1482.
269. ETZIONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION, supra note 88, at 21-87.
270. Cf. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW, supra note 124, at 149 (making this claim
about the "law and society" school). That possible subspecies of "communitarianism" that
relies on "power" theories, such that the powerful manipulate norms or the consciousness of
the powerless to serve the ends of the powerful provides an explanation, but it is one
resembling Hobbesian (or, perhaps, Machiavellian) rationality.
271. See Stone, Employees as Stakeholders, supra note 4 (generally treating employee-
corporate relationship in terms of implicit contract).
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story, the parties engage in a calculation of the costs and benefits of
contract (and later, of contractual compliance), where these costs and
benefits are assessed by reference to the preferences or purposes of each
actor. The contract (cooperation) is a mere means, an instrument by
which ends apart from the contract may be advanced or retarded. Thus,
a party's decision to breach (e.g., management's decision to exploit
employees following their investment in firm-specific human capital) is
determined, for the neoclassical analyst, by that party's calculation of the
costs and benefits to that party of breach; the cooperative arrangement
is not itself an object valued within this calculation. 72 Given the
analyst's collectivism-her commitment to efficiency-the legal questions,
in the absence of express agreement about job security, are whether
wealth would be maximized by job security (whether rational maximizers
would agree to it) and, if so, what remedy will ensure that the manageri-
al actor includes costs to employees within the breach calculation.73
If the social construction thesis means that persons do not calculate in
the fashion suggested by this story, that they instead make promises
through tacit understandings of and expectations of commitment to
norms and they keep promises or are excused from so doing because
these behaviors are simply perceived to be the "thing to do," the thesis
obviously threatens the story. At least it threatens the story if the story
is intended as a depiction of actual behavior.
Does the thesis also threaten Hobbesian accounts? The neo-
Hobbesian view of promise keeping is distinct, but similar to the
economic one. It, perhaps unlike the neoclassical view, predicts non-
defection (promise keeping) in circumstances in which defection could
be advantageous to the non-defecting actor. 4 The similarity is that
action in both conceptions is instrumental to the partially ("selfishly")
held purposes of individuals. The distinction is subtle. Promise keeping
in circumstances of advantageous defection may be predicted by the
neoclassical analyst by adopting a "long-term perspective" and by
therefore including additional costs from defection: the actor now
272. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust and Economic Organization, supra note 89.
273. See, e.g., POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 70, at 117-26
(discussing theory of efficient breach); Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital
Investments and Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 DUKE L.J. 173, 192-
97 (discussing the neoclassical analysis of the implicit contract between "outsiders" and the
corporation).
274. See GAUTHIER, supra note 123, at 177-89. Recall that "Hobbesian" is not identical
to that which Hobbes would have approved. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
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contemplates the reputational effects of defection.175 The neo-Hobbes-
ian's emphasis, by contrast, is on the notion that disposition to partici-
pate in a practice or commitment to promise keeping, always assuming
a perception of reciprocal participation by other parties, advances the
actors' purposes.276  Social construction as non-calculating norm
compliance is a threat to this depiction to the extent that calculation is
a prominent feature of the depiction, particularly if disposition or
commitment is a matter of continuous calculation (as distinguished from
a routine). Moreover, the neo-Hobbesian emphasis is upon the question
of defection, a matter that assumes a promise, not one that supplies the
content of a promise. The communitarian conception of promise
keeping appears to suggest such a content: defection (breach of promise)
entails escape from a relationship, so non-defection may imply for the
communitarian an "implicit" promise to preserve the relationship.
Does the communitarian thesis (that human behavior is noncalculat-
ing) threaten Humean accounts? Humeans may not be significantly
distinct from some Hobbesians in treating norm compliance instrumental
to coordination of individual ends,277 or cooperation for mutual
advantage, but the Humean tendency is to view norm compliance as
uncalculated.27 Given a Humean commitment to partiality (self-interest
as partiality to individually held ends), a norm of promise keeping would
not be sustainable absent its tendency to pay off. Nevertheless, the
Humean treats norm compliance or rule following as "natural," in the
sense that the actor generally perceives compliance as the conceivable
course of action and attaches moral weight, a sense of moral obligation,
to compliance.2 79 Norms on some Humean accounts are instrumental
to the coordination and mutual achievement of individually held ends,
275. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 181-83.
276. GAUTHIER, supra note 123, at 165-89; LOMASKY, supra note 46, at 62-83. Contra
BINMORE, PLAYING FAIR, supra note 89, at 173-256.
277. The similarity lies in the shared notions that persons are partial to their ends or
interests and that norms (or morality generally) is a solution to the problems generated by this
partiality, the presence of more than one person, scarcity, and the possibility of coordination
or cooperation. However, Hobbesian morality, at least in its pure form, is grounded in
rationality, not in sympathy, altruism or benevolence. GAUTHIER, supra note 123, at 69-70.
Humean morality is enabled in part by "sympathy." HUME, TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE,
supra note 105, at 316-24. Cf. KUKATHAS, supra note 100, at 90 (stating that Hayek offers no
theory of egoistic human nature; his theory is instead one of man as a rule-follower).
278. HUME, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS, supra note 108, at 234-54; HUME, TREATISE OF
HUMAN NATURE, supra note 105, at 489-490, 498-501.
279. HUME, TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, supra note 105, at 523; 3 HAYEK, The
Political Order of a Free People, supra note 118, at 156-58.
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but they are not merely objects of rational calculation by individuals
assessing them as means to their ends; rather, individuals follow
rules."' Instrumentalism does not imply conscious design; in the
Humean view, conscious design is denied even though the long-term
instrumental character of norms is simultaneously insisted upon.s 1 A
practice becomes regularized as a norm to the degree that it is successful
in coordinating diverse ends, particularly by rendering behavior predict-
able. 2' It is instrumental in this global sense, but it is perceived,
individually, as the "thing to do."
It should be noted, however, that norms, albeit perceived as
obligations, have a procedural, rather than substantive character and a
certain flexibility in this Humean account. They are procedural globally
in that they are instrumental to coordination and cooperation. They are
procedural at the level of the individual because, although value may be
attached to acts of coordination and cooperation, these activities are
themselves about some objective beyond them; they are valued, but they
are not their own justifications. 283 This may imply something about the
content of the promises to which Humeans would attach the norm of
promise keeping. There is nothing in the Humean account that would
deny, and much within it that would support an implicit promise: persons
may well make and accept promises through tacit understandings and
expectations of compliance with norms.2 84 However, an instrumental
view of the point of a promise suggests that the content of the implicit
promise will not simply be that of preservation of relationship; any such
280. Hayek, Rules and Order, supra note 105, at 43-46; Hayek, Individualism: True and
False, supra note 110, at 23-24.
281. Hayek, Rules and Order, supra note 105, at 37; HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN
NATURE, supra note 105, at 533-34.
282. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY, supra note 110, at 111, Hayek,
Individualism: True and False, supra note 110, at 23-24
283. Cf. Elster, Self Realization, supra note 11 (making this point from a distinct
perspective); GAUTHIER, supra note 123, at 337 (same).
284. Hayek treats social norms as "flexible," Hayek, Individualism: True and False, supra
note 110, at 23, but flexibility in the Humean position is a species of inflexibility. The notion
is that a norm or rule must be sufficiently known and certain to serve its function of generat-
ing predictable behavior: coordination requires that expectations about the conduct of others
be confirmed. At the same time, the norm cannot dictate substantive details without
threatening the notion that ends are diverse and subjectively valued. See HAYEK, The Mirage
of Social Justice, supra note 145, at 146 (noting that morality within an open society, as
distinguished from a primitive one, is general at the price of reducing the content of duty to
others); HAYEK, CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY, supra note 110, at 97-98 (rejecting desert as
moral norm). See also CUBEDDU, PHILOSOPHY OF THE AUSTRIAN SCHOOL, supra note 150,
at 205 (distinguishing cultural values and ends).
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implicit promise of preservation will be highly qualified by a condition
of continued mutual advantage. Whether unilateral termination of
relationship entails a breach of the norm of promise keeping or is instead
an instance of compliance with that norm will be a matter of substantial
complexity of tacit understandings. Humean tendencies to formalism
may be explained in part by skepticism about state capacity to detect
these complexities.
This discussion of "promise-keeping" as a social norm has thus far
suggested that the communitarian account of socially structured behavior,
if accepted as -descriptively accurate, is a threat to the neoclassical,
economic, and, in degree, to the Hobbesian accounts, to the extent that
these rely upon individuated instrumental rationality within each case or
instance of human behavior. It suggests, as well, however, that there are
substantial parallels between the communitarian and Humean depictions
of behavior as rule or norm governed. These suggestions must, however,
be qualified.
In the first place, neoclassical rational calculation can be given a
behavioristic interpretation that renders it less clearly threatened by
social construction than the depiction suggests. On the behavioralist
interpretation, persons do not consciously calculate. Instead, they
behave "as if" they were rational maximizers because they respond to an
incentive structure.M The incentive structure is for the individual, a
social given, parallelling norms in alternative accounts. If norms are
instrumental to coordination and cooperation, as in the Humean view,
they may generate "as if" rationality in the neoclassical view. 86 This
is not to say that the accounts become identical; it is to say, rather, that
the neoclassical position does not lack a functional analogue for norms.
Moreover, this functional analogue is manipulable in the neoclassical
view: incentives can be reformed so as to bring about desired conse-
quences or end-states. This manipulability is an analogue to human
plasticity. Communitarians may think that individual identities may be
altered through norm selection, but legal economists think behaviors may
be altered through incentive manipulation.
The second qualification is that the communitarian and Humean
285. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 70, at 3-4; POSNER, PROBLEMS
OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 354, 382.
286. Cf. GARY S. BECKER, Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory, in THE ECONOMIC
APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 153-68 (1976) (noting that economist's predictions follow
even assuming irrational decision units, such as irrational firms, from changes in opportunity
sets-i.e., scarcity).
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accounts, although similar in their contentions that behavior is rule or
norm governed (and perhaps, that norms are undesigned social
products), differ strikingly over their characterizations of norms and the
implications of agreed upon premises.2" Communitarians tend to deny
that norms are instrumental to the advancement of individual ends and
to deny that the survival of a norm is dependent upon its instrumental
character.2 8  They tend, therefore, also to invest more heavily than
Humeans in the notion that conformity to a norm is itself an end. For
the Humean (and for some Hobbesians) norms come to be perceived by
persons as moral values, but are explained as solutions to a problem of
scarcity or dispersed knowledge.289 For the communitarian, norms are
ends in the strong senses that conformity is an act of participation in a
collective good and that this participation itself, not an objective outside
it, is its own explanation: the human good is not satisfaction through
coordination or cooperation of individual preferences, but, rather, this
participation.2" Moreover, communitarians employ this strong concep-
287. This is most strikingly evidenced by MacIntyre, whose chief villain is Hume and
chief hero is Aristotle, but who recognizes parallels between them. See MACINTYRE, WHOSE
JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY?, supra note 237, at 318-25, 338.
288. ETzIONI, MORAL DIMENSION, supra note 88, at 166-80; Johnson, Individual and
Collective Sovereignty, supra note 4, at 22-33; Mitchell, Groundwork, supra note 34, at 1482-83.
However, some corporate law commentators who may be identified with the communitarian
camp do support the norms they favor with instrumentalist arguments. See supra notes 87-89
and accompanying text. It should be noticed that communitarian anti-instrumentalism is in
part anti-rationalism. That is, the argument tends to be that persons do not behave "ratio-
nally" when rationality is understood (instrumentally) as the best or least cost choice of means
to ends. Norms on this account are limitations or constraints on means-selection or are ends
(values) balanced against "selfish" ends. The last point suggests a second sense in which
communitarians attack rationality: persons are not (wholly) self-interested. The notion,
however, that norms are constraints is not alien to Humean or Hobbesian accounts; and the
notion that persons are not perfect calculators is certainly consistent with Humean accounts.
What does seem distinct is the claim by Humeans and Hobbesians that norms as constraints
serve coordination or cooperation and that coordination and cooperation have their sources
in partially held ends.
289. KUKATHAS, supra note 100, at 54, 58 (discussing Hume's philosophy that rules
solve problem of scarcity, whereas for Hayek, rules solve problem of ignorance). For a
Hobbesian contention that participation and norm compliance, albeit instrumental, come to
be valued see GAUTHIER, supra note 123, at 350-55. For Hume's account of adherence to
convention and non-contractarian, non-rationalist account of the formation of convention,
consult HUME, TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, supra note 105, at 489-90.
290. For neorepublicans, participation is a matter of a participatory democratic politics.
Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace Cooperation: From
Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 753,879-917 (1994); O'Connor, Socio-
Economic Approach, supra note 37; Simon, Social Republican Property, supra note 37, at 1349-
50. For communitarians who emphasize altruistic or communal interpretations of socially
generated norms, participation is compliance with these. Johnson, Individual and Collective
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tion of norms as ends to invest in the state the task of enforcement:
socially generated norms are to be authoritatively interpreted (and
selected) by reference to values (solidarity, altruism, preservation and
stability of relationships), reflecting this conception of the human
good. 9  (Neo-republicans conceive of these values as informing the
construction of political procedure; the socially generated practices
deemed norms in alternative accounts become features of life contingent
upon collective approval within these procedures). Humean formalists,
by contrast, contemplate a limited state dedicated to enforcement of
those norms encompassed with the notion of stable and predictable
property rights and express contractual exchange; norm compliance is
deemed otherwise sustainable outside the state.2" For the communit-
arian, for example, markets are threats to favored norms and stable
relationships. 93 For the Humean, markets are both enabled by and
Sovereignty, supra note 4, at 2231; Mitchell, Groundwork, supra note 34, at 1487-88.
291. See, e.g., ETZIONI, MORAL DIMENSION, supra note 88, at 237-51 (favoring
communitarian morality); Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty, supra note 4, at 2231
(discussing how society is to collectively choose good over bad norms); Mitchell, Groundwork,
supra note 34, at 1481( favoring "morality" over "social role").
It is possible, however, to read some corporate communitarian proposals as "deregula-
tory." See Mitchell, Groundwork, supra note 34, at 1481-88 (proposing to free managers from
legally imposed rule so that they become free to comply with morality). Moreover, much of
this commentary characterizes corporate law, particularly as constructed by the neoclassical
economic position, as distinct from and alien to socially generated norms. E.g., Johnson,
Corporate Life and Corporate Law, supra note 231, at 932-33. And much of the commentary
conceives of markets, particularly the market in control but also the very notion of alienability
of shares, as a threat to the solidarity norms favored by the commentary. E.g., Simon, Social
Republican Property, supra note 37, at 1338-49. Two points may, however, be made about
these characterizations. First, "deregulatory" proposals are typically accompanied by "re-
regulatory" ones. Compare Mitchell, Groundwork, supra note 34 (deregulation), with Mitchell,
A Critical Look at Corporate Governance, supra note 4 (re-regulation). De-regulation turns
out to be the substitution of one set of state-enforced norms for another. Second, and
particularly if one believes that "re-regulation" is an inevitability (i.e., if the public/private
distinction is rejected), the characterizations depend crucially upon assuming that the norms
or interpretations favored by the commentators are those that would be socially generated
(that existing corporate law or market behavior is artificial or imposed). The Humean and
Hobbesian would of course not deem communitarian solidarity the "natural" baseline, as their
instrumental account implies a distinct "natural" baseline.
292. See Hayek, Individualism: True and False, supra note 110, at 23-24; supra notes 183-
230 and accompanying text.
293. Johnson, Corporate Life and Corporate Law, supra note 231, at 903-08, Simon,
Social Republican Property, supra note 37, at 1343-44. "Conservatives" tend to share the view
that (national) markets are threats to (the species of solidarity) they favor and to advocate,
like some communitarians of the left, localized economic regulation. E.g., Kristol, supra note
226. On the history of this theme generally, consult Hirschman, Rival Interpretations of Market
Society, supra note 226.
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sources of favored norms.294
These distinctions, however, are about the content of norms and the
state's relationship to them, not their capacity to construct behavior.
Both the communitarian and the Humean deny that norm compliance
entails rational calculation. The communitarian's rejection of instrumen-
tal explanations of norms is employed in part for the purpose of
asserting the phenomenon of commitment, but Humeans recognize and
rely upon commitment: the social stability they favor requires uncalculat-
ed compliance. An instrumental explanation of norms rules out neither
the social embedding of the individual nor the dependence of instrumen-
tal norms upon non-instrumental commitment to them. If, however, it
is not the phenomenon of norm commitment but instrumental character-
ization that distinguishes Humeans from communitarians, what is the
nature of this distinction?295  The significant distinction between the
instrumental and noninstrumental characterizations of norms may be
normative: the Humean's instrumentalism entails a particular norm, that
of promise keeping as honesty, or adherence to prior commitment, a
norm that assumes promise as an instrument for achieving a desired
294. See HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT, supra note 121, at 38-47, 89-105 (discussing
markets as spontaneous orders). It should be noticed, however, that, for Hayek, markets are
not the "perfect competition" systems contemplated by neoclassical theory, and norm-based
relationships are integral to his markets. See Hayek, The Meaning of Competition, supra note
220, at 92-104. In this regard compare Gauthier, supra note 123, at 83-112 (noting that
markets are morally free zones where market is understood in terms of perfect competition),
with COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 73, at 59-72 (discussing cooperation as
condition for competition).
295. The dispute might be viewed as empirical: are norms instrumental or are they not?
See POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 382-87 (emphasizing that
incentives matter, as demonstrated by fall of communist systems); ELLICKSON, ORDER
WITHOUT LAW, supra note 124, at 167-229 (noting that empirical studies reenforce hypothesis
that social norms enhance joint welfare, at least within closely-knit groups, with discussion of
counter-examples); id. at 149-55 (criticizing various interpretations of norm content, including
sociological functionalism, with a species of which Ellickson identifies Hayek, and interest
group theory).
Law and Society scholars tend to share the claims that socially generated norms govern
behavior and that law does not. E.g., Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in
Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963). Communitarians who rely on this
literature tend to interpret norms as inconsistent with at least "efficiency" versions of
instrumentalism and as consistent with solidarity values. See, e.g., Feinman, supra note 35.
Alternatively, they tend to adopt interest group theories of norms: norms (illicitly) serve the
interests of the powerful. See, e.g., Dallas, supra note 220. Notice that there is again a
question here of instrumental to what; group survival, welfare, coordination and power are all
possibilities.
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end.296 The communitarian's anti-instrumentalism instead entails, even
where framed in terms of promise keeping, solidarity; understood as
unity of purpose and of value and as conformity to these, arguably an
end itself 297
This possibility may be illustrated by confronting an argument that
promise keeping collapses into solidarity in the corporate context. The
argument is that the distinction between promise keeping and solidarity
is illusory in the context of the "relational contracts" that characterize
296. See Gerald Radnitzky, Hayek's Contribution to Epistemology, Ethics and Politics,
in CONTENDING WITH HAYEK 65, 73-85 (Christoph Frei & Robert Nef eds., 1994)
(interpreting Hayek and indicating that promise keeping norms of extended order are
grounded in deontological account, relying largely upon Anthony de Jasay, A Stocktaking of
Perversities, 4 CRITICAL REV. 537 (1990)). Communitarians, particularly ones relying upon
implicit contract theory, might reply that they, too, are merely concerned with promise
keeping. The difficulty with this reply is that solidarity norms inform, if not wholly overwhelm
honesty norms in implicit contract analyses. See Katherine Wezel Stone, Labor Markets,
Employment Contracts and Corporate Change, in CORPORATE CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILI-
TY, supra note 4, at 88-89 (discussing remedies for breach of contract not limited to damages
for harm to expectation interest, but include structural mandates). Stone contemplates
mandates-e.g., employee representation on corporate boards-as remedies that clearly to go
beyond the notion of promise keeping. See also Simon, What Difference Does It Make?, supra
note 5, at 1701 (noting that managers can avoid reliance claims by discouraging reliance, so
more radical reform than implicit contract is necessary); Simon, Social Republican Property,
supra note 37, at 1338-50 (discussing inalienability as necessary to prevent tendencies to self-
interest).
297. Simon, Social Republican Property, supra note 37, at 1403 (noting that efficiency
may be traded off against value of community through collective decision). The distinction
between a norm of promise keeping and a norm of solidarity is roughly this: promise keeping,
albeit explained instrumentally, entails commitment, so compliance from the perspective of the
promise keeper is not simply instrumental. Nevertheless, the substantive nature of promise
making is that it is instrumental to the advancement of individually held and distinctly valued
goods, so promise keeping cannot be wholly divorced from this nature. At the same time, the
honoring of a promise in circumstances where doing so fails to be instrumental (say
circumstances of efficient breach) cannot be explained solely in even long-term instrumental
terms (in the fashion of neo-Hobbesians) if Humean depictions are to be retained. So non-
instrumental, uncalculating commitment also cannot be divorced from the practice. HUME,
TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, supra note 105, at 518-23. Cf. NOZICK, RATIONALITY, supra
note 89, at 45-49 (discussing symbolic utility in combination with evidential expected utility).
Apart, however, from this inseparability of instrumentalism and commitment, promise keeping
is or is largely impersonal: it is not dependent upon identification with or commitment to the
promisee (as distinguished from commitment to the practice). This commitment to others is
what is meant here by solidarity. Notice that this is not to say that commitment to others is
so alien to a promise keeping system as to be absent; it is rather to say that the keeping of a
particular promise within such a system is not dependent upon mutual identification with a
particular substantive end. Commitment to the system as an abstract or general good is
necessary to the system's survival. By contrast, one acts from solidarity by reason of a
commitment to a shared, substantive end and from identification with the others sharing, or
made to share this end; the point of solidarity is that of ensuring the sharing.
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corporations because ex ante promises (including implicit ones) cannot,
given unpredictable future contingencies, be "discrete." ' This means,
inter alia, that what a promise requires ex post cannot be specified ex
ante. An implication communitarians may favor is that Humean honesty
is inadequate to sustain a relational contract because Humean honesty
may contemplate an ex ante specification.
Consider the corporate communitarian variation on this theme:
corporate relationships entail the dependence of one contracting party
(e.g., employees) on the good faith or non-opportunistic determinations
of another party (e.g., managerial determinations regarding employee
performance) given incapacity to specify ex ante. Dependent parties are
induced to accept risks of opportunism (to "trust" management) through
managerial signaling of adherence to a principle or norm of fidelity.2
However, this signaling will prove inadequate; the credibility of a
managerial reputation for fidelity requires legal backing, as through
fiduciary obligation. This is something of a Hobbesian viewpoint, and
appears at first glance to be a quite instrumental one: fiduciary obligation
serves to encourage corporate contracts. The communitarian twist is that
fiduciary obligation is to reflect morality: instrumentalism requires non-
instrumental commitment backed by law.
Is this understanding inconsistent with Humean commitments? With
some of the calculating overtones left out, it is not inconsistent, at least
up to the point of legal enforcement, with Humean honesty, because it
is a story framed in terms of fidelity to an understanding. True this
understanding, one about what may constitute good faith or opportun-
ism, is quite unspecified ex ante, but specification is not, contrary to the
allegation assumed above, a necessary feature of Humean norms (even
if it is one of formalist contract). Indeed, tacit and inarticulate knowl-
edge is central to Humean understandings of human interaction."
The rub comes with legal enforcement, and it is this rub that enables a
communitarian gloss on the story.
The difficulty with legal enforcement, at least from a Humean
perspective, is that the unspecified, tacit, and inarticulable becomes
judicially specified ex post, and there is no assurance that this specifica-
tion will or can approximate through articulation the inarticulable. This
is the reason why Humean formalists prefer non-legal, informal or social
298. This is the theme of relational contract literature of the communitarian variety. See
supra note 35 and accompanying text.
299. Bratton, supra note 89.
300. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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sanctions even at the (perhaps substantial) risk of their inadequacy.30 1
Moreover, the communitarian gloss on the story follows from articulate
state specification. Legal enforcement risks a subtle shift from (1)
enforcement of a norm of fidelity to an understanding to (2) enforce-
ment of a norm of fidelity to the interests of the dependent, and from
there to (3) fidelity to the unity of state conceived interests and
objectives that is the norm of solidarity.3" It can be granted by the
Humean that uncalculating commitment to the principles of a "corporate
culture" may arise spontaneously as an non-instrumental solution to the
instrumental problem of inducing the "trust" of parties contemplating a
relationship of dependence. The story is in fact quite Humean. What
the Humean cannot grant is that the understanding represented by this
culture should be made uniform across corporations, can be captured by
legal authority standing outside it, or necessarily entails in character or
degree the "norms of reciprocity, equality, and cooperation, 30 3 commun-
itarians contemplate.
It is of course possible that the refusal to grant these matters will
have the consequence of disabling productive corporate relationships; it
may even be "inefficient." Whether this is true is likely an unresolvable
empirical issue of the sufficiency of social sanction. But this empirical
issue does not turn on social construction of the individual, even when
construed as the phenomenon and utility of uncalculating commitment.
In sum, social construction, even when understood as a thesis about
norm governed behavior, is not an exclusively communitarian precept
and does not compel, without the addition of substantive normative
commitments not themselves derived from the thesis, communitarian
interpretations or recommendations (or, for that matter, "liberal" ones).
The particular "is" of social construction yields no particular
"ought. ,,304
301. Cf. Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J. dissenting)
(noting that underlying rationale of contract law should not be confused with its actual
requirements by implying pledge to avoid opportunistic conduct).
302. See Bratton, supra note 89, at 166 (describing "socio-economic approach").
303. Id.
304. See HUME, A TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE, supra note 105, at 468-70 (stating
that "ought" cannot be derived from "is"); Jeffrey Friedman, The Politics of Communi-
tarianism, 8 CRITICAL REV. 297 (1994) (criticizing communitarians for failing to bridge the
is/ought gap) [hereinafter Friedman, The Politics of Communitarianism]; Gardbaum, supra note
51, at 697-705 (discussing how social construction compatible with variety of normative
positions). Charles Taylor has made a similar point. TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS,
supra note 11, at 182-85. However, Taylor's point is that liberal critics of communitarianism
mistake communitarian ontological theses for commitments to political collectivism. This,
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B. Community and Morality
"Community" is given a normative and, in a sense, epistemological
status in communitarian thought, again paralleling institutionalist claims
about human cognition. Community is the source of knowledge about
"the good, 315 understood as the purpose or end or way of living that
is valued but also as that which is deemed "moral." One implication is
rejection of foundationalist, universal truths or values in favor of
communal contextualism. A further implication is that the good varies:
distinct communities embody distinct goods. That is, the good is to be
discovered within the context of particular communities, through
interpretive and dialogic means, not through deduction from foundation-
al principle or scientific method. These implications have the potential
to link communitarian political philosophy to post-modem interpretive
or contextualized epistemology, to some forms of pragmatism, and to the
indeed, would be a mistake, but the point in the text is that it is at least often one made by
communitarians.
This is not to say that communitarians are without a mechanism by which they hope to
derive authoritative oughts: they resort to a hermeneutical process from which a best account
of practice may be derived. They contemplate, moreover, criteria for this best account, as in
the claim that one account is better than another if it can explain the other and the other
cannot explain it. See Charles Taylor, Explanation and Practical Reason, supra note 61, at 208-
231. There are parallels in Hayek to these notions. See HAYEK, Mirage of Social Justice,
supra note 145, at 24-27.
It should be noticed that a modus vivendi conception of appropriate social and legal
arrangements must, however, ultimately reject these proposals. There are two reasons: (1) The
proposals contemplate a procedure that assumes values rejected by the modus vivendi view
(the advocate of the view wishes to be left alone, he is not curious about the prospects for
resolution). Cf. Steven L. Winter, Contingency and Community in Normative Practice, 139 U.
PA. L. REV., 963, 970 (1991) (noting that dialogue theories build into their procedure
controversial commitments). (2) The advocate of the modus vivendi view suspects that the
proponents criterion is rigged, as he thinks the proponents accounts cannot, except arbitrarily,
make claims to superior explanation. Notice that the superior explanation criterion is itself
rigged; it assumes the activity of explanation as the good, thus privileging the good of
academic, scientific or philosophical inquiry. See infra notes 361-79 and accompanying text.
305. The second claim is in fact an aspect of the first: if persons are "embedded," such
that their identities are socially determined, it follows that their knowledge of the good is
social. Transformative or reformist communitarians reject current (individualist) institutional
patterns, and corporate law commentators associated with communitarianism are typically
transformists. Although corporate communitarians are typically transformative, the tendency
of some to rely upon interpretation, particularly interpretation of social norms or moralities
as sources of corporate law links them to the community (here, large, social community) as
source of good notion. See, e.g., Bratton, Public Values and Corporate Fiduciary Law, supra
note 4 (arguing for imposition of social norms); Millon, Theories of the Corporation, supra note
4, at 247 (relying on conventionalist, communal account of meaning and interpretation);
Mitchell, Groundwork, supra note 34, at 247 (invoking social morality).
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contextualized ethics of some strands of feminism.3' 6 However, it also
has the potential to link communitarian philosophy to political and social
conservatism and even to certain strands of classical liberalism.37  To
the extent that the good is identified with the practices of a community,
a conservative emphasis on tradition is implied. To the extent that a
particular tradition is itself a liberal one, liberalism also may be identified
with "the good."
However, this communitarian emphasis upon "the good" is simulta-
neously an attack upon "liberalism's" alleged "priority of the right over
the good," where "right" is understood as a neutral morality ultimately
grounded in the "foundation" of an autonomous Kantian will. Egalitari-
an or progressive liberalism tends to predicate neutrality on a Kantian
vision of autonomy linked to versions of "positive liberty": individuals
create the good for themselves through acts of choice and require for this
activity the means to render the activity meaningful. The ideal is one of
self-realization through self-direction."' Prominent strands of communi-
tarianism attack this notion: as individuals are constituted by communi-
ty, they realize themselves through the activity of discovering and
participating in a good already given by community, not through choice
from among competing goods.3 9 Neutrality is on this account a threat
306. Gardbaum, supra note 51, at 705-17. See MINDE, POSTMODERN LEGAL
MOVEMENTS, supra note 184, at 224-46 (depicting postmodernism).
307. Variations on the community as source of value theme are evident in cultural
conservatism (the anti-individualist notion that common morality should be enforced by law),
Gardbaum, supra note 51, at 719-23, and in some variations on classical liberalism. The
"conservatism" of Michael Oakeshott has, at least until recently, an example of the latter. See
Jacob Segal, A Storm From Paradise: Liberalism and the Problem of Time, 8 CRITICAL REV.
23 (1994) (discussing Oakeshott). Another possible example is John Gray, who engages in a
critique of liberalism on anti-universalistic grounds, but also advocates a post-modem,
"conservative liberalism." JOHN GRAY, LIBERALISMS, supra note 46; JOHN GRAY, POST-
LIBERALISM (1995).
308. See supra notes 100-107 and accompanying text.
309. See, e.g., SANDEL, LIMITS OF JUSTICE, supra note 100, at 160-61. One variation on
this theme is that ends, not simply means to ends, are properly subjects of inquiry; ETZIONI,
MORAL DIMENSION, supra note 88, at 11-13, and that constitutive ends are communal, not
merely a matter of preference, but of meaning. CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF,
95-97 (1989). Another is that unconscious routinization, not rational choice, characterizes
human behavior. BELL, supra note 58, at 33-41. A third is emphasis upon interpretation,
conversation and deliberation (as distinguished from rational calculation). BELL, supra note
58, at 55-89; Taylor, Atomism, supra note 232; Michaelman, Law's Republic, supra note 36, at
1495-1503. A fourth is hostility to "bureaucracy" understood as Weber's ordered, rationalized
activity. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 232, at 254; MacNeil, Bureaucracy, supra
note 35. These themes are evident in corporate communitarian commentary. See, e.g.,
Bratton, Public Values, supra note 4 (invoking dialogic theory and proposing that economic
instrumentalism should be limited by social values); Johnson, Individual and Collective
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to self-realization.
1. Communitarian Autonomy and "Positive Liberty"
Nevertheless, there are senses in which communitarian versions of
self-realization are derived from and extensions of Kantian self-
realization and of the egalitarian liberalism that reflects this ideal.31
Corporate communitarians in particular appear to endorse Kantian
themes, thereby generating something of a tension between the "social
source of the good" notion and these themes. In the first place,
communitarians tend to accept egalitarian liberal precepts but believe
that egalitarianism is more firmly predicated upon communal commit-
ment and obligation than on abstract autonomy.3 ' Secondly, within
the traditions of autonomy and positive liberty is the notion that true or
authentic self-direction requires that false, or unworthy choices are
excluded; true self-direction entails mastery over self-destructive
impulse.3"' A minimalist seed for this notion is evident in even
libertarian insistence upon contractual competence. A contemporary
corporate suggestion of the notion may be found in the claim that
investors display a short-term bias that ought not to be the guide to
corporate decision.313 A critical legal variation on the theme is the
diagnosis of "false consciousness."
The notion of authentic self-direction implies, however, that there
exists an authoritative standard by reference to which inauthentic or
unworthy choices, and therefore, false alternatives may be excluded. It
is, therefore, perhaps a short step from the notion of self-direction to a
communitarian common good.3t4 Consider in this regard Rousseau as
a source of communitarian themes. Kant's liberalism may be viewed as
having turned Rousseau's communitarian collective autonomy on its
head by individualizing it; for Rousseau, collective self-direction was
Sovereignty, supra note 4, at 2235-39 (rejecting universalistic, scientific approaches in favor of
contextualism and criticizing contractual theory of the firm as ignoring bureaucratic reality);
O'Connor, Socio-Economic Approach, supra note 37, at 1540-45 (trust as non-instrumental
value).
310. Friedman, The Politics of Communitarianism, supra note 304, at 298.
311. Id. at 323-26.
312. Berlin, supra note 105.
313. Hazen, supra note 90.
314. Frank Michaelman, Forward: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4,26-
31 (1985) (discussing Neorepublicianism as Kantian) [hereinafter Michaelman, Forward: Traces
of Self-Government]. See Taylor, Atomism, supra note 232 (favoring autonomy but contending
that this requires "belonging"); Taylor, What's Wrong With Negative Liberty, supra note 105
(favoring positive liberty).
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central.315 Moreover, Rousseau's anti-Humean distaste for tradition
clearly contemplates detachment from the existing "goods" reflected in
tradition. Communitarianism may therefore be understood as in a sense
predicated upon autonomy and even as recommending neutrality, but
these take on collective forms. For example, the neo-republican strain
of communitarianism postulates a form of collective autonomy and a
form of neutrality: the common good is to be chosen through a political
dialogue that is constrained by a requirement of public justification
(rendering private justification inauthentic), but is not constrained by a
prior commitment to a particular common good (rendering the process
content-neutral).3 16  The norm-focused branch of communitarianism
appears also committed to collective autonomy, for it postulates a
collective freedom to choose good and discard bad norms, perhaps by
reference to a set of substantive values outside these norms or, at least,
outside those deemed "bad." '317
There may be a further Kantian element in corporate communitarian
thought, for the morality emphasized in this thought is non-, indeed anti-
consequentialist. Consider corporate communitarian proposals to free
managers from the organizing principle of shareholder primacy:
managers are thought then to become free to pursue moral commitments
and therefore to preserve valued relationships as ends, independently of
or regardless of "efficiency." '318 Such proposals, quite in keeping with
315. RAPACZYNSKI, supra note 54, at 239-62.
316. Michaelman, Law's Republic, supra note 36, at 1504; Sunstein, Beyond the
Republican Revival, supra note 36, at 1554, 1576.
317. See, e.g., Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty, supra note 4, at 2231;
Mitchell, Groundwork, supra note 34, at 1481. Neorepublicans clearly treat their vision of
politics as capable of transcending current goods, preferences and norms through collective
choice. Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 36, at 1554.
318. Johnson, Corporate Life and Corporate Law, supra note 231, at 1487-88; Mitchell,
Groundwork, supra note 34, at 1487-88. See Bratton, Public Values, supra note 4 (postulating
a supplementary ethics as trumping cost of regulation in some cases); Bratton, Ethical Case,
supra note 4 (recognizing tension between communitarian ethics and dominant welfarist
premises of corporate law). Kantian deontological ethics may be understood as resting on the
right/good distinction, such that what is right is not dependent upon what should be valued as
good, and communitarianism is largely identified with a rejection of this distinction.
Deontology is also identified, however, with anti-consequentialism: the moral does not depend
upon the good in the sense that it does not depend upon the value assigned consequences of
action, so, for example, one must adhere to principle even if this has bad consequences. It is
in this latter sense that corporate communitarians appear Kantian, even if (which seems
disputable) they do not rely upon "foundations" for the source of morality. It should be
noticed that, ironically, consequentialists are in a sense deontologists: utilitarianism, and wealth
maximization, for example, require a deontological commitment to maximizing utility or
wealth. LARMORE, supra note 54, at 147. They also clearly reject the notion of the priority
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a plasticity thesis of human nature and institutions, reflect a form of
heroic or romantic individualism-the view that individuals, or individu-
als in democratic combination, are free to consciously determine and
intentionally direct common purposes and the structures within which
these purposes are pursued. Corporate communitarian hostility to
contractual market orders follows from this romantic view, for it is a
central feature of such an order, and of the Humean perspective
generally, that persons within it are subject to impersonal direction.
2. Classical (Negative) Liberty
It seems reasonably clear that a classically liberal version of
contractarianism will be hostile to autonomy as self-direction when taken
either to the lengths suggested by egalitarian liberalism or to those
suggested by communitarianism. A species of liberal neutrality more in
keeping with a classically liberal commitment may be predicated on
"independence," understood in terms of a protected sphere for the
individual or as "negative liberty" or "freedom from interference." State
"neutrality," on such an account, protects this sphere. The content of
the sphere consists of the projects, purposes, preferences or ends of the
individual; it is these and their pursuit that are protected. Boundary
problems (defining that which constitutes impermissible interference)
obviously arise and must be resolved by reference to some principle
(such as an equal liberty principle or a theory of rights or a theory of the
prudential accommodations that will arise from recognition of mutual
advantage). 31 9  Resolution of these boundary problems is no doubt
problematic, but the upshot is a negative view of "freedom": freedom
is understood in terms of interpersonal relationships (freedom from
particular forms of coercion by others) rather than in terms of an intra-
personal state (rational self-direction or authentic exercise of autono-
my).320 Notice that this sphere is not one of freedom from "social
interference," or impersonal direction. The "rights" it contemplates are
minimal; they constrain only some forms of coercion by others (e.g.,
force and fraud). An implication is a relatively minimalist state, albeit
of right over good, as their criteria for action are species of the good-i.e., that which persons
value.
319. Whether any such theory generates "neutrality" is disputed by communitarians. See
Michael Sandel, Morality and the Liberal Ideal; THE NEw REPUBLIC, May 7, 1984 at 16-17
(rejecting neutrality and arguing for common good). But see Friedman, The Politics of Comm-
unitarianism, supra note 304, at 323-26 (stating that communitarian formalism resurrects liberal
neutrality).
320. GRAY, LIBERALISMS, supra note 46, at 90.
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one that, in some variations on this theme may be facilitative.32" '
The act of contracting, for example, entails positive freedom in that
it entails an act of choice and constrains negative freedom by conferring
a power on the promisee, but a requirement of contractual consent
preserves negative freedom and contract enables pursuit of the personal
projects or purposes it is the object of negative freedom to protect from
interference.3" The contractual theory of the firm, at least in a
formalist variation, reflects these notions in two respects: it assumes
specified, pre-corporate entitlements, freedom from interference or
obligation in the use of these entitlements and post-corporate or
contractual obligation limited to (some version of) consent (and to
obligations implied by social norms but enforced by non-legal sanc-
tions).3" The contractual theory, viewed at least through the lens of
a Humean spontaneous order, rejects the heroic autonomy of managers.
The firm on this view is contractual, not in the sense that any given
managerial act is necessarily traceable in any precise sense to a specified
term of agreement, but rather, in the sense that managers are (and
should be) highly constrained by impersonal market direction and by the
spontaneously generated norms or rules underlying and enabling that
direction.324 Managers might on this view be freed from threats of
state force,32 but they are not freed from the punishments of imper-
sonal direction. Negative freedom from interference on this account is
rather precisely a rejection of heroic autonomy; impersonal direction is
the favored alternative to conscious, articulate and purposeful determina-
tion or direction.
3. Classical Liberalism and the Social Source of Morality
If it is correct that this negative conception underlies classically
liberal commitments, is that conception incompatible with communit-
arian notions? It is clearly incompatible with communitarian autonomy
as collective self-direction, but what of the communitarian notion of
discovery of the good already given by community? The negative
conception would not seem incompatible with the view that individual
identities are constituted by community or the view that community is
321. See supra notes 183-230 and accompanying text.
322. NARVESAN, supra note 129, at 60.
323. See supra notes 183-230 and accompanying text.
324. HAYEK, Political Order of a Free People, supra note 118, at 82.
325. Cf. Carney, ALI's Corporate Governance Projects, supra note 97 (advocating
abandonment of fiduciary regulation).
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the source of the good unless these views are given a far more precise,
and substantive content than thus far suggested. It is not a feature of the
negative view that the individual projects, purposes, ends or preferences
protected by it are or were autonomously chosen; they may be given by
the historical accident of being "embedded" in a particular communi-
ty.326 There is therefore no necessary notion within the negative view
that freedom consists of autonomous choice of ends or freedom from
social causation. Nevertheless, communitarian objections to the negative
view, founded in the communal source of morality, warrant exploration.
These will be treated here as objections to subjectivism.
Subjectivism is a feature of the negative view; the individual projects
protected are ones valued above other alternatives by the individual
concerned.3 27 Both protection from "interference" and "interference"
itself are unnecessary absent interpersonal disagreement. However, a
socially constructed individual could not value a project absent a social
source both for the project and for its being valued; so a purely
descriptive version of the social source of "goods" thesis is satisfied.
Nevertheless, perhaps a stronger version of the "community as the
source of the good" thesis is inconsistent with subjectivism.328 The
stronger sense communitarians appear to favor equates "the good" with
moral or ethical precepts-norms not merely as constraints, but as valued
ways of life. Subjectivism may be understood as the claim that the
individual, rather than community, is the source of the good. The
individual may be deemed the source of the good because (1) the good
is a mere preference, or (2) the good is created by the act of choice, or
(3) that which is good is binding on the individual only by reason of the
individual's decision to make it so. 329
326. GAUTHIER, supra note 123, at 349-53; LOMASKY, supra note 46, at 42-45; 247-50;
Hayek, Individualism: True and False, supra 'note 110, at 1-32.
327. See supra note 150. Perhaps the partiality implied by subjectivism is untrue of
Hayek's position, as he has been said to have no position on human nature. KUKATHAS,
supra note 100, at 90. However, partiality may be built into Hayek's notion of dispersed
knowledge: the unique knowledge of the individual would seem necessarily to include his
preference, and Hayek's conception assumes purposive behavior. Hayek, Individualism: True
and False, supra note 110, at 13-14. What is missing from Hayek's view is a specified
preference or objective, as specification is alien to his "anti-scientism."
328. Cf. ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITIcS 76-81 (1975) (linking
subjectivism and individualism/liberalism and criticizing same).
329. Gardbaum, supra note 51, at 705. There are on Gardbaum's account three possible
positions on the question of the source of the good: goods are universal or objective; goods
are individual or subjective and goods are particularistic and social. Id. at 706. Given this
categorization, one might say that both individualists and communitarians reject universal
goods and that the battle between them is over the individual or social basis for the good.
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These notions would seem to entail threats to morality if interpreted
as precluding a shared or intersubjective meaning and force to ethical
norms, as moral claims by their nature apply across persons. (One
cannot plausibly claim that a moral constraint applies only to others).
The Hobbesian solves this problem by appealing to an instrumental
rationality: goods are mere preferences, but are achieved through
rational compliance with norms. The Kantian solves it by appealing to
a universal morality: autonomous rational beings choose the "right"
understood as a non-instrumental morality.33° The Humean solves it
by appealing both to sympathy as appreciation of instrumental "utility"
and to "sympathy" as vicarious pleasure from the welfare of oth-
ers-both thought by Hume to be universal tendencies of human nature
and to be reflected in custom or tradition.331 The intersubjective
validity of moral claims is therefore a feature of all three positions.
Subjectivity nevertheless remains also a feature of each: the marginal
value of goods as projects, purposes or ends is expressed through choice
individually within the limits imposed by instrumental rationality,
universal obligation or tradition. Communitarian objections to this
scheme appear to entail a rejection of Kantian universality and a
rejection of instrumentalism. The Kantian notion of non-instrumental
binding obligation outside the individual is retained, but the Kantian's
grounding of this obligation in a morality individually (as distinguished
from collectively) "self-given" is rejected.
For example, consider self-interest as a Hobbesian justification for
norm enforcement: enforcement is justified because there are reasons,
grounded in self-interest, for compliance.33  The communitarian
complaint is this grounding of the justification of enforcement; the
justification seems to deny that a norm can be recognized as a good, as
something valuable and binding, apart from its instrumental efficacy to
the individual. Indeed, this would seem to be the source of the
communitarian's stronger claim about community as the source of the
good and of her objection to subjectivism. The stronger claim is that
However, the view argued in the text is that goods were simultaneously both subjective and
social.
330. See supra notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
331. HUME, TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, supra note 105, at 317-20; HUME,
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS, supra note 108, at 173-78.
332. Although simple self-interest as a motive for obedience is the prominent
understanding of Hobbes, this understanding may be questioned as too-simple; there are
elements of moral obligation in Hobbes, albeit ones tied to law. OAKESHOTT, RATIONALISM
IN POLITICS, supra note 105, at 283-344.
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goods (and in particular moral norms) are not merely generated by, but
binding upon individuals, and this binding feature is something outside
the individual, having value independent of the individual and therefore
independent of its instrumental utility to the individual.333 The norma-
tive implication is that norms should be obeyed, not because there is a
universal morality ascertainable through reason, but just because
individuals are part of and dependent upon community practice."
It is difficult to know what to make of this stronger claim. If it
merely asserts that there is an intersubjective reality to norms outside the
individual, it appears non-threatening. The Humean insists upon such
a reality.335 Even a Hobbesian would admit that there is such a reality,
at least in the sense that norms and their accompanying sanctions are
perceived as constraints. Perhaps, however, the strong claim means that
norms are subjectively perceived as obligatory apart from self-interest.
The implication may be that norms, ways of life, and accepted modes of
behavior are not traded-off or perceived in terms of choice. On this
interpretation, persons are committed to norms in the sense that they
reason from the symbolic and expressive structure of norms, so the
meaning of norm compliance to persons engaged in compliance is non-
instrumental.
Perceived obligation is a threat to Hobbes, and to neo-classical
economic analysis, if these are interpreted as depicting human behavior
as rational cost/benefit calculation in each instance of such behavior, with
sanctions playing the role of costs. This, however, is not the Humean
depiction, and need not be the interpretation given Hobbesian depic-
tions. 336 Humeans, and perhaps Hobbesians, can plausibly say that
subjective assessment occurs within the constraints imposed by and even
cognitive limits structured by norms, ways of life and accepted modes of
behavior. Indeed, Humeans and Hobbesians tend to say that subjectivity
is enabled by perceived obligations of compliance, because this permits
333. See, e.g., Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty, supra note 4, at 2229-35;
Millon, Crisis, supra note 1, at 1382-83; Mitchell, Groundwork, supra note 34, at 1482. See also
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 232, at 205; Charles Taylor, Hegel, History and
Politics, in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 184 (M. Sandel ed., 1984).
334. See, e.g., SANDEL, LIMITS OF JUSTICE, supra note 100, at 179; Millon, Crisis, supra
note 1, at 1482.
335. See supra notes 123-28, 150 and accompanying text.
336. Cf. Buchanan, Domain of Subjective Economics, supra note 141 (discussing how
persons follow rules or norms without calculation in some contexts and not in others). See
supra notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
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prediction about the behavior of others.337 They can also plausibly say
that norms, although perceived as obligatory, are explained and owe
their survival to their efficacy in advancing individually held (but socially
generated) projects. To say such things is not inconsistent with
describing persons as perceiving obligations of compliance and does not
require rational calculation about compliance. Subjectivity can survive
as a phenomenon within the constraints or cognitive limits imposed or
created by perception so long as the content of the norm, way of life or
mode of behavior in question permits this subjectivity. And subjectivity
clearly survives as conflicting interpretation of norms, ways of life, and
modes of behavior.
A further possible interpretation of the strong communitarian claim
is that objective norms-one's outside and binding on the individu-
al-imply something about the process by which they are formulated.
To claim that norms are outside and binding upon the individual is to
claim that they are collective products, not things created by the
individual. But what is the nature of the collective process yielding these
products? Some communitarians appear to derive from the proposition
that norms are collective products the conclusion that they are or should
be within articulate control, in the sense of subjected to public justifica-
tion and examination through debate, as by means of democratic political
process or dialogue.33 There is, however, an alternative explanation:
norms arise out of and are continually modified within informal, chaotic
human interactions, gaining concrete, but largely tacit and inarticulable
meanings within localized contexts, and this process should be main-
tained. "' There is nothing in this alternative that denies that the
product is collective and is one of a collective process, it merely asserts
that this collective process is made up of the constrained multiple
subjective assessments of self-interested individuals over time, and that
the product is not consciously, purposely, or intentionally generated.
What the alternative does deny is that the collective products of a
process not characterized by articulate control constitute mere artifacts
conferring power.' Is the denial warranted? Arguably not; even a
337. Hayek, Individualism: True and False, supra note 110, at 23. Cf. GAUTHIER, supra
note 123, at 157-89 (noting the rationality of disposing oneself to cooperation).
338. B. CROWLEY, THE SELF, THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE COMMUNITY: LIBERALISM IN
THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF F.A. HAYEK AND SIDNEY AND BEATRICE WEBB 382 (David
Stanford ed., 1987).
339. See supra notes 108-128 and accompanying text.
340. The claim denied is expressed in, for example, Habermas. JURGEN HABERMAS,
THE PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY 124 (Frederick Lawrence trans., 1987). And
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formalist insists that a minimal set of "norms," those entailed in a stable
property rights regime, be articulated (and enforced) through the formal
collective processes of the state. And rights, even if minimal, are by
their nature conferrals of power. The distinction between types of
collective process nevertheless holds, and for reasons suggested by
advocates of articulate process: the property rights and market regime
effectively forces interaction within it to be informal, chaotic and free of
a requirement of articulate justification."M4
A final interpretation of the strong claim that norms are binding is
that the "utilitarian" or at least consequentialist'reasons Humeans and
Hobbesians would give for valuing norms are incompatible with the
communal source of morality. Consider an indirect "utilitarian"
understanding of the value of norms: the norms of a classically liberal
community are valuable, not intrinsically, but because they indirectly
serve some end, such as civil peace, general welfare, or coordination,
which end persons have self-interested reasons to deem good.42  A
modus vivendi view of norms is consequentialist, or instrumentalist in
this sense.
It is clearly the case that Humeans and Hobbesians engage in
justificatory assessments of this type,343 but does this render these
efforts inconsistent with the communitarian thesis? It should first be
in MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 232, at 244-55. For both Habermas and Mac-
Intyre, however, the ultimate point is to overcome or revise existing "norms" by means of
dialogue or of neo-republican politics.
341. Chaos does not, however, imply disorder. Cf. STEPHEN H. KELLERT, IN THE
WAKE OF CHAOS (1993) (generally describing chaos theory, particularly as entailing
deterministic but unpredictable order). For an express linkage between chaos theory and
Humean spontaneous order, see DAVID PARKER & RALPH STACEY, CHAOS, MANAGEMENT
AND ECONOMICS 71-92 (1995); William Tucker, Complex Questions, The New Science of
Spontaneous Order, 27 REASON 34 (1996).
342. See GRAY, LIBERALISMS, supra note 46, at 120-39 (indirect utilitarian interpretation
of Hume and Mill).
343. Cf. Cooter, Decentralized Law, supra note 161 (stating that law should be derivative
from norms that serve to coordinate). This is a source of a standard criticism of Hayek-that
his "anti-constructivism" is inconsistent with his tendency to "constructivist" criticism of post-
New Deal law. See, e.g., KUKATHUS, supra note 100, at 206-15. However, the criticism is well
founded only if Hayek's "anti-constructivism" is understood as precluding any critique of social
practice, including the social practice of "constructivism." It is not inconsistent to say that
centralized rational planning should be replaced with "spontaneous order" or to "construct"
an institutional framework that permits such an order. The larger difficulty in Hayek is that
his themes are too abstract to provide determinate answers to concrete questions, at least if
one's criterion for the viability of a theory is such determinacy. Still, it is not impossible to
make judgments about the relative degree of "constructivism" within alternative institutional
structures, even if those structures are themselves the products of a species of "constructivist"
design.
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noticed that, if the communitarian thesis is that normative criteria must
be found within communal practice,' there is a sense in which peace,
welfare and coordination satisfy this requirement. To the extent that
these ultimate values are intelligible to us, and they seem clearly to be
so given that the standard practices of "our community" entail their
justificatory invocation, this invocation is not inconsistent with the thesis
that community is the source of value.' 4
An alternative understanding of the communitarian objection to
consequentialist justification, however, is that consequentialist or
instrumentalist assessment of norms is inappropriate even if these criteria
are themselves social products. Perhaps the binding norm claim is a
species of deontological claim about the nature of morality. There are
a number of variations on this theme: political morality is autonomous,
not subject to assessment by reference to criteria outside it;3" rational-
istic assessment or "scientism" is inappropriate to human affairs, 7
appropriate method is interpretive, in the sense that the intersubjective
meaning of practices, norms and actions, not their consequences or their
conformity to rationalistic, imposed orders, is the viable means of social
inquiry. " This line of argument would seem most clearly invocable
against Hobbesian efforts to construct morality (or at least to explain it)
in terms of rational self-interest, but it seems an odd claim to make
against Humeans, as they make rather precisely these arguments and
derive politically "conservative" recommendations from them. 49
Nevertheless, it is the case that Humeans, Hayek in particular,
incorporate consequentialist or instrumental elements, particularly in the
344. Gardbaum, supra note 51, at 707-10 (attributing this view to Rorty).
345. Cf. Richard Rorty, Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism, 80 J. PHIL. 583 (1983)
(discussing how liberalism, albeit of an egalitarian variety is justified by reference to practical
advantages our tradition's understanding of these).
346. Cf Gardbaum, supra note 51, at 694 (discussing politics as autonomous sphere)
(relying on Michael Walzer, Philosophy and Democracy, 9 POL. THEORY 379, 397 (1981)).
347. See Taylor, Interpretation and the Sciences of Man, supra note 13. "Scientism" may
be understood as the inappropriate application of the methods of the natural sciences to
human affairs. If the natural sciences are rationalistic in the sense of instrumental, such an
understanding is perhaps invocable, but the sense in which "scientism" is used in Taylor's
claim is that the meaning or value of a practice to its participants is missed by a perspective
limited to instrumental assessment of the practice. See also Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning
and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181 (1996) (making similar claim).
348. Id.; Taylor, Explanation and Practical Reason, supra note 61.
349. HAYEK, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION OF SCIENCE, supra note 109; OAKESHOTT,
ON HUMAN CONDUCrsupra note 64; OAKESHOTI', RATIONALISM, supra note 105. Moreover,
Oakeshott, at least, would deny that it is a viable claim against Hobbes. MICHAEL
OAKESHOTT, supra note 105, at 283-344.
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form of an indirect "utilitarianism. "310 This "utilitarianism" has "no
determinate end-state" and it is not assumed; indeed, it is denied that
practices may be rationally designed to achieve a determinate end
state.351 The notion, rather, is that the immanent logic of socially
generated norms, at least within "liberal" societies, is one of coordination
of diverse plans. To "interpret" norms as coordinating (or, in Hobbesian
account, to interpret them as rational) is of course to assert that they are
means to individual purposes. This, however, does not preclude the
propositions that the activity of norm compliance is valued or has
meaning to its participants not fully captured by its instrumental
function. It precludes only the proposition that norms lack an instru-
mental function.
To the extent communitarian critiques of consequentialist or
instrumental accounts call attention to dimensions of social practices (to
their symbolic and expressive dimensions), neglected by instrumentalists,
they are warranted. To the extent such critiques assert that compliance
with or participation in norms exhausts their meaning and value, and
thus deny an instrumental or consequentialist dimension, they seem
implausible. Norms may be both means and ends: adherence to a norm
may be a valued activity but it may also be an activity engaged in for a
purpose beyond itself. 2 The practice of making and keeping promises
is, for example, a valued social product. Promises may be kept and the
keeping may be valued even where individually held purposes become
defeated by the keeping. But promises are not made and kept simply for
350. Compare CROWLEY, supra note 338 (viewing Hayek as authoritarian liberal);
Leland B. Yeager, Utility, Rights, and Contract: Some Reflections on Hayek's Work, in THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FREEDOM: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF F. A. HAYEK 161-80 (Kurt R.
Leuber & Albert H. Ziabinger eds., 1984) (viewing Hayek as rule utilitarian); Jacob Segal, A
Storm From Paradise: Liberalism and the Problem of Time, 8 CRITICAL REV. 23 (1994)
(viewing Hayek as consequentialist), with JOHN GRAY, LIBERALISMS, supra note 46, at 95-100
(viewing Hayek as both a Humean, indirect utilitarian and as conservative relying on cultural
evolution). Donald W. Livingston, Hayek as Humean, 5 CRITICAL REV. 159 (1991) (viewing
Hayek as overwhelmingly Humean). It is also possible to view Hayekian spontaneous order
as rejecting particular ("socialist") normative visions by reason of a commitment to another
normative vision (a species of liberalism). See, e.g., Laurent Dobzinskis, The Complexities of
Spontaneous Order, 3 CRITICAL REV. 241,251-55 (1989) (Hayek's liberal bias). But cf. GRAY,
HAYEK ON LIBERTY, supra note 108, at 120 (stating that liberalism is not a necessary product
of spontaneous order). Utilitarianism in Hayek should again be understood in terms of
maximizing coordination or maximizing the prospects for fulfillment of individually generated
plans or projects, not in terms of objective measurements of wealth, happiness etcetera.
351. KUKATHUS, supra note 100, at 64.
352. See GAUTHIER, supra note 123, at 330-37 (stating that intrinsic value depends upon
instrumental value); JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES, supra note 105, at 91-100 (stating that
participation must have a point beyond the good of participation as the latter is a by-product).
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the sake of engaging in these practices; promises are about something.
And it may be doubted that promise making and keeping would survive
as socially given valued activities if they generate a tendency to defeat
the something about which promises are made. Norms must be
interpreted, their meaning and value to the persons adhering to them is
an important element in understanding them, so it is plausible to say that
their content cannot be reduced to their function. But it is not plausible
that either this meaning or social explanation is independent of function.
At least this is so if the norm in question is one like promise keeping.
Perhaps the norm that communitarians favor-solidarity-is not of this
type. Perhaps, solidarity has no purpose beyond itself so analysis of
solidarity must take the form solely of interpreting its meaning (or of
deeming the "function" of some behavior the expression of solidarity).
If so, however, communitarian objections to functionalism, consequential-
ism or instrumentalism turn out to be objections to particular norms and
advocacy of others.
4. Community Values and Communitarian Normative Commitments
Communitarians probably intend more by linking community and
"the good" than a descriptive claim about social origins. They wish to
make normative claims, claims inconsistent with classically liberal
normative stances. One implication of the classical stance is that there
are distinct projects reflecting distinct and contradictory conceptions of
good lives even within the general concept socially given. Another is
that persons are partial to their particular projects. While persons may
intersubjectively recognize a project as valuable (given their social
construction), under the classical view, they place distinct marginal
(subjective) values on it when engaged in trade-offs. If the communitar-
ian normative claim is that there should be a collective and authoritative
prioritization and integration of projects, and, therefore, an authoritative
marginal valuation, communitarians must reject these implications. If
this rejection is to be grounded on community as the source of the good,
the interpretations communitarians wish to obtain from an examination
of the meaning of "our community's" morality is one that excludes or at
least subordinates pursuit of individually held purpose as an element of
that meaning and as an element of the explanation of that morality.
Here is a concrete corporate law example, arising from the communi-
tarian perspective, of these normative possibilities: The dominant,
contractual theory of corporate management's responsibility, that of
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maximizing shareholder wealth,353 is inconsistent with the meaning of
"our morality" as this morality is conceived by the corporate communit-
arian. In the first place, the contractual explanation of this responsibility
assumes that corporate contracts, for example, the corporate "contract"
with employees, is a relationship instrumental to individually held
purposes (the purposes for which the employees' wages will be employed
and the purposes for which the shareholders' "profits" will be employed).
In the second place, both the instrumental value and any intrinsic value
of the relationship recognized by the contractual explanation are
subjective: wages and leisure are compared and traded-off individually
by the employee; job security and its cost in flexibility are compared and
traded-off in management's estimates of that which will enhance
productivity; the values of "doing a good job" or "belonging to a team"
are compared to other goods and traded off by both manager and
employee. In the third place, neither the corporation nor its constituent
relationships have a meaning or value apart from their instrumental
function in the contractual theory, or, at least, any such value is
subordinated or is itself given a function. Thus, being an employee of
corporation X has no symbolic value or influence on identity, except as
it may be deemed efficacious to productivity. And a norm of managerial
loyalty to employees (expressed, for example, in an implicit promise of
job security) has no meaning or value under the theory independent of
its efficacy in ensuring a supply of competent employees.
This line of argument, albeit perhaps an accurate depiction of a
neoclassical analysis, is not a plausible account of a Humean one. The
values it claims are absent from a contractual theory of the firm are
clearly present in the Humean theory. Nevertheless, the depiction may
be accurately applied to the formalist corporate law suggested by
Humean theory, for these values are not subjects of legal inquiry within
that formalism."4 The corporate communitarian, by contrast, wishes
to conform corporate law to "our morality" as she sees it by making the
meanings and values relegated to trade by the contractual theory visible
in the law.
This communitarian position can now be expressed concretely in
terms of corporate communitarian recommendations: The law is to
353. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994);
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
354. See supra notes 183-230 and accompanying text.
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recognize a managerial obligation to employees355 or is to restructure
ownership of the firm in service of employees." 6 Subjective tradeoffs
are to be eliminated or minimized in favor of an authoritative valuation
under these proposals. For example, a managerial tradeoff of job
security and flexibility in terms of estimated productivity is obviated, or
at least, subjected to legal reassessment if a fiduciary obligation to
employees is recognized, and it is doubtful that an employee assessment
of a wage/job security tradeoff could be respected in communitarian
hopes for this obligation.357 Although corporate communitarians
sometimes justify such proposals in instrumental and consequentialist
terms, it is clear that norms of solidarity and commitment trump function
under the proposals. For example, inalienable employee ownership of
the firm, if it generates inefficiencies, is nevertheless politically justi-
fied.35
355. See, e.g., Johnson & Millon, Corporate Takeovers and Corporate Law: Who's In
Control, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1177,1181 (1993) (stating that non-shareholder claims should
be permanent aspect of modern corporate law) [hereinafter Johnson & Millon, Who's In
Control]; Mitchell, Corporate Governance, supra note 4 (proposing reconstructed board and
fiduciary duty regulation); O'Connor, Socio-Economic Approach, supra note 37 (generally
proposing mandatory employee participation structure).
356. Simon, Social Republican Property, supra note 37, at 1344-49.
357. See, e.g., Johnson, Individual & Collective Sovereignty, supra note 4, at 2241-42
(noting that corporate law concern should be with distribution as well as efficiency); Millon,
Redefining Corporate Law, supra note 4, at 274-75 (private ordering inequitable because
reflects inequality of wealth); Millon, Crisis, supra note 1, at 1383, 1385 (noting communitarian
conception of liberty as a positive one requiring that primary needs be satisfied; efficiency
ignores unequal distribution of wealth); Simon, Social Republican Property, supra note 37, at
1344-49 (recounting distributive egalitarianism of republican tradition).
358. Simon, Social Republican Property, supra note 37, at 1403 (noting that evidence of
private, individual decisions regarding organization of economic production cannot settle issue
of desirability of neorepublican organization, as this is political issue ). It is of course possible
that a worker controlled enterprise might seek to maximize "profit," although this may be
doubted from perspectives critical of political processes. Cf Henry Hansman, When Does
Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs Law Firms, Codetermination and Economic Democracy,
99 YALE L.J. 1749 (1990) (discussing how heterogeneity of interests in worker controlled
enterprises generate prohibitive costs). The point of communitarian proposals along these
lines appears, however, to be that "profit" maximization conceived as lowest cost production
responsive to consumer demand is to be moderated, or foregone, because the human costs of
maximization are what is complained of. Worker control would not seem a plausible
alternative to shareholder primacy if workers behave as if they were shareholders.
None of this denies that forms of worker democracy may be the best means of achieving
"efficiency," understood as lowest cost response to consumer demand. The point is that
worker democracy conceived as an end or common good in itself is not grounded upon
efficiency. The problem generated by proposals of this type is therefore the source of outside
capital. To the extent that there are alternatives to worker controlled firms (and assuming that
worker controlled firms are inefficient), outsiders would invest elsewhere (equivalently, would
demand higher rates of return for the vicissitudes of worker democracy). An implication is
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There is of course a difficulty with all of this: on what grounds may
it be said that this legal program is derived from the thesis that
community is the source of value? Communitarianism, and corporate
communitarianism, are predominantly transformative: they contemplate
a new community, not the one we have. If the traditions of American
society reflected in its law are excessively individualistic traditions, as
communitarian critics of that society contend, and if the communitarian
depiction of the contractarian corporation reflects this excessive
individualism, it is difficult to see how to ground a normative commit-
ment to a transformative program of conversion to a nonindividualistic
community on them.359  Indeed, these excessively individualistic
traditions would seem to justify an individualistic agenda. It is possible,
for example, to construct a defense of neoclassical economics on the
''community as source of value" notion: neoclassical analysis of law may
be a proxy for the normative commitments of an individualist tradi-
tion.360
This, however, is perhaps too quick. It is possible to ground
transformative commitments on the community as source of value notion
by denying that our tradition is one of a thoroughgoing individualism.
This, indeed, is a standard argument of transformative communitarians.
They argue, quite plausibly, that our traditions, albeit dominantly
contractual restrictions on democracy (i.e., workers who offer these restrictions to avoid the
high cost of capital). To the extent that there are no investment alternatives, lower levels of
investment are predictable. A solution is state allocated capital, with allocation presumably
based upon political considerations, but this solution then either directly leads to resource
"misallocation" (i.e., investment by reference to criteria other than consumer preference) or
state "banks" operating as entrepreneurial capitalists and a return, therefore, to a contractarian
market regime. See GRAY, LIBERALISMS, supra note 46, at 173-79; DeBow & Lee, supra note
1, at 413-22. Cf. Mark Blaug, Hayek Revisited, 7 CRITICAL REV. 51, 58-59 (1993) (socialism
is viable at low levels of economic development or in war time command economics; it is
unworkable where consumers demand a mix of products).
359. Holmes, The Community Trap, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 28, 1988 at 27-28; Tatsuo
Inove, The Poverty of Rights-Blind Commonality: Looking Through the Window of Japan,
1993 BYU L. REV. 417,523-24; KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra
note 63, at 215; NANCY ROSENBLUM, ANOTHER LIBERALISM, supra note 244, at 162. For
evidence that corporate communitarians view the status quo as excessively individualistic, see
Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty, supra note 4, at 2229-35 (arguing both a social
construction thesis and a claim that dominant conceptions can be reformed); Mitchell,
Groundwork, supra note 34, at 1479-81 (arguing for replacement of the dominant ethic of self-
reliance with "morality" and that currently defined social roles can be changed to conform
with this morality).
360. See POSNER, ECONOMIC OF JUSTICE, supra note 154, at 65-115 (treating neoclassical
analysis as compatible with individualist intuitions). But see POSNER, PROBLEMS OF
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 376-82 (treating neoclassical analysis as inconsistent with
individualist intuitions).
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individualistic, are both ambiguously so and accompanied by egalitarian
and altruistic strands. This strategy of partial denial is evident in the
literature of critical legal studies (where it typically takes the form of the
"contradiction" between individualism and altruism in legal doctrine)36'
and in the literature of neo-republicanism (where it takes the historical
form of a resurrection of a lost or submerged republicanism of the
founders).36 It is a strategy reflected in corporate communitarian claims
that the common morality of the man on the street is incompatible with
the recommendations of neoclassical economics363 and that convention-
alist accounts of meaning nevertheless permit reformist interpretation
within the broad limits of convention.
The strategy of partial denial, however, does not obviate the
complaint that transformative communitarianism is inconsistent with
reliance upon the norms of existing community. In the first place, the
competing norms story relies heavily upon characterizing the traditions
in question. It is rather easy to "discover" an altruistic tradition if its
individualistic competitor is characterized as narrow, materialistic egoism,
but this characterization is disputable.365 In the second place, and
assuming both that egalitarian, altruistic norms compete with individual-
ist norms in our tradition and that it is possible to derive a transform-
ative agenda from interpretation of the altruistic and egalitarian strands
of that tradition, it is implausible that the choice of egalitarian altruism
over individualism can be justified on the basis of community. The point
of the strategy of partial denial is that "our community" is composed of
361. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976) (noting that conflict between self-reliance and altruism permeates
adjudication) [hereinafter Kennedy, Form and Substance]; Kennedy, Distributive and Pater-
nalist Moves, supra note 20. Professor Balkin's interpretation of CLS, that it presents a
structuralist view in which legal doctrine can be seen as relatively individualistic (in
comparison to some alternatives) and relatively altruistic (in comparison to others) and that
it is simultaneously deterministic while holding possibilities for transcending determinism,
suggests the point. Balkin, supra note 255, at 1158-64, 1167-69. Roberto Unger's notion that
a political principle is subject to multiple interpretations and therefore does not compel a
particular doctrinal result is also suggestive of this strategy. See ROBERTO UNGER, THE
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 5-7 (1986). However, Unger ultimately opts for a
foundational, universalist commitment to a general political theory. See KRONMAN, LOST
LAWYER, supra note 61, at 248-64.
362. Michaelman, Law's Republic, supra note 36; Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra
note 36.
363. Johnson, Corporate Life and Corporate Law, supra note 231, at 877-78.
364. Millon, Theories of the Corporation, supra note 4, at 247-50.
365. HOLMES, supra note 244, at 211-23; BRIAN BARRY, JUSTICE AS IMPARTIALITY 119-
38 (1995).
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competing and contradictory norms; the basis for choosing between these
is problematic. There would seem to be three possibilities: One may
justify one's choice on some source outside a community,36 one may
resort to an arbitrary choice of commitments, 367 or one may explain
one's choice as itself socially constructed, as in the thesis that normative
commitments are manifestations of competing political cultures. 36 The
first possibility is a resort to universal principle, not community. The
second and third possibilities explain the commitments of particular
persons, but provide no reason attractive to persons who do not share
these commitments. These complaints, once it is recognized that "our
community" is one of competing traditions, apply as well, to individualist,
including classically liberal positions. A consistent adherence to Humean
formalism could require as much of a transformation as communitarian
reform and cannot provide reasons for its interpretations of the
normative commitments of "our community" attractive to communitar-
ians.
To this the transformative communitarian can reply that this problem
of competing traditions is recognized and resolved in communitarian
thought by devices here earlier rejected: a process, dialogue or technique
of practical reason operating within a political, governmental, "public"
realm.369 It was earlier conceded here that these devices are plausible
366. See Gardbaum, supra note 51 (distinguishing substantive community, derived from
an extra-communal, universalistic norm from metaethical community, the notion that norms
are to be found within contextual practice); Jeffrey Friedman, The Politics of Communitar-
ianism, supra note 304, at 311-12, 317-20 (discussing how Taylor, Sandal, Walzer, and
Maclntyre all contradict their particularism by resorting to universalistic stances from which
they criticize individualist culture).
367. It is sometimes claimed, however, that the interpretive technique discovers "deep"
commitments, typically of egalitarian varieties. See, e.g., BELL, supra note 58, at 57-89 (deep
commitments); WALZER, supra note 11, at 35 (deeper shared meanings entailing "complex
equality"); ROBERTO UNGER, LAW AND MODERN SOCIETY 242 (latent solidarity in legal
practice). Cf. Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 361, at 1724 (predicating choice on
intuition within particular factual contexts). This move is unconvincing. That which is
relatively more "deep" or shallow is a partisan characterization. It is of course quite possible
to engage in shallow or deep interpretation, but the experience of "deep" interpretation is one
in which uncertainty and incommensurability are more likely discoveries than certainty and
reconciliation. Indeed, these are so more likely that their discovery may serve as a plausible
proxy for "depth" of interpretation. Cf. Kymlicka, Appendix I: Some Questions About Justice
and Community, in BELL, supra note 58, at 212-14 (questioning "deep" commitments).
368. See generally Ellis, supra note 8, (postulating competing individualist and egalitarian
political cultures as determinants of political preferences).
369. See, e.g., Charles Taylor, Explanation and Practical Reason, supra note 61, at 208
(discussing practical reason as alternative to skepticism and relativism); MACINTYRE, WHOSE
JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY?, supra note 237, at 348-88 (discussing resolution by means
of tradition's inability to resolve problems within it); Alisdair MacIntyre, Epistemological
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accounts of at least some actual legal practices.3 7 However, it is this
communitarian program that is transformative: it contemplates that
conflicting norms, practices or traditions are to be authoritatively
resolved by public, political, and legal means. The communitarian point
is to extend the realm of the political, displacing the social, by seeking
resolution through these devices.
Perhaps, however, this merely recognizes a communitarian tradition
at another level: among our traditions is that of public, political, or legal
centrality, or at least, of its advocacy. Indeed, the tradition of public
centrality, despite communitarian complaints about excessive individual-
ism, is arguably the presently dominant one, even though this tradition's
manifestation in the post-New Deal regulatory state may be deemed
excessively rationalistic by some communitarians. Recognizing this
different level, however, reproduces the problem: a dialogue or technique
of practical reason as a mechanism in law for resolution of competing
normative commitments is itself a partisan choice: it assumes a "public,"
in the sense of political, rather than a "private," in the sense of social,
resolution.
Communitarians invoking notions of articulate dialogue tend to rely
upon a criterion of the superiority of one interpretation over another or
upon a procedural technique for fudging the matter of consent. The
criterion of superiority, invoked in the context of practical reason, is
some variation on a better explanation theme: one party to the
conversation identifies a premise or good to which her opponent is
committed, and shows how this requires a conclusion distinct from that
the opponent had maintained.371 The technique is proposed in opposi-
tion to "scientism," understood as explanation by reference to some
"objective," neutral, and consequentialist criterion outside commit-
Crises, Narrative and the Philosophy of Science, 60 THE MONIST 453-72 (1977) (advocating
transitional argument as substitute for external, neutral point of view). Michaelman, Traces
of Self Government, supra note 314, at 25 (practical reason); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups
in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 32 (1985) (practical reason). Cf. KRONMAN,
LOST LAWYER, supra note 61, at 53-108 (discussing prudence, or practical wisdom within a
neotraditional stance). For corporate, communitarian examples, see, e.g., Bratton, Public
Values, supra note 4 (dialogue); Johnson, Individual Collective Sovereignty, supra note 4, at
247-50 (adopting communal, conventionalist account of meaning, but claiming that variety of
interpretations within the framework of conventional meaning are possible); Millon, Theories
of the Corporation, supra note 4, at 244-51 (adopting contextualist framework but arguing that
conventional meaning not so determinate as to preclude reform).
370. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
371. Taylor, Explanation and Practical Reason, supra note 61, at 209-225.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
ment.372 The procedural technique is to infer consent to a dialogic
procedure and to deem this sufficient to justify authoritative conclusions
about substantive matters despite the objections of losers.373
It is not the point here to reject these moves as plausible accounts
of reasoning or as potential justifications of the state. Indeed, there are
Humean and Hobbesian parallels to them. What has been deemed here
the Humean position clearly shares with "practical reasoning" a partial
rejection of "scientism" and an interpretive technique in which the
meaning of a practice, not solely its conformity to external criteria, has
importance.3" The dialogic justification of consent to procedure has a
rather clear Hobbesian parallel in the "social contract."'375 The
problem, however, is that dialogic procedure and interpretive technique
assume a particular project, the intellectual's project of "grasp[ing] what
the world is like."376  This is an unlikely account of the projects of
others. 377 In seeking to extend the reach of authoritative reason or of
authoritative dialogue the intellectual is engaged in imperialism.
It might be said that this imperialism is inevitable, that the content
of corporate law (even an "individualistic" one) is already an account of
what the world is like and is therefore an account with which persons not
engaged in grasping are stuck. There are two levels at which this
rejoinder may be made. First, the individualist or contractarian status
quo is itself a partisan choice, and one itself justified through some
372. Id. at 213-15; Taylor, Interpretation and the Sciences of Man, supra note 13.
373. Bratton, Public Values, supra note 4.
374. See supra notes 113-28 and accompanying text. Cf. MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE,
WHICH RATIONALITY?, supra note 237, at 320-21 (treating Hume as relying upon communal
consensus as measure and means of practical rationality).
375. There is also a Hobbesian parallel to the better explanation theme. The technique
would seem straightforward: if one's opponent agrees that some state of affairs is a "bad," it
may be possible to come to an agreement that a proposal should not be adopted because it
will generate this "bad." This, indeed, is a typical neoclassical move. See, e.g., Craswell,
Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules, supra note 94. It is not, however, necessary to adopt the
full neoclassical apparatus to engage in modest degrees of consequentialism, see BUCHANAN,
WHAT SHOULD ECONOMISTS Do?, supra note 96, at 52-62 (distinguishing "Smithean"
institutional recommendations from "scientism"). Cf. Rorty, supra note 345 (emphasizing
practical consequences of institutional arrangements). One potential communitarian response
is nevertheless that the mechanism by which predictions about consequences are made remains
in dispute (e.g., the self-interest assumption). Another is that there is in fact no agreement
about the normative status of a predicted consequence (e.g., "efficiency," or coordination, or
a specified form of distribution are normatively problematic).
376. Taylor, Explanation and Practical Reason, supra note 61, at 217.
377. Cf. Jonathan Macey, Packaged Preferences and the Institutional Transformation of
Interests, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1443,1466-72 (1994) (discussing how mediating institutions permit
desired disengagement).
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intellectual efforts at grasping. This is true, in the sense that, if the
status quo is individualist or contractarian, it is not communitarian. This,
however, is not surprising. Liberals are not neutral about neutrality, and
legal formalists, understood as minimizers of authoritative practical
reasoning and of public justification through dialogue, are not neutral
about the desirability of these. Second, it might be argued that the
behavior of corporate actors within the status quo is traceable to the
collective choice of a practical or dialogic type. The argument, however,
entails an implicit choice of a baseline. It is the case that "private"
behavior is potentially subject to a collective demand for justification, so
it is perhaps contingent upon this potential, but it is also the case that
the law can decline to make this demand. Private behavior is not legally
determined if there is no legal mechanism for assessing it, even though
that behavior is in a sense enabled by the refusal to assess it.3"8 If the
reader likes, the "private" or social realm is rendered possible through
a refusal to hear "other voices," by a refusal to entertain a dialogue.
The possibility is confirmed by communitarian complaints about
corporate law. To assert that corporate behavior should be subjected to
the practical reasoning of legal authority is to assert a demand for
justification, a demand (largely) absent from the status quo.379
Resolution of conflicting normative visions through law conceived as
a political process or dialogue, or as the practical wisdom of legal
authority is not a resolution compelled by the norms of our community.
Rather, it is a choice of one tradition over another. That choice is not
itself justified by reference to the tradition chosen; it is merely explained
by reference to the chooser's prior commitment to that tradition. This
is equally true of a classic liberal formalism. State perfectionism is built
into the communitarian's dialogic project, but contract is built into the
formalist's skepticism about that project.
5. Community and Plasticity
The previous section questioned the claim that "community as the
source of moral value" justifies a transformative program. To this line
of argument there is an obvious answer: the transformative program
378. See supra notes 200-206 and accompanying text.
379. It is largely absent; fiduciary duty is an obvious counter example. See supra notes
212-16 and accompanying text. Debates about fiduciary duty, however, reflect the discussion
in the text. Communitarians tend to argue (as has this writer on occasion) in favor of intensi-
fied fiduciary regulation; contractarians tend to argue in favor of abandoning that regula-
tion.
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does not in fact rely upon this thesis, it relies instead upon a substantive
vision of community, alien to the values of current community, or at
least to those thought to be dominant in current corporate law, and seeks
to displace these values. This position employs the social construction
thesis to enable a transformative agenda by adding a plasticity thesis:
given that persons are socially constructed, it is possible to reconstruct
persons by reconstructing the society in which they are embedded."'
For example, the answer enables the claim that persons are not naturally
"selfish" but are capable of altruism and are rendered "selfish" because
of the society that has constructed them.8  Another example: as
preferences are socially given, there is no warrant to respecting
preferences deemed socially dysfunctional.3" Indeed, perhaps the
point of moderation in corporate communitarian accounts of the social
construction thesis is that individualist/contractarian norms, institutions
and traditions are revisable-persons are only "partly" constituted by
these and may transcend them.38 3
380. The notion is expressed within CLS through emphasis upon the historical
contingency of our beliefs and in the possibility of transcending them. Compare Kennedy,
Form and Substance, supra note 361, at 1712 (we cannot escape contradiction in our values),
with Duncan Kennedy & Peter Gabel, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1, 15-18 (1984)
(rejecting the contradiction view earlier espoused). See Balkin, supra note 255, at 1166-69
(contrasting structuralist, deterministic aspects of CLS and transcending, subjectivist,
existentialist strands of CLS, relying on James Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal
Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 685, 740-45 (1985)). The notion is at
least suggested within corporate communitarianism by Johnson, Individual and Collective
Sovereignty, supra note 4, at 2230-31 (rejecting atomism as first step in reform of institutional
influences); Millon, Theories of the Corporation, supra note 4, at 243-50 (discussing how
conventions shape responses but are not so restricting as to preclude reform); Mitchell,
Groundwork, supra note 34, at 1481 (stating that persons can transcend their social roles).
381. ETZIONI, MORAL DIMENSION, supra note 88, at 237-51; O'Connor, Socio-Economic
Approach, supra note 37, at 1534-36. Cf Marleen O'Connor, How Should We Talk About
Fiduciary Duty?, Directors Conflict of Interest Transactions and ALI's Principles of Corporate
Governance, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 954, 965-69 (1993) (viewing language as determining
commitment to self or to relationship).
382. Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
1129 (1986).
383. Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty, supra note 4, at 2229-35 (arguing
that both over- and under-socialized accounts of behavior should be avoided). The point,
then, of plasticity is that of enabling displacement of the "social" with the "political," or, at
least, with a new, politically mandated reform. This displacement is in fact the essence of the
substantive communitarian vision; the notion of a common good and of participation in its
creation is a denial of markets and of contract because the latter presuppose diverse goods
pursued individually. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 232, at 244-55. Nevertheless,
communitarian programs typically call merely for partial displacement, criticizing self-
interested acquisitiveness and calling for limiting it or for adding participatory structures.
BELL, supra note 58, at 58-60, 70-72; BELLAH, supra note 24, at 281-87; ETZiONI, MORAL
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Notice that the plasticity thesis entails the positions both that persons
are plastic (identities, preferences, etcetera are socially determined) and
that the social structures yielding constructed persons are plastic. The
former position is an interpretation of the social construction thesis. It
may take a moderate form (persons are "partly" constructed), in which
case a role for "natural" inclination (persons are partially self-interested)
and conscious choice (persons can choose between selfish and altruistic
behaviors) would seem to be assumed. The latter position requires, in
addition to social construction, both that social structures (institutions,
norms, etcetera) are things subject to conscious, intentional design and
that the reforming agent is competent to reconstruct social structures to
conform to that agent's normative vision. Of course, transformative
communitarianism requires, in addition to plasticity, a claim to the
validity of its normative vision. This claim no more follows from
plasticity than it follows from social construction. Nevertheless, it is
enabled by plasticity and social construction in the sense that it is
rendered possible if these are assumed.
The plasticity thesis explains transformative communitarianism's
reliance on social construction without attributing to it the mistake of
deriving a substantive agenda from social construction. It further
explains why transformative communitarianism's substantive agenda
appears inconsistent with the individualist norms of current community:
the agenda does not rely on such norms; it contemplates a substitution
(or, at least, favors interpretation and exposition of one strand of
tradition over interpretation and exposition of another). What the
plasticity thesis does not do is justify the substantive program of the
transformative vision. One cannot persuasively say that this program is
compelled by "our morality" if our moral practice is to be transformed;
one needs instead an argument for the superiority of the transformed
practice. This is not to say that corporate communitarians have not
DIMENSION, supra note 88, at 237-51. On the displacement generally, see KYMLICKA, supra
note 63, at 216-30 (communitarian state perfectionism ignores role of society in liberal
thought). Gardbaum, supra note 51, at 727 (discussing how good can be embedded in social
practice without political pursuit of common good).
Corporate communitarianism reflects the displacement both in its critique of contract and
market and in its proposals for constituency participation in corporate governance. See, e.g.,
O'Connor, Socio-Economic Approach, supra note 37 at 1546-56 (discussing employee voice
via participation); Johnson & Millon, Who's in Control?, supra note 355, at 1179-80 (calling
for democratization of corporate governance); Lewis Soloman & Kathleen Collins, Humanistic
Economics: A New Modelfor the Corporate Social Responsibility Debate 12 J. CORP. LAw 331
(1987) (advocating employee co-determination); Simon, Social Republican Property, supra note
37 (discussing economic democracy via inalienability and participation).
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offered such arguments; some have, and in quite consequentialist terms,
thus mimicking neoclassical economic analysis."8 Rather, it is to say
that a transformative agenda is not a conclusion reachable from a
communitarian premise regarding the communal source of morality.
C. Decentralization, Direction, and Conformity
The preceding section of this article strongly suggests that classical
and communitarian perspectives are to be normatively distinguished by
the former's commitment to decentralized decision, "freedom" within a
nondirective legal structure and tolerance of diversity within the socially
given, and, by contrast, the latter's commitment to centralization,
direction and conformity. It is not likely that communitarians would
accept this suggestion, largely because the meanings of centralization,
direction and conformity, and for that matter the meaning of "freedom"
are in dispute. This section attempts an exploration of some of the
elements in this dispute.
1. National and Local Communitarianism
In addition to the conservative/transformative tension generated from
claims about community as a source of norms, a local/national tension is
generated by such claims.385 If the source of norms is community, it is
possible to conceive of the nation-state as the relevant community on the
ground that the set of norms in question is shared by the inhabitants of
the nation state. It is, however, equally possible to identify sets of norms
shared only by subparts of the nation state (often, but not necessarily
geographically distinct ones) and therefore to conceive of the relevant
community in localized terms. Such a localized communitarianism may
be viewed as a species of decentralized decision making authority, albeit
the decentralized authority of communal units.
These possibilities occur within corporate communitarianism:
particular corporations may be viewed as the relevant community or all
corporations may be so viewed. Corporation communitarians who
contemplate reform of corporate law to foster communitarian values,
particularly through mandatory and uniform rules, may be viewed as
adopting the nation-state conception.386 Corporate communitarians
384. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
385. See generally Torke, supra note 242.
386. See, e.g., O'Connor, Socio-Economic Approach, supra note 37, at 1539 (discussing
mandatory co-determination). Proper characterization is however problematic, because
mandatory terms of the sort O'Connor advocates could be viewed as fostering localized
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who emphasize notions of exclusive membership within particular
enterprises, particularly as suggested by variations on employee
ownership themes, may be viewed as adopting the localized concep-
tion.3" There is of course a parallel to this dichotomy in the question
of federalism generally and in the question of federal versus state
corporate law particularly.
One basis for this distinction between local and national community
is a descriptive claim about homogeneity, or common, shared norms.
Commitments to local or to national community may also or instead
reflect the distinction between commitment to community as source of
value (a particularized view of community) and a commitment to
transformed community (a universalist community). A localized
understanding of community implies relativism: it suggests that different
local communities may exhibit quite distinct norms. It also implies, or
is at least most compatible with viewing norms as spontaneously
generated and perpetuated through a localized history.3" An egalitari-
an conception of local community is of course possible, so an egalitarian
link between local community and transformative communitarianism is
also possible, but the local conception also implies exclusion of non-
members and, therefore, inequalities."9 A national view of community
is more compatible with the transformative impulse because the
normative vision contemplated by that impulse is intolerant of deviation
from it and of the inequality generated by the exclusionary tendencies
of localism. In short, although neither moral particularism nor moral
universalism compels any given definition of the scope of community, the
moral particularism of the claim that community is the source of value
is at least suggestive of and compatible with localism, and the universal-
ism of transformative communitarianism is at least suggestive of and
community. Still, the notion that participatory work programs should be mandatory for all
corporations strongly suggested a common set of values within the nation-state as a whole.
387. See Simon, Social Republican Property, supra note 37 (generally contemplating
particularized communities and recognizing implication of exclusive membership); Hyde,
Employee Ownership, supra note 88 (recognizing that workability of employee ownership
depends upon localized conditions). Cf Simon, What Difference Does It Make, supra note 5,
at 1702 (community requires local, internal finance).
388. Cf. Gardbaum, supra note 51, at 705-19 (contrasting particularism of metaethical
community with universalism of substantive community).
389. Simon, Social Republican Property, supra note 37, at 1403-12. Consider, for
example, a standard neoclassical argument against regulation of plant closings: loss to one local
community is gain to another. Communitarian emphasis on loss ignores the "loss" to the
community that would have been advantaged by a move if this move is, on communitarian
grounds, precluded.
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compatible with national community."
One point suggested by the foregoing is obviously that corporate
communitarianism is ambiguous in its understanding of relevant
community, and that resolution of this ambiguity is likely to depend
upon the individual commentator's relative taste for the universality of
the substantive position she favors. Another is that the distinction
between enabling and protecting local community on the one hand and
dictating the norms of such a community, on the other, may prove to be
elusive.39'
390. Torke, supra note 242, at 39-42. The notion that a particular corporation has a
"corporate culture" worthy of legal protection, Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.
571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990), obviously suggests a local community focus. So, too, does
commentary supportive of employee ownership. See Hyde, Employee Ownership, supra note
88, at 164-74 (defending employee ownership as potentially efficient and arguing that such
ownership depends upon local conditions). Professor Simon's communitarian conception of
production is clearly decentralized. Simon, Social Republican Property, supra note 37. See
Simon, What Difference Does It Make, supra note 5, at 1702 (noting that without local
community ownership, communitarianism unlikely). See also Gunther Teubner, The "State"
of Private Networks: The Emerging Legal Regime of Polycorporatism in Germany 1993 BYU
L. REV. 553 (postulating networks as "intermediary institutions" with communitarian
characteristics).
391. Cf. Robert Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982) (rejecting the
notion that nation states, and even lesser law-generating entities constitute single communities
of meaning).
Notice that this tension in corporate communitarianism finds a parallel in the neoclassical
theory of the firm. The master concept in neoclassical analysis of the federalism issue is
market competition: state competition generates a market in charters that in turn generates
optimal law and a market in control serves to provide management with an incentive to shop
for this optimum. Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8
CARDOZO L. REV. 709 (1987). The tension arose when state efforts to eliminate a national
market in control threatened to eliminate (or at least reduce) this incentive. Responses to this
state effort, such as preemption of state law through securities regulation and invalidation of
state law through the commerce clause, required, however, a threat to state competition in
charters. Paul Cox, The Constitutional "Dynamics" of the Internal Affairs Rule: A Comment
on CTS Corporation, 13 J. CORP. L. 317, 358-60 (1988). The Supreme Court's resolution,
particularly through its reliance upon the internal affairs rule of choice of law, maintains state
competition, but, from a neoclassical point of view, may permit elimination of a necessary
incentive to that competition. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
Consider, however, this resolution from the perspective of a Humean baseline:
competition not as generating an optimum, but as maximizing the prospects for accomplishing
individual projects. The Supreme Court's resolution formally precludes uniformity in the sense
that states, by virtue of the internal affairs rule, cannot monopolize the market. Exit from a
"local community" is therefore maintained as a formal possibility. Amanda Acquisition Corp.
v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.). This does not obviate the incentive
problem, so the substantive consequences of the resolution might be otherwise, but ignoring
this possibility is consistent with formalism. See supra notes 183-230 and accompanying text.
Nevertheless, there is a national/local tension within classical liberalism as well. On the
one hand, localism would seem attractive to the liberal so long as exit is plausible: it reflects
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Consider a form of "liberal" understanding of the distinction between
local and national: on a contractarian conception of corporate law, there
is no objection to a corporation operated on principles of democratic
equality with restrictions on alienability; such a corporation may be
created by agreement. There is, therefore, no cognizable (legal) barrier
to a "local" corporate community having these features. Moreover, an
agreement to create such a corporation will be (or at least on individual-
ist assumptions should be) enforced, so that democratic, egalitarian
norms expressed in such an agreement will be the relevant norms in the
event of disputes. The difficulty with this understanding from the point
of view of a transformative communitarianism is obvious: not only is
liberal neutrality inconsistent with the transformative project of a
common good, the contractual solution to community creation assumes
(wrongly on this account) the legitimacy of the individual preferences
that are the building blocks of that solution.
What, however, of a particularized communitarian point of view, one
concerned with localized community? A facilitative contractual solution
might be attractive to such a view; it promises toleration of diversity and
interpretation predicated on the internal norms of particular communi-
ties. Corporate commentators associated with communitarian themes
who advocate contractual analyses, such as implicit contract, as a basis
for these themes,3" and commentators who advocate legal reforms
designed to stimulate contractually created employee ownership may
therefore be understood as adopting an enabling conception of localized
community compatible with liberal or contractarian tolerance. On the
other hand, there is, even within this literature, a tendency to proclaim
that a failure of "private" contracting or of the market to yield business
communities possessing the democratic, egalitarian characteristics desired
a commitment to decentralized, dispersed knowledge, permits, through exit, a measure of
autonomy and, from a national perspective, constitutes a means by which diverse traditions
or ways of life may be tolerated. On the other hand, the classical liberal is as concerned about
the content of local norms as is the communitarian. The tendency of the formalist liberal is
to minimize the role of law and to rely upon local social norms and sanctions, but this
tendency would require a national constraint on local law making capacity. The tendency of
the facilitative liberal is to object to local obstructions to national markets. Perhaps
contemporary "conservatives" are persons with classically liberal commitments who have
overcome this tendency, on the ground in particular that the greater threat is the national
option's tendency to threaten socially generated tradition. See DEVIGNE, RECASTING
CONSERVATISM, supra note 26, at 36-77, 144-52 (reviewing contemporary conservatism's
preference for localism, but treating its economic variation as emphasizing decentralized
markets and corporations as "local").
392. See supra notes 88, 89.
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should call forth a public, collective decision to "impose" them, precisely
on the ground that a communitarian perspective rules out the products
of contractarian processes. 393 Moreover, the communitarian view that
markets are threats to localized community implies substantial possibili-
ties for rejecting market verdicts on the viability of enterprises adopting
the operating principles contemplated in this commentary.394
A rejection both of private contracting and of market verdicts is of
course consistent with those strands of communitarian thought that
contemplate a collective, political creation of a common good, and is
obviously not consistent with a liberal, contractarian conception of
enablement or of tolerance of communal diversity. If liberal, contract-
arian conceptions of the enabling/directive distinction are ruled out, an
implication is that localized community, at least at some point, collapses
into national community: local variation is tolerated so long as it yields
norms consistent with a national, transformative vision.395
2. Centralization and Decentralization
The national/local community theme may be expressed as a
centralization/decentralization theme. It is therefore possible to
understand the localized community strands of communitarian thought
as advocating, contrary to much of what has been said here, decentraliza-
tion. How might the communitarian view be conceived as advocating
decentralization? The corporate communitarian literature suggests that
they may be so conceived in this way: managers freed from the
393. O,Connor, Restructuring, supra note 89 (mandatory fiduciary obligation); Stone,
Employees as Stakeholders, supra note 4 (communitarian remedies for breach of implicit
contract).
394. See, e.g., Morey McDaniel, Stockholders and Stakeholders, 21 STETSON L. REV. 121
(1991) (defending anti-takeover legislation on grounds of protection of stakeholders from
losses generated by market in control); Simon, Social Republican Property, supra note 37
(advocating preservation of corporate relationships from threat posed by markets). On the
threat posed to stable relationships by unrestrained markets, see Jeffrey Gordon, Corporations,
Markets and Courts, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1931, 1971-86 (1991) (invoking KARL POLANYI, THE
GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944) to explain political reaction against markets in control);
Hirschman, supra note 226 (recounting various theories of self-destructiveness of capitalism
and self-reinforcement of capitalism); Kristol, supra note 226 (postulating destruction of
capitalism because of dependence of same on communitarian values of traditional variety).
Both the notion that capitalism is doomed because it tends to destroy its bourgeois moral
underpinnings and the notion that constraints on markets are necessary to achieve production
efficiencies are famously articulated in JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND
DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 1950).
395. Cf Friedman, Politics of Communitarianism, supra note 304, at 332 (discussing
communitarian proposals for decentralized, localized community contradicted by locating
political power in nation state).
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organizing principle of shareholder primacy are free to pursue moral
commitments and to therefore promote valued relationships. 396
Managers are freed from shareholder primacy when freed from the
discipline of capital markets, as by means of corporate constituency
statutes.39  One implication is that ends apart from shareholder wealth
may be therefore recognized. Another is that managers are to have
discretion: freedom from shareholder centrality does not dictate any
particular action or end, it merely enables commitment to norms
conceived in communitarian terms.
There are, however, a number of difficulties with this view. If
managers are to have full discretion, they are free to contract with
providers of capital to abstain from commitment to communitarian
norms.398  This freedom is an unlikely communitarian prospect, as
investor demands are that from which managers are to be freed in these
proposals.399 Moreover, managerial discretion to determine the meaning
and weight of norms of deference in particular contexts is an unlikely
feature of the communitarian position. Proposals to free managers are
often accompanied by proposals to regulate their behavior so as to
conform it to communitarian interpretations of norms."
There is an obvious communitarian reply to these arguments. There
is nothing in the freeing managers proposal or in neorepublican
democracy that requires detailed direction. The objection to centralized
direction may be interpreted as one to detailed centralized direction.
Freeing managers need not be accompanied by detailed regulation of
their conduct and may therefore constitute decentralization: centralized
(governmental) regulation by reference to a norm of shareholder
primacy is abandoned. Moreover, neorepublican democracy can take the
form of a decentralized democracy-the corporation of subparts of it
organized along neorepublican lines.
There is merit to this reply. Freeing managers proposals may be
396. Johnson, Corporate Life and Corporate Law, supra note 231, at 930-36; Mitchell,
Groundwork, supra note 34, at 1487-88. See Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty,
supra note 4, at 2235-45 (treating neoclassical economic theory of firm as an effort at achieving
legal objectivity to be imposed "from the top down").
397. See, e.g., Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, supra note 4.
398. Cox, Indiana Experiment, supra note 6.
399. Lyman Johnson, Sovereignty Over Corporate Stock, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 485 (1991);
Lyman Johnson, State Takeover Statutes: Constitutionality, Community and Heresy, 45 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 781 (1986).
400. See, e.g., Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, supra note 4, at 257-64; Mitchell, A
Practical Framework For Enforcing Corporate Consistency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REv. 579
(1992).
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interpreted as deregulatory moves. Constituency statutes, for example,
can be viewed as variations on a business judgment rule theme. Indeed,
they may be viewed as in effect reallocating entitlements, such that
managers become the "owners" of firms.4°1 The result is consistent
with a market order: managers are free to employ their entitlements in
pursuit of their individually held purposes, projects, or ends subject to
the impersonal direction of markets (e.g., subject to the constraints of the
contractual obligations that may be imposed by investors) should
managers seek capital. Neorepublican proposals may also be viewed as
consistent with spontaneous order. The Humean argument against
detailed planning works well against the centralized economic planning
that was its original target,4°2 but it may also work well against the
hierarchically organized corporation; it may explain both their past
failures and their current efforts to decentralize.4 3 The Humean
argument may therefore support forms of decentralized democracy, such
as worker participation programs. In particular, decentralized neo-
republican process may be a means of retrieving within corporate
bureaucracies the dispersed and individually held "knowledge" thought
in spontaneous order theories to be retrieved through market process-
es. 
40 4
There are nevertheless reasons to doubt that a decentralized
401. Cox, Indiana Experiment, supra note 6.
402. HAYEK, Individualism and Economic Order, supra note 110, at 119-208.
403. O'Connor, Human Capital, supra note 41, at 922-27. Cf KAREN VAUGHN,
AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS/FEMININE ECONOMICS 14-15 (discussing unpublished paper quoted in
Donald N. McCloskey, Some Consequences of a Conjective Economics, in BEYOND ECONOMIC
MAN, FEMINIST THEORY AND ECONOMICS 78 (Marianne A. Ferber & Julie A. Nelson eds.,
1993) (discussing committees as means of gathering decentralized information)). But see
Robert Weissberg, The Real Marketplace of Ideas, 10 CRITICAL REV. 107 (1996) (reviewing
research indicating that collective decision making generates results no better than
performance of best individual member of the collectivity).
404. In economic terms, the point is that a cost of hierarchy is foregone information.
KIRZNER, THE MEANING OF MARKET PROCESS, supra note 141, at 161-62. See generally
JAMES G. MARCH & HERBERT A. SIMON, ORGANIZATION (1958) (emphasizing routine and
habit as characteristics of organization and managerial direction as establishing norms and
rules generating this routine and a bargaining process where goals are not shared); HERBERT
SIMON, MODELS OF MAN (1957) (discussing bounded rationality; subgoal pursuit). General
organizational literature tends to treat organizational behavior as largely independent of
shareholder wealth maximization. A similar conclusion would seem to follow from the
Hayekian critique of directed order. But cf. JAMES COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL
THEORY 436 (1990) (offering depiction of organizations resembling markets in their internal
structure). A distinction is that the organizational literature tends to view this independent
behavior as attributable to arbitrary power to be harnessed, through direction, to egalitarian
ends. See WILLIAMSON, INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, supra note 74, at 206-39 (recounting
and challenging arguments of this type).
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interpretation of communitarian proposals is viable. One is that the
interpretation provides no guarantee that freeing managers will result in
pursuit of communitarian norms, particularly if freed managers remain
subject to markets and, therefore, to an institutional influence communit-
arians deem responsible for material selfishness. There is therefore a
tendency for communitarians to propose renewed regulation: fiduciary
obligation grounded on shareholder centrality is to be abandoned, but
fiduciary obligation to multiple constituencies is to be adopted.4"5
A second reason to doubt decentralized interpretations of communit-
arian proposals is their tendency to possess a mandatory character.4 6
A mandate is not a local product reflecting the advantages of local
information; it is the product of central direction lacking these advantag-
es. For example, neorepublican worker democracies may be unworkable
if interests are diverse. 7 It may be workable if diversity is absent or
subject to moderation. The extent of its workability is dependent upon
the complexities of any circumstance." Mandated democracy ignores
this complexity. Decentralized production may better serve to capture
localized knowledge, but whether it will is itself a piece of localized
knowledge. It is of course possible to deny that there is a problem of
diverse interest, or to deny that it would be within communitarian
institutions, but these claims themselves seem to deny the localized
character of information, or to assume institutional reform of the type
that goes beyond the local.409
What, however, of decentralizing communitarian proposals that lack
mandatory character? Consider, for example, this proposal: reallocate
initial entitlements to favor the disempowered, but then permit free
alienation of these entitlements. 10 Such a proposal would be objec-
405. Mitchell, Groundwork, supra note 34.
406. O'Connor, Social-Economic Approach, supra note 37, at 1540; Simon Social-
Republican Property, supra note 37, at 1403. At bottom, the problem with the communitarian
view of decentralization is that its denial of "self interest" is a denial of the diverse meaning
that decentralization accepts. Such a denial of diverse meaning is suggested for example, by
Rousseau. JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, The Social Contract and Discourse, in 1 THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT Ch. 6 (Gerald Hopkins trans., Oxford 1947). For a similar contemporary view, see
BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY 136-37 (1984). In "republican" conceptions, this
denial takes the form of an anticipated common meaning generated through politics.
407. Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work?, supra note 370, at 1790-94;
Henry Hansmann, Worker Participation and Corporate Governance, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 589
(1993).
408. Hyde, Employee Ownership, supra note 88.
409. Cf. Simon, What Difference Does It Make?, supra note 5, at 1702 (noting that
ambitious versions of economic community require substantial institutional change).
410. David Millon, Law Reform Strategies, supra note 203.
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tionable from an efficiency point of view to the extent that existing
allocations are thought to be consistent with efficiency and would be
objectionable from a formalist point of view to the extent that reformed
allocations entail greater degrees of state decision than status quo
entitlements (e.g., a good cause discharge default term as a substitute for
an at will term). However, the proposal is generally consistent with a
decentralization theme. Indeed, it may be questioned whether a
"communitarian" (as distinguished from one-shot redistribution) label is
appropriate. The relevant objection to this proposal is the credibility of
its commitment to post-redistribution decentralization. As alienability
can be expected to upset the distributive baseline desired by the
proposal's proponents, what is to prevent further redistributive moves in
service of reestablishing that baseline? 411
3. Diverse Community
Localism and decentralization imply diversity. It was argued above
that communitarian commitments tend to undermine diversity. A similar
claim might be made, however, of contractarian commitments. If a
decentralized contractual order generates diversity, why is shareholder
primacy a near universal feature of the contractually conceived
corporation?
An answer to this question is implicit in the contractual theory of the
firm. An enabling (contractual) view of the firm presents no legal
obstacle to opting out of standard terms, so there is no centralized,
conscious, and intentional direction of shareholder primacy. Firm
behavior consistent with shareholder primacy is therefore attributed to
contract. These answers are of course variations on a more general
contractarian theme: contract assumes diversity and preserves it by
limiting legally enforced cooperation to mutual advantage serving
individually held ends. Communitarian proposals instead assume
collective ends that subordinate individually held ends, compelling their
justification and evaluation in terms of these collective ends, and thus
reject diversity.
A difficulty with this answer is that it assumes a particular conception
of diversity incompatible with communitarian conceptions. Communitar-
ians view spontaneous orders-particularly markets-as relentless
generators of a commonality. According to communitarians, markets are
411. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA, 160-64 (1995); cf. STIGLITZ,
WHITHER SOCIALISM?, supra note 47, at 164-66 (viewing credible commitment to non-
intervention as necessary to decentralization).
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threats to diversity because they render "ways of life" that are not
instrumental to material satisfaction, and even the moral norms essential
to the operation of markets, atrophied or abandoned.412 The matter
may be put in terms of the non-neutrality of the "liberal vision." In
corporate law terms, the impersonal direction of the capital market is
said by communitarians to preclude, for example, commitment to the
long-term, to moral norms and to relationships as ends. Diversity in the
contractarian theory is a matter of formal possibility: the theory presents
no state-enforced obstacle to diversity and permits no "force or fraud"
as an obstacle to diversity. Communitarian diversity is a matter of
observed, substantive result. It is also a matter of freedom from
impersonal constraint, for transformative communitarianism's commit-
ment to heroic autonomy implies a further commitment to the capacity
of persons to create a way of life that deviates from that "dictated" by
"social norms" or "market forces." '413
One way of dealing with these opposing contentions is again to treat
them as raising empirical issues. Thus, the hypothesis of the depressing
commonality generated by markets may be opposed by the hypotheses
that ways of life that are in fact valued will survive because their value
will be reflected in markets. A difficulty with characterizing the debate
as raising an empirical issue is that diversity is in the eye of the beholder.
The extent to which markets generate a depressing commonality is in
part a matter of the level of abstraction employed in description. A
second and more important difficulty is that the contending hypotheses
are grounded in distinct and incommensurable normative positions. A
"way of life" not valued in a market-say the way of life of "small town
America" or of "family farm"-is not a valued way of life from a
perspective consistent with a commitment to impersonal direction. It is
of course valued, quite apart from the answers provided by markets,
from a communitarian perspective.
Candor requires, however, a recognition that market orders are
indeed engines of "creative destruction" and that regret follows from this
recognition. It is a silly pretense to claim that the loss of "small town
America" (or the family farm, etcetera) is not a regretted consequence
412. See supra note 226. A diversity theme, grounded in autonomy, is particularly
evident in the communitarian liberalism of Joseph Raz. RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM,
supra note 104.
413. For an example of objection to the "disempowerment" implied by this impersonal
direction, see Alan Wolfe, The Modern Corporation: Private Agent or Public Actor?, 50 WASH
& LEE L. REV. 1673, 1685 (1993).
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of a market order, even though candor should also require recognition
that romanticized views of lost institutions are dubious. What is not silly
is to believe that regret may be outweighed by commitment to imperson-
al order. The notion that ways of life may be effectively preserved
through direction-and in particular through direction by law-is
grounded in heroic autonomy. Rejection of heroic autonomy does not
preclude regret, but it does preclude the beliefs that directed preserva-
tion can be effective or normatively justified.
Consider, however, another way of dealing with the question of
preserving diverse ways of life. Both classical liberalism and the
communitarian strand that emphasizes local community share hostility
to centralized direction. This shared hostility may be combined, in the
manner suggested by some forms of conservative communitarianism, 14
by rendering the central state a minimal one. The notion is that the
liberal state, in its social democratic, welfare, or egalitarian liberal form,
is responsible for the destruction of community, understood as a
localized community of shared culture, of belonging, commitment and
obligation, and as one that excludes strangers. The family, traditionally
conceived, and "small town America," as conceived in its idealized form,
are perhaps paradigmatic examples of the local communities contemplat-
ed. The egalitarian liberal welfare state is thought by conservatives to
be responsible for the destruction by reason of its insistence upon
imposing an ideal of individual autonomous choice-the notion of self-
realization through free choice of goods-"all the way down. 4 1 5
A way of putting the point is that the egalitarian liberal state
generates "too many" rights. 416 Another way of putting it is that
negative liberty-the liberty of freedom from interference-should be
construed as the liberty of localized communities, not the liberty of
individuals within these.417 Such a construction is consistent with a
version of the social construction thesis: individually held projects are
(or should be) the projects of localized community internalized (as
though disciplined education) by its members. Both ways of putting the
point imply a minimal (classically liberal) centralized state. Do they
414. See generally CHARLES MURRAY, IN PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS AND GOOD
GOVERNMENT (1988); CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY,
1950-1980 (1984).
415. Peter Simpson, Liberalism, State and Community, 8 CRITICAL REV. 159, 170 (1994).
416. LOMASKY, supra note 46, at 4-7; cf. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE
IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991) (making the "too many rights" argument
from a somewhat distinct perspective).
417. Simpson, supra note 415, at 167-68.
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imply a minimal localized state? Perhaps, for one version of this line of
argument is that persons are naturally inclined to form localized
communities of this sort, so social sanctions short of coercion may be
sufficient local common goods.41 There is, however an obvious
counter-position, for the common good of a conservatively conceived
localized community would clearly seem to justify state coercion within
it.
The conservative line of argument postulates a form of decentraliza-
tion that may generate a diversity of communities and it supplies the
conditions necessary to community of the type communitarians attack
liberalism for failing to provide and nurture-one of belonging,
commitment, and common or shared goods. The prospects for the
corporation, or at least for the species of corporation that operates
within and is made possible by national and international markets are,
however, potentially grim if localized community is conceived in
geographical and statist terms. The line of argument from localized
community then implies a geographically localized governmental control
of economic production. In concrete terms, it is unlikely that Wal Mart
will be welcomed in a "small town America" empowered by mini-
malizing the central state, at least if communitarian versions of the
(nonconsumer) preferences yielded by such an empowerment are
assumed.
An obvious difficulty with a geographical conception of localized
community is that its realization is implausible in the extreme:
homogeneous localities are things of the past, or, at least rarities.
Perhaps this accounts for corporate communitarian conceptions of
particular corporations as potential "localized" communities. It is,
however, implausible to view a corporation engaged in geographically
dispersed activity as sufficiently homogeneous in the composition of its
"constituencies" to approximate a conservative conception of the
localized community. Moreover, the relationship of a business corpora-
tion viewed as a local community to concerns such as family solidarity
and education of the young is problematic, unless it is contemplated that
the corporation is to become an all encompassing means of organizing
the lives of persons associated with it, and as therefore a contemporary
version of the "company town."
The important point, however, is not the practical problems
418. Charles Murray, The Pursuit of Happiness Under Socialism and Capitalism, 11, CATO
J., 239, 249 (Fall, 1991).
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associated with local community of a conservative type. It is, rather, that
transformative communitarians of the left are unlikely to find conserva-
tive community attractive. A voluntarist version of conservative
community, one that minimized in some degree the coercive authority of
local states, may well be compatible with classically liberal conceptions
of spontaneous social order.419 However, the features of conservative
community that enable diversity among localized communities and
enable the realization of belonging, commitment and shared commonality
are incompatible with transformative communitarianism's egalitarian
commitments. This is most obviously illustrated by the necessary
tendency of local community to exclude strangers-a necessary tendency
if homogeneity is to be preserved and one that cannot be restricted by
central authority without thereby destroying diversity.42° It is illustrat-
ed as well by the tendency of some communitarians to insist upon neo-
republican democracy, an insistence incompatible with local control over
and variation in organizational form.42' It is finally illustrated by the
plasticity thesis itself, for that thesis supposes a capacity to choose
between good and bad norms-between good and bad communities-not
a localized capacity to perpetuate diverse traditions.
This is not to say that similar tensions are absent from conservative
or classically liberal conceptions of diversity or localism. Communitarian
normative limits on the content of decentralized community confine the
potential scope of diversity, but conservative and liberal limitations on
a decentralization theme do this as well. To the extent, for example, that
national markets or democratic forms of localized government4" are
mandated, some forms of "diversity" are precluded, in part because the
survival of some "ways of life" is threatened by competitive pressure.
The point is not that communitarianism is unique in this respect. It is,
rather, that "diversity" is intimately connected to the normative vision
giving it content.
419. See HAYEK, Political Order for a Free People, supra note 118, at 145-47. Notice,
however, that classically liberal limitations on the power of local government parallel
communitarian limitations on the content of local community.
420. CF. Friedman, Politics of Communitarianism, supra note 304, at 293-320 (discussing
how Taylor, Sandel, Walzer, and MacIntyre all modify their "particularism" with universalist
commitments, particularly to equality and neorepublicanism); Gardbaum, supra note 51, at 729
(stating that neorepublicanism is a universalist stance).
421. See Simon, What Difference Does It Make?, supra note 5, at 1702 (advocating
substantial institutional changes).
422. U.S. CONST. art I, sec. 8, cl. 3; Id., art. IV, sec. 4. Cf. Torke, supra note 242, at 27
(recognizing tension between small community and anti-discrimination policy).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The perhaps rare reader who has managed to reach this point in an
admittedly lengthy discourse will have noted that largely absent from this
article is any attempt at an application of the concepts prescribed here
to a concrete legal problem. This is by reason of this article's limited,
(albeit protracted in execution) ambition. The primary point has been
to express skepticism about the terms of debate within "corporate law
theory," not to generate concrete recommendations.
Still, a rather abstract and general type of recommendation is
obviously suggested by this skepticism, one that shares much with
communitarian premises and much with neoclassical conclusions. It is
that the law's role, where law is understood as decision by state
functionaries, is, can, and should be quite consciously limited, not
because such limitation is the best means of achieving an articulable
social state of being, whether this state be one of solidarity or efficiency,
but because the processes of articulate argument prized within contempo-
rary conceptions of law, while unavoidable in moderation, are incom-
plete, feeble and very often perverse means of seeking to control that
social state of being. There is no gainsaying that this recommendation
is political, non-neutral, or even "public" at some level of abstraction, for
the notion of a limited role has a substantive content (of what in
contemporary jargon is a conservative variety) and is implemented by a
type of law, not by law's complete absence. It is also a recommendation
reached painfully by one "partially constructed" by the contemporary
conceptions of law it rejects.
In what way is a legal minimization criterion consistent with
communitarian premises and neoclassical recommendations? It is
consistent with the former in its acceptance of "community," understood
as norms of behavior to which persons attach moral meaning, as essential
to order and in its skepticism about rational calculation as a substitute
for commitment to these norms. It is consistent with the latter to the
extent that the latter tends to yield a conservative respect for status quo
entitlement and distaste for egalitarian redistribution. These consisten-
cies of course render the criterion inconsistent with both communitarian
and neoclassical analysis in a respect that suggests characteristics they
share-in particular their faith in the capacity of intellectual authority to
engage in conscious, purposeful control.
What the legal minimization criterion lacks is what economic analysis
purports to have achieved and what communitarian analysis, if this
critique has been successful, lacks as well: a systematic mechanism for
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generating determinate, consistent recommendations. Legal minimiza-
tion does not obviate the necessity of law, it merely counsels lack of
ambition in law. Nor, as has been conceded, does it avoid a political
commitment. Nevertheless, the dictates of that commitment are less
than clear cut; and formalist criteria for choice among possible entitle-
ment allocations will constrain, but not determine these.
With what, then, does the minimization recommendation leave us?
It clearly leaves a distinction in normative stance, for the justifications it
offers for a debatable recommendation will be as intolerable to a
communitarian as the latter's justifications will be to one attracted to the
recommendation. It leaves otherwise a "mood." While moods will not
pass muster as adequate modes of analysis for the scientifically inclined,
and while this particular mood will not be attractive to communitarians,
it might at least be recognized by the latter as not alien to their method.
